Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, Rodney Dewayne McDonald was convicted by a jury of attempted first-degree murder, second-degree assault, possession of a weapon by a previous offender, and two habitual criminal counts. The habitual criminal counts were based on prior felony convictions from 1994 and 1995. McDonald was sentenced to seventy-two years in prison, and his conviction became final in 1999.In 2007, McDonald sought a proportionality review of his sentence, which the district court denied, concluding that the sentence was not grossly disproportionate. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. Following the 2019 Wells-Yates decision, which altered the proportionality-review process in Colorado, McDonald moved for a second proportionality review, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under the new rules. The district court denied this motion, stating that Wells-Yates had not been applied retroactively by higher courts. The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld this decision, agreeing that Wells-Yates did not apply retroactively.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that the Wells-Yates decision did not announce new substantive rules of constitutional law and therefore did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. The court held that Wells-Yates merely clarified existing law and did not change the substantive reach of the habitual criminal statute. Consequently, McDonald was not entitled to a second proportionality review of his sentence. The judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "McDonald v. State" on Justia Law

In 1993, David L. Ward was convicted by a jury of robbery, aggravated robbery, and three habitual criminal counts based on prior felony convictions. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. Ward appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed his robbery and aggravated robbery convictions but remanded the case to determine if Ward had a justifiable excuse for his untimely challenge to the prior convictions. The trial court found no justifiable excuse, and the appellate court affirmed the habitual criminal counts. Ward's convictions became final in 1999.In 2020, Ward filed a pro se motion for a proportionality review of his sentence under the Wells-Yates decision. The postconviction court concluded that Ward's claims were time-barred under Colorado law. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that Wells-Yates did not create a new substantive constitutional rule that applies retroactively and affirmed that Ward's collateral attack was untimely.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and applied its conclusion from a companion case, McDonald v. People, that Wells-Yates's holdings do not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. The court found that Ward did not establish justifiable excuse or excusable neglect for failing to collaterally attack his prior convictions within the required three-year period. Consequently, the court concluded that Ward's collateral attack was untimely and affirmed the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals. View "Ward v. State" on Justia Law

Pete Paul Martinez was charged with first-degree murder and pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). Dr. Charles Harrison, a psychologist at the Colorado Mental Health Institute, conducted a sanity evaluation and concluded that Martinez was legally sane at the time of the offense. The prosecution did not initially list Dr. Harrison as an expert witness but later included him in a supplemental witness list without formally designating him as an expert. During the trial, Dr. Harrison testified about Martinez's mental state without being formally tendered and accepted as an expert witness.The trial court admitted Dr. Harrison's testimony, and Martinez was convicted. On appeal, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ruling that Dr. Harrison's testimony was inadmissible because he was not formally offered and accepted as an expert witness. The majority held that his testimony exceeded the scope of lay testimony under Colorado Rule of Evidence (CRE) 701. Judge Tow dissented, arguing that Martinez had waived any objection and that any error was not plain.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that CRE 702 and relevant case law do not require a formal offer and acceptance of an expert witness for their testimony to be admissible. The court held that as long as the expert testimony meets the requirements of CRE 702 and the standards set in People v. Shreck, the lack of formal tender and acceptance does not render the testimony inadmissible. The court found that the trial court did not err in admitting Dr. Harrison's testimony and reversed the appellate court's decision, remanding the case for further proceedings on unresolved issues. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Francine Erica Segura was involved in an armed home invasion robbery and was subsequently charged and convicted of multiple crimes, including second-degree kidnapping and aggravated robbery. She was sentenced to 111 years in prison, which was later reduced to 73 years upon her request for sentence reconsideration. Segura then filed a pro se motion under Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(c), claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel and requesting postconviction counsel.The trial court reviewed Segura's motion and denied ten out of eleven claims, forwarding the remaining claim to the prosecution and the Office of the Public Defender (OPD). Due to a conflict of interest, an attorney from the Office of Alternate Defense Counsel (OADC) was appointed. This attorney filed a supplemental motion focusing on the single surviving claim, which was ultimately denied after an evidentiary hearing. Segura appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision in part, ruling that the trial court had improperly restricted the scope of postconviction counsel's representation.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that under Rule 35(c)(3)(IV)-(V), a trial court must either deny all claims in a pro se motion or forward the entire motion to the OPD if any claim has arguable merit. The court rejected the prosecution's argument for a hybrid approach that would allow partial denial of claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, ruling that the trial court violated the procedural requirements of Rule 35(c)(3)(IV)-(V) by limiting the scope of postconviction counsel's representation. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "People v. Segura" on Justia Law

