Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Luper was committed to a state hospital in 2014 (Penal Code section 1026) after he was found not guilty of felony vandalism by reason of insanity (NGI). In August 2020, pursuant to the People’s petition, the trial court ordered his commitment extended for two years.The court of appeal dismissed an appeal. Luper’s counsel had notified the court that he reviewed the record of the section 1026.5 proceedings and found no arguable issues to raise on appeal. Counsel and the court notified Luper of his right to file a supplemental brief. Luper did not do so. The court declined to independently review the record for error pursuant to the Wende procedures. The Wende procedures were established in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s “Anders” holding that an indigent criminal defendant in his first appeal of right is entitled to a full review of the record by the appellate court if counsel fails to identify any arguable issues for appeal. Under California precedent, Wende review is unavailable in appeals of orders pursuant to section 1026.5 extending NGI commitments. View "P.eople v. Luper" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a confrontation between petitioner’s gang and a rival gang in which an innocent bystander was shot. Petitioner, the driver of the vehicle from which his fellow gang members fired several shots, was convicted of attempted murder, assault with a firearm, criminal street gang participation with gang and firearm enhancements, for which he was sentenced to 32 years to life. The prosecution's primary theory was that petitioner aided and abetted these offenses, which were the natural and probable consequence of disturbing the peace or simple assault. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal, finding in the published part of its opinion that a person convicted as an aider and abettor was a “principal” for the purposes of Penal Code section 12022.53(e). In 2014, petitioner petitioned for writ of habeas corpus to the superior court, which was denied. In 2015, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Court of Appeal, which also was denied. The California Supreme Court granted review and subsequently remanded the case to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the matter in light of California v. Canizales, 7 Cal.5th 591 (2019). On remand, the appellate court vacated the superior court's denial, and remanded to that court for additional proceedings. The superior court again denied relief in March 2020. Petitioner again petitioned for habeas relief to the Court of Appeal in January 2021, arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence to give a kill zone instruction, a prejudicial error requiring reversal of his attempted murder conviction; (2) allowing him to be liable for the section 12022.53 enhancement as a principal violated his due process right to adequate notice; (3) the failure to instruct the jury on attempted involuntary manslaughter violated his due process rights; (4) cumulative error warrants reversal; and (5) appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise issues raised in the habeas petition. The Court of Appeal determined the kill zone instruction given in petitioner's case differed from that in Canizales. "The instruction in this case, when combined with the prosecutor’s arguments concerning it, presented the same problem that led to reversing the conviction in Canizales. The instruction allowed the jury to use circumstantial evidence to infer an intent to kill the victim when that same circumstantial evidence can support a reasonable inference of no intent to kill." Finding the error was prejudicial, the Court vacated petitioner's murder conviction, reversed the sentence, and remanded for additional proceedings. View "In re Lisea" on Justia Law

Flores entered a no-contest plea to one felony count of committing a lewd act on a child under age 14 (12-year-old victim). The trial court sentenced him to the middle term of six years in prison and denied his subsequent request to recall the sentence.The court of appeal reversed and remanded for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(b). The court rejected an argument that the trial court abused its discretion by choosing a six-year term over probation and stated that the court’s refusal to recall his sentence is not appealable. However, an ameliorative change in Penal Code section 1170, the determinate sentencing law, that became effective January 1, 2022, applies retroactively to this case because the conviction is not yet final. View "People v. Flores" on Justia Law

In 2007, Langi was convicted of the second-degree murder of Martinez. Langi was one of four men who beat and robbed a group that included Martinez, who died after someone in Langi’s group punched him, causing him to fall and hit his head. Langi’s Penal Code section 1170.95 resentencing petition was filed before the 2021 amendment, which authorizes resentencing of persons convicted of murder “under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” Langi contends that another member of his group threw the fatal punch and that, although the trial court did not give an instruction framed in terms of the natural and probable consequences theory, the instructions were ambiguous and allowed the jury to find him guilty of murder under a theory under which malice was imputed to him based solely on his participation in a crime. The trial court summarily denied his petition, finding that a 2009 opinion affirming his conviction established that he was convicted as the actual killer.The court of appeal reversed. Citing the Supreme Court’s 2021 "Lewis" decision, the court concluded that reliance on the 2009 opinion was improper. The record of conviction does not conclusively eliminate the possibility that the jury found Langi guilty of murder on a theory under which malice was imputed to him based solely on his participation in a crime. View "People v. Langi" on Justia Law

