Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a prison inmate, was charged with escape from custody. However, Defendant only broke out of his cell and breached interior security barriers. The jury found Defendant guilty of escape from prison without force or violence. The court of appeal reversed, finding insufficient evidence of escape and concluding that the term "escape" under the relevant statute required an actual escape beyond the outer boundary of the prison facility having custody of that prisoner. The court refused to modify the escape conviction to attempt to escape. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeal correctly determined it could not modify the escape conviction to an attempt to escape, as the record contained evidence that could lead a rational jury to find the element of specific intent lacking.

Defendant entered a plea of no contest to felony vandalism for vandalizing a pickup truck, extensively denting it and damaging the driver's side door. The trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $2,812, reflecting an automotive body shop's written estimate of repair cost. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Defendant's contention that the trial court should have limited restitution to the victim's $950 purchase price of the used truck. In reaching that conclusion, the court of appeal expressed its agreement with a decision by another court of appeal, In re Dina V., but its disagreement with the opposite holding in People v. Yanez. The Supreme Court affirmed after agreeing with the conclusion reached in Dina V., holding that a trial court's restitution award need not be limited to the lesser of the replacement cost of the victim's damaged property or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary, and robbery. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting Defendant to represent himself during proceedings to determine whether he was mentally competent to stand trial. To remedy the error, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings to allow the trial court to determine whether a retrospective evaluation of Defendant's competence to stand trial was feasible and, if it was, to hold such a hearing. If the trial court determined that such a hearing was not feasible or Defendant was incompetent, Defendant was entitled to a new trial.

Defendant Perla Gonzalez (Perla) recruited her brother and her boyfriend to assault Roberto Canas-Fuentes (Canas). After Canas fended off a knife attack and gained the upper hand in the fight, Perla handed the boyfriend a loaded rifle. Canas wrested the rifle away and shot the boyfriend dead. The jury convicted Perla of the attempted premeditated and deliberate murder of Canas and, based on the provocative act doctrine, the first degree murder of her boyfriend. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported Perla's conviction for the murder of her boyfriend; and (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the requirements for premeditated and deliberate first degree murder, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

On February 10, Donald Smith and Christopher Sims were charged with felony first degree residential burglary. Smith did not waive his statutory right to be brought to trial within sixty days of his arraignment, but the trial date of Sims was continued beyond the sixty-day period for good cause. The trial was set for April 27, which meant that the last day for trial, pursuant to Cal. Penal Code 1382, was May 7. On May 1, Smith sought a writ of mandate in the court of appeal to stay further trial court proceedings against him. The court of appeal directed the superior court to enter an order dismissing the information pending against Smith. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under section 1382, when one codefendant's trial is continued to a date within section 1382's ten-day grace period, the state's strong interests in joinder provide good cause to continue the trial for all properly joined codefendants to the same date within the ten-day period; and (2) therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in continuing Smith's trial to a date within the ten-day period in order to permit Smith and Sims to be joined in a single trial.

A high school security officer arrested minor M.M. for vandalism. The county district attorney's office filed an amended petition alleging that the minor had resisted or delayed a public officer in violation of Cal. Penal Code 148(a)(1) and had committed misdemeanor vandalism. The juvenile court found a school security officer was a public officer within the meaning of section 148(a)(1), and found true the allegations that the minor had resisted or delayed a public officer and of misdemeanor vandalism. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that a school security officer is not a public officer within the meaning of section 148(a)(1). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that school security officers, like sworn peace officers, fall within the protection of section 148(a)(1). Remanded.

In 1984 a jury convicted Defendant of first degree murder, attempted murder, attempted rape, and burglary. After a penalty trial, the jury set the penalty at death. The Supreme Court affirmed. In 1997, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, while affirming the federal district court's denial of Defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus as to the guilt phase, reversed its denial of the writ as to the death sentence. After the first retrial of the penalty phase resulted in a mistrial, a second penalty retrial was held, in which the jury returned a verdict of death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the second penalty retrial was constitutional; (2) the trial court did not err by excusing prospective jurors; (3) the court did not erroneously admit victim impact evidence and giving related instructions; (4) the court did not err in excluding proffered defense expert opinion testimony or mitigating evidence; (5) there was no prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) California's death penalty law and related standard jury instructions were constitutional and lawful.

Defendant, a convicted felon, carried a loaded and concealed firearm. A jury convicted Defendant of possession of a firearm by a felon, carrying a readily accessible concealed and unregistered firearm, and carrying an unregistered loaded firearm in public. Defendant appealed, arguing that Cal. Penal Code 654, which prohibits multiple punishment for an act that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law, prohibited multiple punishment for his convictions. The court of appeal modified the judgment to stay execution of the sentence on count three and affirmed the judgment as modified. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because different provisions of law punish in different ways Defendant's single act, section 654's plain language prohibits punishment for more than one of those crimes. Remanded.

After police found Defendant Victor Correa hiding in a closet with a cache of guns, Defendant was convicted of seven counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court initially limited review to the question of whether imposing sentence on more than one of these counts violated Cal. Penal Code 654's prohibition against multiple punishment for the same criminal act. The Court then requested supplemental briefing on the question of whether section 654 applies to multiple violations of the same criminal statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) by its plain language, section 654 does not bar multiple punishment for multiple violations of the same criminal statute, but this interpretation was not applied to Defendant because the new rule may be applied prospectively only; and (2) even so, Defendant's sentence did not violate section 654 because specific statutory authority makes possession of each weapon a separate offense.

Penal Code section 4019 has offered prisoners in local custody the opportunity to earn conduct credit against their sentences for good behavior. For eight months during 2010, a now-superseded version of section 4019 that was enacted during a state fiscal emergency temporarily increased the rate at which local prisoners could earn conduct credits. At issue was whether this former statute retroactively benefited prisoners who served time in local custody before January 25, 2010, the date on which it became operative. The court held that former section 4019 applied prospectively, meaning that qualified persons in local custody first became eligible to earn credit for good behavior at the increased rate beginning on the statute's operative date. The court also held that the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions did not require retroactive application.