Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Ryan Wallace Bonde was sentenced to two concurrent, four-year community corrections sentences as part of a plea agreement. After successfully completing the residential portion, he was transferred to nonresidential status. However, following his arrest for new offenses, his nonresidential status was terminated, and he was resentenced to the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC). Bonde requested presentence confinement credit (PSCC) for the 355 days served during the nonresidential portion of his community corrections sentences, which the district court denied based on the precedent set in People v. Hoecher.The district court ruled that Bonde was not entitled to PSCC for time served on nonresidential status but could qualify for good time and earned time credit. Bonde was resentenced to two concurrent, four-year sentences in the CDOC, receiving PSCC for time served in jail and during the residential portion of his community corrections sentences, along with 153 days of earned time credit. Bonde appealed, arguing that the reasoning in Hoecher had been undermined by subsequent legislative amendments, which now support granting PSCC for time served on nonresidential status.The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that it was bound by the express holding in Hoecher, which denies PSCC for time served during nonresidential community corrections sentences. The court noted that Bonde did not demonstrate that nonresidential offenders face liberty restraints that constitute "confinement" under the PSCC statute.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, reaffirming the holding in Hoecher. The court concluded that nonresidential community corrections sentences do not qualify for PSCC, as the freedoms associated with nonresidential status are inconsistent with the notion of confinement under section 18-1.3-405. The court emphasized that any policy-based changes to grant PSCC for nonresidential community corrections sentences should be directed to the legislature. View "Bonde v. People" on Justia Law

Shaun Jeff Snow was charged with multiple offenses, including first-degree murder and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. He entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for the dismissal of other charges and a stipulated sentencing range of sixteen to twenty-four years. The plea agreement did not mention restitution. At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed a twenty-year prison sentence and deferred the issue of restitution for sixty days. Seventy-eight days later, the prosecution filed a motion for restitution, and 108 days after sentencing, the court entered a post-sentencing restitution order for $13,852.60.Snow did not appeal his conviction or sentence but later filed a motion to waive restitution, which the district court denied. Snow then appealed, arguing that his sentence was illegal under the precedent set by People v. Weeks. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the post-sentencing restitution order, concluding that Snow's Crim. P. 35(a) claim was an illegal manner claim and thus time-barred.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the district court's deferral of the restitution issue in its entirety at sentencing was not authorized by law, making Snow's sentence illegal. The court concluded that the post-sentencing restitution order must be vacated. The court remanded the case with instructions to the district court to enter an order reflecting that Snow owes no restitution. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory requirements for restitution orders and ensuring timely and effective assessment of restitution. View "Snow v. People" on Justia Law

The police were conducting an operation to arrest Anthony Veloz at a motel when they encountered Oscar Jonas Ganaway walking toward the motel. An officer asked Ganaway where he was going, and Ganaway pointed to Veloz's room. A detective then asked Ganaway if he could pat him down for weapons, and Ganaway consented. During the patdown, the detective found methamphetamine and arrested Ganaway. Ganaway moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the initial encounter was a seizure and the evidence should be suppressed.The Arapahoe County District Court granted Ganaway's motion to suppress, finding that the initial encounter was a seizure and that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion. The court concluded that the evidence obtained from the search must be suppressed. The People appealed the trial court's order.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the initial encounter between the police and Ganaway was not a seizure, meaning it did not trigger Fourth Amendment protections. The court further held that Ganaway voluntarily consented to the patdown. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "People v. Ganaway" on Justia Law

Audrey Lee Tennyson committed a series of robberies in 2007 and was charged with fifty counts. He entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery in exchange for a sentencing range of ten to thirty-two years in the Department of Corrections, to be served concurrently with sentences in three other felony cases. The plea agreement included a stipulation that Tennyson was liable for restitution, with the amount to be determined within ninety days of sentencing.The district court sentenced Tennyson to twenty-six years for each count of aggravated robbery, to run concurrently, and deferred the determination of the restitution amount. The prosecution submitted a proposed restitution order within the ninety-day period, which the court approved 136 days after sentencing. Tennyson did not object to the restitution amount within the given timeframe. Approximately ten years later, Tennyson filed a Crim. P. 35(a) claim, arguing that his sentence was illegal due to the untimely determination of the restitution amount.The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Tennyson's claim was an illegal manner claim, not an illegal sentence claim, and was therefore time-barred as it was not filed within 120 days after sentencing.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the district court's failure to set the restitution amount within the statutory deadline did not render Tennyson's sentence illegal. Instead, it constituted an illegal manner claim, which must be brought within 120 days after sentencing. Since Tennyson did not file his claim within this period, it was time-barred. The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Tennyson v. People" on Justia Law

