Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of seven felony sex offenses related to the molesting of his two stepdaughters, including one count of oral copulation of Jane Doe 1 in violation of Penal Code 288.7. Defendant claimed on appeal, among other things, that his section 288.7(b) conviction must be reversed and the count dismissed because Jane Doe 1 - who was 10 years and approximately 11 months old at the time of the molestation - was not "10 years of age or younger" within the meaning of section 288.7. The court concluded that the interpretation of the statutory phrase "10 years of age or younger" included children younger than 10 years of age and children who have reached their 10th birthday but who have not yet reached their 11th birthday. That is, "10 years of age or younger" as expressed by the Legislature in section 288.7 was another means of saying "under 11 years of age." Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent it concluded defendant was improperly convicted of violating section 288.7(b) with respect to Jane Doe 1.

Defendant and co-defendant were convicted of murder and the jury found true the special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed while defendant and co-defendant were engaged in the commission of a robbery. The jury also convicted defendant of the second degree robbery of two other victims and unlawful possession of a firearm. In connection with the murder and robbery counts, the jury found true allegations that defendant personally used a handgun. In a separate, subsequent proceeding, the same jury convicted defendant of the first degree murder of Harry "Ricky" Byrd, and found true the special circumstance allegation that defendant had been convicted of more than one murder and the allegation that defendant personally used a handgun in the murder. Defendant was sentenced to death and this appeal was automatic. The court ordered that the abstract of judgment be corrected to conform to the trial court's oral pronouncement that the Penal Code section 12022.5, subd. (a), gun use enhancement relating to count 1 (murder of Byrd) was 10 years, and the Penal Code section 12022.5, subd. (a), gun use enhancement relating to count 3 (robbery of Krystal Anderson) was stayed. The judgment was affirmed as so corrected.

Defendant was convicted of the first degree murders of two victims under the special circumstance of multiple murder and lying in wait, of three counts of premeditated attempted murder, and of possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant was sentenced to death. On automatic appeal, the court considered several guilt phase issues and penalty phase issues, and ultimately affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner faced charges of first degree murder with a special circumstance. In compliance with his statutory pretrial discovery obligations, he notified the prosecution of his intent to introduce evidence, through designated expert witnesses, that he suffered from neurocognitive deficits as a result of childhood brain trauma or congenital brain dysfunction. In response, the prosecution obtained an order for his examination by a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and a neurologist chosen by the prosecution. Invoking his federal constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimination, petitioner sought various protective orders as conditions of his submission to court-ordered mental examinations. The court held that, by forcing the trial court to resolve defense claims of privilege prior to trial, without prosecutorial access to the evidence in dispute, the Court of Appeal majority has imposed procedures that were neither required nor justified by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and were manifestly unfair to the prosecution. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment with directions to deny the petition for mandamus.

Defendant was convicted of murder and contended that the trial court violated his right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment by barring his attorney from discussing with him the existence or contents of a sealed transcript of a witness's part of those proceedings. The court held that defendant could obtain relief on that claim only by establishing that the trial court's order affected the reliability of the trial process, a question not addressed by the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

After defendant waived a jury trial, the court found him guilty of first degree murder under the special circumstances of robbery and burglary murder, of robbery, and of burglary. The court also found defendant personally used a firearm in committing each of the offenses and personally inflicted great bodily injury in committing the robbery and murder. Defendant was sentenced to death and this automatic appeal followed. The court affirmed the judgment after addressing issues related to the jury trial waiver; alleged prosecutorial misconduct; cumulative guilt phase error; victim-impact evidence; testimony that defendant displayed hatred; considering mitigating evidence as aggravating evidence; cumulative error affecting the penalty; automatic application to modify the verdict; and challenges to California's Death Penalty Law.

These consolidated cases raised the following question: Under the statutes and regulations applicable here, what showing must be made to postpone the filing of a sexually violent predator (SVP) petition beyond the inmate's scheduled release date to allow for the completion of a full SVP evaluation? Reading Welf. & Inst. Code 6601.3, the court concluded that the statute provided that, to be timely, a petition must be filed while the inmate was in lawful custody. The lawful custody period extended to the release date. However, an inmate could be held for up to 45 days beyond the release date upon a showing of good cause. Petitioners argued that the regulation's definition of good cause was inadequate because it did not require a showing that the need for the requested delay was justified. The court held that the regulation was invalid, but that the Board's reliance upon it was excusable as a good faith mistake of law.

Defendant was convicted of violating Penal Code section 246 by standing outside his truck and shooting a passenger. Defendant argued that because the gun had crossed the threshold of the truck at the time of the shooting, the gun was not "discharged 'at' the vehicle" but was instead discharged "within" the vehicle. Although the court agreed that the statutory text alone was susceptible of more than one interpretation, reliable extrinsic evidence aids to statutory construction convinced the court that the Legislature intended section 246 to apply to a person standing outside an occupied motor vehicle and shooting into it, even if the gun had crossed the plane of the vehicle. Because the court could discern the Legislature's intent, there was no need to invoke the rule of lenity. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant of the first degree murder of the victim, also finding that he had personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense and finding true the circumstance that defendant had committed the murder during the course of a robbery. The jury imposed the death sentence. On appeal, the court addressed pretrial and guilt phase issues, as well as penalty phase issues. The court concluded that the outcome of the trial was unaffected by any errors that occurred and affirmed the judgment of the district.

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder of one victim and two first degree murders of officers. The jury found true special circumstances allegations that the officers were killed while engaged in the performance of their duties and that defendant was convicted of more than one murder. On automatic appeal, the court modified the judgment to correct the sentence imposed on count 1 for second degree murder where the trial court made an error in imposing a sentence of death for count 1, an offense that was not punishable by death. The court affirmed defendant's convictions and death sentence in all other respects.