Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Petitioner and his codefendant were convicted of burglarizing the home of Bobby Hassan and of robbing and murdering Bobby and his son, Eric. Petitioner and his codefendant were sentenced to death in 1982. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Petitioner later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his trial attorney ineffectively represented him at the penalty phase of trial. In 2002, the Supreme Court issued an order to show cause based on Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court appointed a referee and directed him to take evidence and make findings of fact. In 2014, based on the referee’s findings, the Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Petitioner’s counsel did not provide incompetent representation at trial. View "In re Champion" on Justia Law

In 1986, Defendant, a native of Mexico and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, pled guilty to possessing a sawed-off shotgun. In 2010, Defendant moved to vacate his conviction, asserting that he had not been given the required immigration advisements when he entered his guilty plea. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a certificate of probable cause is not required to appeal a trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate a conviction under Cal. Penal Code 1016.5; (2) when proof of the required immigration advisements is not adequately shown on the record, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the advisements were given; and (3) the evidence in this case supported the trial court’s finding that Defendant was told of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty. View "People v. Arriaga" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of animal cruelty. During voir dire, the trial court denied Defendant’s challenges to two prospective jurors on incompetence grounds, after which Defendant used two of his allotted peremptory challenges to remove the same jurors. Defendant subsequently exhausted his peremptory challenges and unsuccessfully requested that the trial court grant him extra peremptory challenges to remove other prospective jurors he deemed to be objectionable. On appeal, Defendant claimed he was entitled to reversal of the trial court’s judgment because one of the jurors he objected to sat on his case. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) Defendant cured any error that occurred when the trial court denied his for-cause challenges because those jurors were removed with Defendant’s peremptory challenges; (2) the trial court was under no obligation to grant Defendant extra peremptory challenges to remove additional, otherwise competent, jurors; and (3) because no incompetent juror who should have been dismissed for cause sat on Defendant’s case as a result of Defendant exhausting his peremptory challenges, Defendant was not entitled to reversal. View "People v. Black" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder, kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking, carjacking, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. After the penalty phase, the trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court reversed the carjacking conviction and stayed the sentence of kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking but affirmed the judgment in all other respects, including the death sentence, holding (1) because carjacking is a necessarily lesser included offense of kidnapping during a carjacking, Defendant’s conviction and sentence for carjacking could not stand; and (2) Cal. Penal Code 654 required staying of the kidnapping during a carjacking conviction. View "People v. Montes" on Justia Law

In 2006, Culver City installed a red light camera at a certain intersection. In 2008, that camera photographed a car registered to Defendant driving through a red traffic light. Defendant was subsequently convicted of violating the red light traffic law. On appeal, Defendant argued that the City had failed to comply with Cal. Veh. Code 21455.5(b)’s requirements of a public announcement and a thirty-day period of warning notices with respect to the camera that recorded his traffic violation. At issue was whether the statutory requirements pertained only to the City’s first installation of an automated traffic enforcement device or also to each later installation of such devices at different intersections within the City.The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the public announcement and warning requirements apply to each installation of such a device; but (2) compliance with the statute’s requirement of a thirty-day period of warning notices is not a precondition to issuing a valid citation for a red light traffic law violation, and therefore, the court of appeals correctly upheld Defendant’s conviction. View "People v. Gray" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the first degree murder of Monique Cleveland, the willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder of Robert Cleveland, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. After a penalty retrial, the jury returned a verdict of death on the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) any error on the trial court’s part in ordering Defendant to wear a stun belt during his trial was harmless because there was no reasonable possibility that Defendant would have received a more favorable verdict had the trial court not required him to wear a stun belt; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; and (3) the trial court did not commit reversible error in its rulings during the penalty retrial. View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the first degree murder of her husband under the special circumstances of murder by administering poison and murder for financial gain. At the penalty trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Defendant had murdered her infant daughter several years previously. The jury returned a verdict of death, and the trial court imposed that sentence. On appeal, Defendant raised allegations of error regarding primarily pretrial events, guilt trial issues, and penalty issues. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the circuit court did not reversibly err in its rulings and that Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial in this case. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Under California law, unlawfully carrying a concealed firearm and unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm in public are generally misdemeanors but become felonies when committed by an active participant in a criminal street gang, as defined in Cal. Penal Code 186.22(a). At issue in this case was whether possession of a firearm by a felon, a felony, constitutes “felonious criminal conduct” within the meaning of Cal. Pen. Code 186.22 so as to elevate to felonies the misdemeanor offenses of carrying that concealed firearm and carrying that loaded firearm in public. Defendant in this case was indicted on multiple firearm charges. Defendant argued that a violation of former Cal. Penal Code 12021(a)(1) may not be used to elevate the misdemeanor gun offenses charged in this case to felonies because “the same act of gun possession” cannot be used “to both establish the substantive gang charge and elevate the two otherwise misdemeanor gun offenses to felony gun offenses.” The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal, holding that possession of a firearm by a felon does qualify as “felonious criminal conduct.” View "People v. Infante" on Justia Law

Defendant was a life inmate. In 2005, the Board of Parole Hearings denied Defendant parole for the ninth time. The superior court ordered a new parole hearing, and in 2008, the Board found Defendant suitable for parole. In 2009, the Governor reversed the grant of parole. Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging the reversal. While the petition was pending, the Board again found Defendant suitable for parole. The Governor did not review the second decision. Defendant was released from prison subject to a maximum five-year parole term under the relevant statute. The superior court subsequently found that the Board and Governor had acted unlawfully in denying Defendant parole and ordered that he receive credit against his parole term for the period he spent in prison following the Board’s deficient 2005 suitability finding. The court of appeal modified the order to provide credit only for the year-long period between the Governor’s 2009 reversal and Defendant’s release on parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to credit against his parole term for the time he spent in prison between the Governor’s erroneous reversal and his eventual release. View "In re Lira" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder with robbery and multiple-murder special circumstances and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in its entirety, holding (1) no error occurred during the selection of the jury; (2) the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings; (3) changes in the composition of the jury did not violate Defendants rights to trial by an impartial jury; (4) the trial court did not err in instructing the jury; (5) no error occurred during the penalty phase of the trial; and (6) the aspects of California’s death penalty Defendant challenged did not render it unconstitutional. View "People v. Duff" on Justia Law