Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

David Samuel Crawford and A.L. ended their four-year relationship in 2018. Despite A.L.'s firm decision to end the relationship, Crawford persistently contacted, surveilled, and approached her for over four years. His actions included calling, emailing, texting, messaging on social media, contacting her friends and family, sending letters and gifts to her workplace, and showing up uninvited at her home. A.L. reported serious emotional distress due to Crawford's conduct, but law enforcement determined there was no imminent threat of harm as Crawford's actions did not include true threats.The Jefferson County District Court charged Crawford with two counts of stalking under section 18-3-602(1)(c), C.R.S. (2024). The prosecution sought to introduce evidence of Crawford's repeated contacts with A.L. Crawford challenged the charges, arguing they violated the First Amendment based on the precedent set in Counterman v. Colorado. The district court concluded that the prosecution needed to prove Crawford had recklessly disregarded that his repeated contacts would cause A.L. serious emotional distress.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that stalking charges based on repeated actions, including contacts but not their contents, do not require proof of a reckless state of mind. The court reversed the district court's order expanding Counterman's holding and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court clarified that Counterman's recklessness mens rea requirement applies only to true-threats cases based on the content of speech, not to cases involving repeated, unwelcome, and content-neutral conduct. View "People v. Crawford" on Justia Law

Late one afternoon, Eugene Jennings was driving a tractor-trailer truck for his employer, All State Enterprise, Inc., in Custer County. As he negotiated a curve on Highway 69, his truck flipped over and crushed the vehicle in the oncoming lane driven by Timothy Trenshaw, killing him instantly. Jennings reported injuries and was transported to Parkview Hospital, where he discussed how he was injured with an emergency department physician. The physician documented these statements in Jennings's medical records.The district attorney's office for the Eleventh Judicial District charged Jennings with vehicular homicide and careless driving resulting in injury. Trenshaw's sister and son sued Jennings and All State in a wrongful death action. Plaintiffs obtained a police report containing a screenshot of Jennings's medical records, which included his description of the collision. Jennings filed a motion for a protective order, which the district court granted, prohibiting Plaintiffs from possessing or further disclosing Jennings's medical records. However, the district court later reviewed the screenshot in camera and ruled that five sentences describing the collision were not privileged, dissolving the protective order and requiring Jennings to disclose those sentences.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that medical records containing information provided by a patient to a physician during treatment are protected by the physician-patient privilege. The court concluded that the district court erred in reviewing the screenshot and conducting a sentence-by-sentence analysis. The Supreme Court made absolute the order to show cause, emphasizing that the proper method for Plaintiffs to learn about the facts of the collision is through discovery directed at Jennings, not by accessing his privileged medical records. View "Gardne v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Patrick Nkongolo was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault on a child, A.K., as a pattern of abuse. A.K. disclosed to a therapist that Nkongolo had sexually assaulted her over three years, starting when she was eleven. The therapist reported this to Arapahoe County Human Services, which then informed the police. As part of the investigation, the police asked A.K.'s father, D.K., to initiate a text conversation with Nkongolo. During the conversation, guided by a police officer, D.K. asked Nkongolo about the allegations. Nkongolo downplayed the incidents but eventually apologized for upsetting A.K. and admitted to giving her a "friendly kiss."The Arapahoe County District Court reviewed the case and held a pretrial hearing. The court found that the statements made by Nkongolo on November 2 and 7 were voluntary and admissible. However, it concluded that the statements made on November 15 were involuntary due to implied promises by D.K. to keep the matter within the family if Nkongolo confessed. The court ruled that these implied promises were coercive and overbore Nkongolo's will, rendering his statements involuntary and inadmissible.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's suppression of the November 15 statements. The Supreme Court concluded that D.K.'s conduct was not coercive and did not play a significant role in inducing Nkongolo's statements. The court held that Nkongolo's statements were voluntary and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Nkongolo" on Justia Law