David Samuel Crawford and A.L. ended their four-year relationship in 2018. Despite A.L.'s firm decision to end the relationship, Crawford persistently contacted, surveilled, and approached her for over four years. His actions included calling, emailing, texting, messaging on social media, contacting her friends and family, sending letters and gifts to her workplace, and showing up uninvited at her home. A.L. reported serious emotional distress due to Crawford's conduct, but law enforcement determined there was no imminent threat of harm as Crawford's actions did not include true threats.The Jefferson County District Court charged Crawford with two counts of stalking under section 18-3-602(1)(c), C.R.S. (2024). The prosecution sought to introduce evidence of Crawford's repeated contacts with A.L. Crawford challenged the charges, arguing they violated the First Amendment based on the precedent set in Counterman v. Colorado. The district court concluded that the prosecution needed to prove Crawford had recklessly disregarded that his repeated contacts would cause A.L. serious emotional distress.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that stalking charges based on repeated actions, including contacts but not their contents, do not require proof of a reckless state of mind. The court reversed the district court's order expanding Counterman's holding and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court clarified that Counterman's recklessness mens rea requirement applies only to true-threats cases based on the content of speech, not to cases involving repeated, unwelcome, and content-neutral conduct. View "People v. Crawford" on Justia Law

Late one afternoon, Eugene Jennings was driving a tractor-trailer truck for his employer, All State Enterprise, Inc., in Custer County. As he negotiated a curve on Highway 69, his truck flipped over and crushed the vehicle in the oncoming lane driven by Timothy Trenshaw, killing him instantly. Jennings reported injuries and was transported to Parkview Hospital, where he discussed how he was injured with an emergency department physician. The physician documented these statements in Jennings's medical records.The district attorney's office for the Eleventh Judicial District charged Jennings with vehicular homicide and careless driving resulting in injury. Trenshaw's sister and son sued Jennings and All State in a wrongful death action. Plaintiffs obtained a police report containing a screenshot of Jennings's medical records, which included his description of the collision. Jennings filed a motion for a protective order, which the district court granted, prohibiting Plaintiffs from possessing or further disclosing Jennings's medical records. However, the district court later reviewed the screenshot in camera and ruled that five sentences describing the collision were not privileged, dissolving the protective order and requiring Jennings to disclose those sentences.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that medical records containing information provided by a patient to a physician during treatment are protected by the physician-patient privilege. The court concluded that the district court erred in reviewing the screenshot and conducting a sentence-by-sentence analysis. The Supreme Court made absolute the order to show cause, emphasizing that the proper method for Plaintiffs to learn about the facts of the collision is through discovery directed at Jennings, not by accessing his privileged medical records. View "Gardne v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Patrick Nkongolo was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault on a child, A.K., as a pattern of abuse. A.K. disclosed to a therapist that Nkongolo had sexually assaulted her over three years, starting when she was eleven. The therapist reported this to Arapahoe County Human Services, which then informed the police. As part of the investigation, the police asked A.K.'s father, D.K., to initiate a text conversation with Nkongolo. During the conversation, guided by a police officer, D.K. asked Nkongolo about the allegations. Nkongolo downplayed the incidents but eventually apologized for upsetting A.K. and admitted to giving her a "friendly kiss."The Arapahoe County District Court reviewed the case and held a pretrial hearing. The court found that the statements made by Nkongolo on November 2 and 7 were voluntary and admissible. However, it concluded that the statements made on November 15 were involuntary due to implied promises by D.K. to keep the matter within the family if Nkongolo confessed. The court ruled that these implied promises were coercive and overbore Nkongolo's will, rendering his statements involuntary and inadmissible.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's suppression of the November 15 statements. The Supreme Court concluded that D.K.'s conduct was not coercive and did not play a significant role in inducing Nkongolo's statements. The court held that Nkongolo's statements were voluntary and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Nkongolo" on Justia Law

