Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of lewd conduct. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on battery as a lesser and necessarily included offense of lewd conduct. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal, holding (1) battery is not a lesser included offense of lewd conduct; (2) accordingly, if only lewd conduct is charged, the trial court has no duty to instruct on battery as a lesser included offense; and (3) therefore, the trial court in this case did not err in its judgment. View "People v. Shockley" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Burum and James Erwin were charged with aiding and abetting the receipt of bribes by members of a County Board of Supervisors and with conspiring with the supervisors to have them accept the bribes. The People's theory was that Burum, the payor of the bribes, and Erwin, who acted as Burum's agent, used threats and coercion to encourage the Supervisors to accept the illegal payments. Defendants demurred to all of the counts against them. The trial court sustained the demurrers in part. The court of appeals affirmed in part, concluding (1) the payor of a bribe, as a matter of law, cannot aid and abet the receipt of the same bribe or conspire to commit that offense; and (2) the payor's agent stood in the payor's shoes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the status of being the offeror or payor of a bribe does not disqualify that person, as a matter of law, from complicity in the offense of receiving the bribe; and (2) being the offeror or payor of a bribe does not disqualify that person, as a matter of law, from culpability for participating in a conspiracy to accept that same bribe. View "People v. Biane" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and related crimes. Following a penalty phase trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding, among other things, that (1) Defendant's rights to a speedy trial were not violated; (2) Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights of self-representation and to the assistance conflict-free counsel were not violated during trial; (3) the prosecution did not violate Defendant's due process rights under Brady v. Maryland; (4) the trial court did not improperly admit "inflammatory and damning evidence" that compromised Defendant's ability to receive a fair trial; (5) the prosecutor did not engage in improper misconduct; and (6) the trial court did not prejudicially err in its penalty phase rulings. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder and robbery. The jury also sustained a special circumstance allegation of murder in the commission of a robbery. After a penalty trial, the court pronounced a death judgment for the special circumstance murder. Defendant appealed, alleging several trial errors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in, among other things, selecting the jury, making its evidentiary rulings, and instructing the jury during both the guilt phase and the penalty phase. The Court also rejected Defendant's attack on California's death penalty law, finding it to be constitutional. View "People v. Contreras" on Justia Law

Michael Garcia received special education services during his school years. Before Garcia turned sixteen, he was arrested on felony charges and transferred to the Los Angeles County Jail to await trial. At that point, Garcia stopped receiving special education services. The issue of whether Garcia was entitled to special education services in the county jail was raised in several proceedings, including an action before the Office of Administrative Hearings, Special Education Division (OAH). The OAH concluded that Cal. Educ. Code 56041 applied, and because Garcia's mother resided within the boundaries of the Los Angeles Unified School District (L.A. Unified), L.A. Unified was responsible for Garcia's special education while he was incarcerated in county jail. L.A. Unified sought relief from the OAH's decision with the federal district court, which affirmed. On appeal, the court of appeals asked the California Supreme Court to decide a question of state law. The Supreme Court answered that Cal. Educ. Code 56041 - which provides generally that for qualifying children ages eighteen to twenty-two, the school district where the child's parent resides is responsible for special education services - affixes responsibility for providing special education to a qualifying individual who is incarcerated in a county jail. View "Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to possession of methylenedioxymethamphetamine. As part of the plea proceeding, Defendant waived a preliminary hearing and a probation report. After the prosecutor conducted a voir dire of Defendant, defense counsel stipulated to the existence of a factual basis for Defendant's plea without referring to any document to support the stipulation. The trial court accepted the plea. Defendant appealed, contending the trial court failed to establish a factual basis for his plea under Cal. Penal Code 1192.5. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant acknowledged in the plea colloquy that he had discussed the elements of the crime and any defenses with his counsel and was satisfied with her advice, the trial court did not err in finding a factual basis for Defendant's no contest plea based on counsel's stipulation. View "People v. Palmer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count each of attempted murder, aggravated mayhem, and second degree attempted robbery. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for the two murder convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in allowing a certain juror to remain on the jury despite her alleged fear for her safety; (2) Defendant's arguments that the trial court should have granted a new trial and a new penalty phase trial in light of alleged juror misconduct failed; (3) the trial court did not err in excusing for cause three prospective jurors and in failing to remove five prospective jurors for cause; (4) the prosecution did not impermissibly use peremptory challenges to excuse prospective jurors for discriminatory reasons; (5) the trial court did not violate Defendant's constitutional rights by ordering him to wear an electric shock belt during trial; (6) the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant's aggravated mayhem conviction; and (7) the trial court did not prejudicially err in instructing the jury. View "People v. Manibusan" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more. During the trial proceedings, the trial court excluded expert witness testimony challenging the reliability of the breach-alcohol testing machines used on Defendant. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the generic charge but found Defendant guilty of driving with 0.08 percent or more of alcohol in his blood. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court committed prejudicial error in excluding the challenged expert testimony. The Supreme Court reversed and affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the trial court properly excluded the challenged expert testimony, holding that the fundamental reliability of a federally approved, properly calibrated and employed breath-testing machine used in the application and enforcement of a per se statute is a matter that has been determined as policy by the Legislature, and a defendant's expert witness may not invite a jury to nullify that determination in the manner at issue here. View "People v. Vangelder" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of battery with serious bodily injury and sentenced to two years in prison. Before Appellant was released on parole he was required to accept treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). The Board of Parole Hearings affirmed Appellant's certification as an MDO. The superior court determined that Appellant met the criteria of an MDO and ordered him to be committed to the State Department of State Hospitals for an additional year. The court of appeal reversed the judgment classifying Appellant as an MDO and ordered a new hearing, concluding that insufficient evidence supported the finding that Appellant had been evaluated and certified by the personnel specified in Cal. Penal Code 2962, which requires civil commitment of a state prisoner during and after parole if certain criteria are met. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evaluation and certification provisions of section 2962 specify the procedures by which an MDO determination is initiated but do not constitute the statutory criteria by which the trier of fact at a hearing decides whether a prisoner is or is not an MDO. Remanded. View "People v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged for unlawful transportation of marijuana and unlawful possession of marijuana for purposes of sale. In his defense, Defendant claimed he possessed the marijuana lawfully for purposes of medical treatment. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish his intent to sell because the expert who gave his opinion at trial lacked experience distinguishing between lawful possession for medical use and unlawful possession for purposes of sale. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant forfeited his argument that the expert's opinion was inadmissible because the witness was unqualified by failing to object at trial to the witness's qualifications; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant's convictions. View "People v. Dowl" on Justia Law