Patrick L. Beverly, II sold fentanyl pills to Matthew Bowen, who later died from consuming them. The coroner determined Bowen's death was a suicide. Beverly was charged with distributing less than four grams of fentanyl, with the distribution being the proximate cause of Bowen's death, which carries enhanced penalties under Colorado law.The El Paso County District Court denied the People's motion to exclude evidence of Bowen's suicidal intent, which Beverly intended to use as a defense. The People sought relief from the Supreme Court of Colorado, arguing that the trial court erred in its decision.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that evidence of a drug purchaser's suicidal intent might be relevant to determining whether the defendant's distribution of fentanyl was the proximate cause of the purchaser's death. The court reasoned that the term "proximate cause" includes the concept of an intervening cause, which can break the causal chain if the event is not reasonably foreseeable. The court concluded that a purchaser's suicide by intentional overdose could be an intervening cause, making the defendant's distribution not the proximate cause of death.The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the People's motion to exclude evidence of Bowen's suicidal intent. The evidence was deemed relevant and not unduly prejudicial, as it could support Beverly's defense that Bowen's suicide was an intervening cause.The Supreme Court of Colorado discharged the order to show cause and affirmed the trial court's evidentiary ruling, allowing the evidence of Bowen's suicidal intent to be considered in determining proximate cause. View "People v. Beverly" on Justia Law

Late on the night of August 26, 2022, Arapahoe County Sheriff Deputy Swank heard gunshots while on patrol in Centennial, Colorado. He and other officers arrived at the scene near the Green Tree Hotel and found Sheron Mario Furness and his friend V.M. near a dark-colored Lexus sedan. Furness claimed to have seen a shooter and was looking for his car keys. Officers found the keys in a nearby grass-covered area and observed an empty gun case and an empty bottle of whiskey in the car. Furness was arrested for violating a protection order due to his admitted alcohol consumption. A witness identified Furness as the shooter, leading officers to search the vehicle, including the trunk, where they found a handgun, ammunition, drugs, and other items.The Arapahoe County District Court found that officers had probable cause to search the passenger compartment but not the trunk, as there was no access from the backseat to the trunk. The court suppressed the evidence found in the trunk, leading the People to file an interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that the officers had probable cause to search the trunk based on the totality of the circumstances. The court noted that Furness was near the trunk when officers arrived, the car windows were down, and a witness identified Furness as the shooter. The court held that it was reasonable for officers to believe the trunk contained evidence of a crime. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the district court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Furness" on Justia Law

Bradford Wayne Snedeker was convicted of various fraud and theft charges in two separate Boulder County District Court cases. In the first case, he was sentenced to four years in prison for securities fraud and a consecutive one-year term of work release plus twenty years of probation for theft. In the second case, he was sentenced to fifteen years of probation for theft, to run concurrently with the first case's sentence. After serving the prison term, Snedeker argued that his sentences were illegal under the ruling in Allman v. People, which held that a court cannot impose both imprisonment and probation for different offenses in the same case. The district court agreed that the first case's sentence was illegal and ordered resentencing but found the second case's sentence legal.The Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed the Fraud Case and affirmed the district court's resentencing decision. Snedeker then petitioned the Supreme Court of Colorado for review, arguing that reimposing the original probationary sentence after serving the prison term still violated Allman and that imposing concurrent prison and probation sentences in separate cases also violated Allman.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that when a sentence is illegal under Allman and the defendant has already served the prison portion, the court can reimpose a probationary term because probation remains a legal sentencing option. The court also held that it does not violate Allman to sentence a defendant to imprisonment in one case and probation in a separate case. Thus, the court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment in the Fraud Case and the district court's resentencing in the Theft Case. View "Snedeker v. People" on Justia Law