Patrick L. Beverly, II sold fentanyl pills to Matthew Bowen, who later died from consuming them. The coroner determined Bowen's death was a suicide. Beverly was charged with distributing less than four grams of fentanyl, with the distribution being the proximate cause of Bowen's death, which carries enhanced penalties under Colorado law.The El Paso County District Court denied the People's motion to exclude evidence of Bowen's suicidal intent, which Beverly intended to use as a defense. The People sought relief from the Supreme Court of Colorado, arguing that the trial court erred in its decision.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that evidence of a drug purchaser's suicidal intent might be relevant to determining whether the defendant's distribution of fentanyl was the proximate cause of the purchaser's death. The court reasoned that the term "proximate cause" includes the concept of an intervening cause, which can break the causal chain if the event is not reasonably foreseeable. The court concluded that a purchaser's suicide by intentional overdose could be an intervening cause, making the defendant's distribution not the proximate cause of death.The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the People's motion to exclude evidence of Bowen's suicidal intent. The evidence was deemed relevant and not unduly prejudicial, as it could support Beverly's defense that Bowen's suicide was an intervening cause.The Supreme Court of Colorado discharged the order to show cause and affirmed the trial court's evidentiary ruling, allowing the evidence of Bowen's suicidal intent to be considered in determining proximate cause. View "People v. Beverly" on Justia Law

Late on the night of August 26, 2022, Arapahoe County Sheriff Deputy Swank heard gunshots while on patrol in Centennial, Colorado. He and other officers arrived at the scene near the Green Tree Hotel and found Sheron Mario Furness and his friend V.M. near a dark-colored Lexus sedan. Furness claimed to have seen a shooter and was looking for his car keys. Officers found the keys in a nearby grass-covered area and observed an empty gun case and an empty bottle of whiskey in the car. Furness was arrested for violating a protection order due to his admitted alcohol consumption. A witness identified Furness as the shooter, leading officers to search the vehicle, including the trunk, where they found a handgun, ammunition, drugs, and other items.The Arapahoe County District Court found that officers had probable cause to search the passenger compartment but not the trunk, as there was no access from the backseat to the trunk. The court suppressed the evidence found in the trunk, leading the People to file an interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that the officers had probable cause to search the trunk based on the totality of the circumstances. The court noted that Furness was near the trunk when officers arrived, the car windows were down, and a witness identified Furness as the shooter. The court held that it was reasonable for officers to believe the trunk contained evidence of a crime. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the district court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Furness" on Justia Law

Bradford Wayne Snedeker was convicted of various fraud and theft charges in two separate Boulder County District Court cases. In the first case, he was sentenced to four years in prison for securities fraud and a consecutive one-year term of work release plus twenty years of probation for theft. In the second case, he was sentenced to fifteen years of probation for theft, to run concurrently with the first case's sentence. After serving the prison term, Snedeker argued that his sentences were illegal under the ruling in Allman v. People, which held that a court cannot impose both imprisonment and probation for different offenses in the same case. The district court agreed that the first case's sentence was illegal and ordered resentencing but found the second case's sentence legal.The Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed the Fraud Case and affirmed the district court's resentencing decision. Snedeker then petitioned the Supreme Court of Colorado for review, arguing that reimposing the original probationary sentence after serving the prison term still violated Allman and that imposing concurrent prison and probation sentences in separate cases also violated Allman.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that when a sentence is illegal under Allman and the defendant has already served the prison portion, the court can reimpose a probationary term because probation remains a legal sentencing option. The court also held that it does not violate Allman to sentence a defendant to imprisonment in one case and probation in a separate case. Thus, the court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment in the Fraud Case and the district court's resentencing in the Theft Case. View "Snedeker v. People" on Justia Law