Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder committed in 1987, and was sentenced to a term of 15 years to life in prison with a two-year enhancement for firearm use. At issue was whether a majority of Division One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal properly applied the "some evidence" standard to a decision denying parole for petitioner. The court concluded that the Court of Appeal majority had again invaded the province of the parole authority, in this case the Board of Parole Hearings. The court also offered general guidance to the Courts of Appeal on inmates' lack of insight as a parole unsuitability factor.

A jury charged codefendants, Michael Allen and Cleamon Johnson, of the first degree murders of two victims, with multiple-murder special-circumstance findings as to both. After Allen waived his right to a jury trial, the court found that he had previously been convicted of first degree murder. The jury returned verdicts of death for both defendants. During the guilt phase deliberations, two jurors reported their concern that another juror had made up his mind before the case was submitted to the jury. After speaking with all panel members, the trial court discharged that juror for having prejudged the case, and for having relied on evidence not presented at trial. The court held that because the record did not show to a demonstrable reality that Juror No. 11 was unable to discharge his duty, the court abused its discretion by removing him. Accordingly, both guilt and penalty phase judgments must be reversed. In view of the disposition, the court need not address defendants' remaining claims.

Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pleaded guilty to cultivation of marijuana and admitted to having suffered a prior conviction and having violated probation in two other cases. At issue was under what circumstances was a trial court obligated to conduct a hearing on whether to discharge counsel and appoint new counsel when a criminal defendant indicated a desire to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea on the ground that current counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The court concluded that a trial court must conduct a People v. Marsden hearing only when there was at least some clear indication by defendant, either personally or through counsel, that defendant wanted a substitute attorney. The court also held that, if a defendant requested substitute counsel and made a showing during a Marsden hearing that the right to counsel had been substantially impaired, substitute counsel must be appointed as attorney of record for all purposes. In so holding, the court specifically disapproved of the procedure of appointing substitute or "conflict" counsel solely to evaluate a defendant's complaint that his attorney acted incompetently with respect to advice regarding the entry of a guilty or no contest plea. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the matter to that court with instructions.

Defendant was convicted of oral copulation in a local detention facility and of the first degree murder of a fellow inmate. The jury found true the special circumstance allegations of murder while engaged in the attempted commission of oral copulation and, in a separate proceeding, of a prior conviction of murder, returning a death verdict. On automatic appeal, the court addressed pretrial, guilt phase, and penalty phase issues. The court found no error, and where the court assumed error, it found no prejudice. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder, premeditated attempted murder, two counts of robbery, attempted rape, assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury, and false imprisonment and kidnapping. The jury subsequently returned a verdict of death and defendant's appeal was automatic. The court concluded, or assumed for argument, that six instances of nonprejudicial error occurred during the course of defendant's trial. The court held that, given the strong evidence of defendant's guilt of first degree murder and the aggravating circumstances attending that crime, none of the trial court's missteps amounted to substantial error and there was no prejudicial cumulative effect warranting reversal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of crimes stemming from two home invasions committed the night before Mother's Day 1993, in the same neighborhood in Torrance. The most serious incident, in which the victims, - a married couple with children - were home during the burglary, resulted in convictions for first degree murder of the husband and attempted premeditated murder of the wife. Related convictions involved burglary, attempted forcible rape, and forcible oral copulation. The jury also sustained special circumstances providing that the husband's murder occurred in the commission of burglary, robbery, attempted rape, and oral copulation. Additional findings were that defendant was armed with and personally used a handgun and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the wife. In the other incident, defendant was convicted of burglarizing the home of a second couple who were vacationing out of town. The defendant was subsequently sentenced to death and the trial court declined to grant a new trial, denying the automatic motion to modify the death verdict. On automatic appeal, the court found no prejudicial error at defendant's trial and affirmed the judgment in its entirety.

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of the first degree murder of his nephew, the second degree murder of his sister, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury also found true the firearm-use allegations and the special circumstances of multiple murder. The jury concluded that defendant was sane and returned a verdict of death. On automatic appeal, the court considered pretrial issues, guilt phase issues, sanity phase issues, penalty phase issues, and presentencing issues. The court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant, a member of the Crips street gang, was found guilty by a jury of the first degree murders of Perry Coder and Gregory Martin and two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The jury also found true the allegation that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the murders and the multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation. After a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. On automatic appeal, the court addressed numerous pretrial issues, guilt phase issues, and penalty phase issues and subsequently affirmed the judgment.

Defendant attacked another inmate and was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon or by means likely to inflict great bodily injury by a prisoner serving a life sentence (aggravated assault by a life prisoner) and assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm or by means likely to inflict great bodily injury (aggravated assault). On appeal, defendant argued that the conviction for aggravated assault must be reversed because that offense was lesser than, and necessarily included within, the offense of aggravated assault by a life prisoner. The court agreed and reversed the judgment because the Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder of Brenda Gail Kenny with the personal use of a deadly weapon. The jury concluded, as special circumstances, that the murder was committed in the course of burglary and rape. Defendant was also convicted of first degree burglary and assault with a deadly weapon on Colleen Cliff, first degree burglary and two rapes of Regina M., first degree burglary and false imprisonment of Regenia Griffin, first degree burglary and two rapes of Julia K., first degree robbery of Joseph C., attempted murders of Phillip Courtney and Howard Long, and prowling. The jury also made numerous findings supporting weapon enhancements. Defendant was sentenced to death. On appeal, the court addressed pretrial, guilt phase, and penalty phase issues and affirmed the judgment and sentence.