Roberto C. Silva-Jaquez was convicted in 2014 of two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of attempted first-degree murder, and one count of second-degree assault with a deadly weapon. His convictions were affirmed by the court of appeals. Silva-Jaquez then filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The postconviction court appointed alternate defense counsel, who supplemented the motion. Before the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution requested disclosures related to the defense's expert witness, which Silva-Jaquez opposed.The postconviction court granted the prosecution's request, relying on its inherent authority to manage cases, despite acknowledging that Crim. P. 16 did not apply to postconviction proceedings. The court believed it could order disclosures to avoid surprise and delay, referencing People v. Owens, which discussed inherent authority in managing dockets.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that a trial court may not rely on its inherent authority to order discovery in a postconviction proceeding. The court emphasized that discovery in criminal cases must be authorized by a constitutional provision, statute, or rule. Since no such authority existed in this case, the court concluded that the postconviction court erred in ordering the disclosures. The Supreme Court made absolute the order to show cause and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "People v. Silva-Jaquez" on Justia Law

Patrick Frazee was arrested in connection with the murder of his romantic partner, Kelsey Berreth. Following his arrest, the Teller County Department of Human Services took emergency custody of their daughter. Mary Longmire, a caseworker from the Department, met with Frazee in jail to discuss the child's welfare. During a subsequent meeting, Longmire asked Frazee questions about his background and relationship with Berreth, without providing Miranda warnings.The trial court denied Frazee's motion to suppress his statements to Longmire, ruling that Longmire was not a law enforcement officer or acting as an agent of law enforcement, and thus, Miranda warnings were not required. The court found that Longmire's actions were consistent with her duties under the Children's Code. The jury convicted Frazee of multiple charges, including first-degree murder.The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that Frazee was not in custody for Miranda purposes during his meeting with Longmire. Frazee then petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for review.The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that Longmire was neither a law enforcement officer nor an agent of law enforcement. Therefore, Miranda warnings were not required. The court declined to adopt a bright-line rule that Miranda should apply to caseworkers conducting custodial interrogations involving criminal allegations. The court emphasized that Longmire's primary purpose was to assess the child's welfare, not to gather evidence for a criminal case. View "Frazee v. State" on Justia Law

In February 2017, Adam Douglas Densmore lived in Boulder with his child and the child's mother, Ashley Mead. After Mead went missing, Densmore was arrested in Oklahoma with the child. The Oklahoma Department of Human Services took custody of the child, and caseworker Jessica Punches interviewed Densmore at the jail without providing Miranda warnings. Punches's role was to ensure the child's safety and find appropriate placement, not to conduct criminal investigations.The trial court denied Densmore's motion to suppress his statements to Punches, finding that she was not acting as an agent of law enforcement. The court of appeals affirmed, applying a totality of the circumstances test and concluding that Punches's primary duties were related to child welfare, not law enforcement.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case to determine if Miranda v. Arizona applies when a Department of Human Services caseworker conducts a custodial interrogation. The court concluded that courts must consider the totality of the circumstances, including both objective and subjective factors, to determine if a caseworker acted as an agent of law enforcement. Applying this standard, the court found that Punches did not act as an agent of law enforcement and was not required to provide Miranda warnings. The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Densmore v. People" on Justia Law

Lakewood police agents followed Tien Dinh Pham after observing his vehicle leave a house in a high-crime area. They initiated a traffic stop for a lane change violation. Pham pulled into a parking lot, and the agents ordered him out of the vehicle. After a brief pat down, Pham was directed away from the car, leaving the door open. Agent Kyle Winters then deployed a drug-detection dog, which entered the vehicle and alerted to the presence of drugs. The agents searched the vehicle and found drugs, paraphernalia, and weapons. Pham was charged with multiple offenses, including possession with intent to distribute controlled substances and possession of a weapon by a previous offender.The Jefferson County District Court held a suppression hearing and ruled that the search was unconstitutional. The court found that the officers had no reason to remove Pham from his vehicle and acted improperly by leaving the door open, facilitating the dog's entry into the car. The court suppressed the evidence obtained from the search.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case. It concluded that the trial court erred in finding that removing Pham from his vehicle was improper, as officers may order a driver out of a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop for safety reasons. However, the court agreed that the dog's entry into the vehicle constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. Since the search was conducted without probable cause, it was deemed unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Pham" on Justia Law