The Acting Warden of the California Institute for Men petitioned a Superior Court for authorization to perform electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) on inmate Rudy Terraza. Convicted of first-degree murder at age 17, Terraza was a 44-year-old with a history of mental illness. According to a prison psychiatrist, Terraza has a “schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type . . . characterized by auditory hallucinations, delusions, and impairment in thought processing, volition and motivation, and social functioning, as well as significant mood swings, depression, and mania.” Despite medication and psychiatric treatment, his mental health had grown worse over time, and he had resided in a psychiatric hospital since September 2019. He had been “consumed” by voices, with no desire to socialize or “practice self-care.” He occupied a single hospital room and was unable to function in standard prison housing. A psychiatrist averred that ECT was the “gold standard” treatment for patients like Terraza; seizures produced by the treatment would "help the brain return to normal functioning." The trial court authorized ECT after making several findings required by the Penal Code, including that ECT would be beneficial and that there was a compelling justification for it. In this habeas proceeding, the inmate argued the state constitutional right to privacy required the appointment of a surrogate to make a consent determination for him, beyond trial court findings of ECT’s suitability. Upon consideration of precedent, the Court of Appeal concluded the state constitutional right to refuse medical treatment did not require appointment of a surrogate decisionmaker. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that a court’s authorization of ECT therapy had to include a consideration of whether the inmate, when he or she was competent, expressed any preferences, views, or beliefs that would operate to preclude consent to the procedure. "By statute, such consideration is required for most medical procedures performed on incarcerated persons lacking capacity to consent." Because the statutory balancing test for ECT did not do so, the Court granted the writ to allow further consideration. View "In re Terraza" on Justia Law

A criminal restitution order can account for a car's loss of resale value based on a branded title from theft and this lost value is objectively quantifiable. Defendant pleaded no contest to stealing an Audi and, at the restitution hearing, she assented to a sum to repair the car. The owner of the Audi also submitted an email from a car dealer explaining that, because of the Audi's branded title, it now was worth $15,000 instead of $18,000 to $20,000. Defendant accepted $3,000 as the dollar value of the title stain, but she challenged whether this loss can be part of a restitution order. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's rejection of defendant's argument, concluding that the Audi owner suffered an actual economic loss that the repairs alone did not fully redress. The court explained that the victim cannot regain a pre-theft position until defendant pays the debt. View "People v. Newsom" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's Penal Code section 1170.95 resentencing petition. The court concluded that the trial court properly denied defendant's resentencing petition because the evidence at the section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3) hearing, including defendant's plea to personally using a firearm, supported only the conclusion that defendant was the actual killer. The court also concluded that defendant failed to demonstrate that any error in applying the incorrect standard of proof was prejudicial, and the court denied defendant's claim that any such error was structural. Finally, the court concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that defendant was the actual killer. Because the court concluded that the trial court did not err in denying the petition, the denial did not violate defendant's right to due process. View "People v. Garrison" on Justia Law

Porter was driving a getaway car following the 2008 robbery of a gas station convenience store. When the car was stopped by California Highway Patrol officers, Porter’s passenger shot at the officers. The passenger was apprehended. Porter turned himself in. Porter was convicted on two counts of attempted murder of a police officer and was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life with the possibility of parole. The court of appeal concluded that sufficient evidence supported his convictions for attempted murder under a natural and probable consequences theory.In 2020, Porter sought resentencing on his attempted murder convictions under Penal Code section 1170.95. The court summarily denied the petition on the ground section 1170.95 does not apply to convictions for attempted murder. The court of appeal reversed. During the pendency of Porter’s appeal, section 1170.95 was amended to expressly permit resentencing of certain persons convicted of attempted murder under a natural and probable consequences theory. (Sen. Bill 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) The parties agreed to a remand for the trial court to determine whether Porter has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. View "People v. Porter" on Justia Law

Abdelsalam came to the U.S. in 2017 on a fiance visa. His fiance, Mona, discovered that Abdelsalam had other relationships and was planning to divorce her as soon as he gained citizenship and reported him to immigration authorities. Abdelsalam subsequently physically injured and threatened Mona and burglarized her house. He pled guilty to making criminal threats. The trial court orally told him that, as a result of the conviction, he would be deported. He was also advised in writing that he would be deported. His attorney reviewed the immigration consequences of the plea with Abdelsalam, who orally acknowledged that he understood those consequences, and stated that he would “wait for immigration.”After deportation proceedings were initiated, Abdelsalam claimed he never understood that he would be deported and should be allowed to withdraw his plea. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea, finding it unsupported by the record. A defendant cannot be told repeatedly that his plea will result in deportation, confirm he understood, present no contrary evidence from the attorney who advised him, and then withdraw the plea with the claim that he did not understand he would be deported. View "People v. Abdelsalam" on Justia Law

Mejorado, convicted in 2009 of the first-degree murder of Flores, and of the later first-degree murders of two others, is serving three terms of life without parole, plus more for various enhancements. The jury found true the special circumstance allegation that Mejorado committed the Flores murder while engaged in a robbery. The jury could not determine whether Mejorado or his companion was the actual killer, but necessarily found Mejorado either acted with intent to kill or acted with reckless indifference to human life and was a major participant in the robbery. In 2011, the court of appeal affirmed. In 2020, Mejorado sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court denied the petition without appointing counsel, holding that the jury’s special circumstance finding barred relief.The court of appeal reversed. A case decided after the denial of Mejorado’s motion established the trial court’s failure to appoint counsel under these circumstances was state law error. The error was prejudicial. A special circumstance finding is not a categorical bar to resentencing relief in every case. The facts recited in the 2011 court of appeal opinion do not establish, as a matter of law, that Mejorado acted with reckless indifference to human life during the course of the Flores robbery and murder, as that term has been construed in subsequent opinions. View "People v. Mejorado" on Justia Law