In October 2018, the petitioner and several friends planned to rob alleged drug dealers at gunpoint. During one of these planned robberies, the petitioner and his group approached a victim, K.H., and during the confrontation, the petitioner and another individual fired their weapons, resulting in K.H.'s death. The petitioner was subsequently arrested and charged with multiple offenses, including first-degree felony murder and aggravated robbery.The case proceeded to trial in the El Paso County District Court, where a jury convicted the petitioner on most counts, including felony murder. The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the felony murder conviction, plus additional years for other charges. The petitioner appealed, arguing that his LWOP sentence for felony murder was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence, concluding that the LWOP sentence was not categorically unconstitutional and was proportionate to the offense.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that an LWOP sentence for felony murder for an adult offender is not categorically unconstitutional. The court reasoned that there was no national consensus against such sentences and that the sentence served legitimate penological goals such as retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation. The court also conducted an abbreviated proportionality review and concluded that the petitioner's offense was grave and serious, and thus, the LWOP sentence was not grossly disproportionate. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals. View "Wayne Tc Sellers IV v. People" on Justia Law

The case involves Ashton Michael Whittington, who was accused of providing alcohol to a minor and being complicit in her sexual assault on May 14, 2023. Formal charges were filed against him on December 27, 2023. Under Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(I)(b)(1), the prosecution was required to disclose certain evidence within twenty-one days of filing charges, but they failed to do so within the required timeframe. Subsequent disclosures were made in February and March 2024, some of which contained broken links, leading to communication issues between the defense and prosecution.The Ouray County Court partially granted Whittington's motion for sanctions against the Seventh Judicial District Attorney's Office for these discovery violations. Whittington requested dismissal of the charges, but the court instead excluded all evidence disclosed after the January 17, 2024 deadline from the preliminary hearing. The court did not make specific findings to justify this exclusion, such as willful misconduct or a pattern of violations by the prosecution. The People appealed the sanction order to the district court, which dismissed the appeal, suggesting the matter should be taken up as an original proceeding.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that the Ouray County Court abused its discretion by excluding evidence without making the necessary findings to justify such a severe sanction. The Supreme Court emphasized that exclusion of evidence is a drastic remedy and should be supported by findings of willful misconduct or a pattern of neglect. The court reversed the county court's order imposing sanctions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Whittington" on Justia Law

Police officers questioned Terrence Kenneth Eugene about his involvement in a road-rage incident without informing him of his Miranda rights. During the encounter, Eugene admitted to pushing the other driver but denied using a weapon. His statements were used at trial, leading to his conviction for second and third-degree assault.The trial court denied Eugene's motion to suppress his statements, finding he was not in custody for Miranda purposes. The court noted that Eugene's movement was not restricted, the officers did not use coercive tactics, and Eugene was not formally arrested. A jury subsequently convicted Eugene.On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, concluding that Eugene was in custody during the interrogation and that the trial court erred in not suppressing his statements. The appellate court found that the circumstances of the interrogation, including the officers' tone and the duration of the encounter, indicated a custodial situation.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that Eugene was not in custody for Miranda purposes, emphasizing the public and non-coercive nature of the encounter. The court noted that Eugene was questioned outside his apartment in broad daylight, was not physically restrained, and the officers did not use force or threats. Consequently, the court reinstated the trial court's suppression ruling and remanded the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. View "People v. Eugene" on Justia Law

The defendant, Phillip Romero, was charged with multiple offenses, including assault and false imprisonment, after threatening and attacking his romantic partner. During jury selection, the prosecution used a peremptory strike to excuse Prospective Juror F, one of two Hispanic jurors in the pool. Romero raised a Batson challenge, arguing that the strike was racially motivated. The prosecution explained that the juror appeared disinterested and unfocused. The trial court denied the Batson challenge, finding the prosecution's reason credible and race-neutral.The Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that the trial court had clearly erred in denying the Batson challenge. The appellate court held that the prosecution's reason lacked specific factual justification and objective evidence, and thus, the trial court should not have credited it. The appellate court ordered a new trial for Romero.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the appellate court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court misapplied the clear error standard of review by not deferring to the trial court's credibility determinations. The Supreme Court emphasized that the trial court is in the best position to assess demeanor and credibility. It found that the trial court had implicitly found the prosecution's reason credible and that the record supported this finding. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for consideration of other issues raised by Romero on appeal. View "People v. Romero" on Justia Law

Rachel Ann Niemeyer was questioned by police after her husband suffered a gunshot wound to the head. During the interrogation at the police station, Niemeyer made incriminating statements. She was charged with murdering her husband and moved to suppress these statements, arguing they were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona. The trial court denied her motion, concluding she was not in custody when she made the statements. A jury convicted her of second-degree murder and other offenses.The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The majority held that a reasonable person in Niemeyer's position would not have considered herself in custody, as her freedom of action was not curtailed to the degree associated with a formal arrest. The court reasoned that the hand-bagging procedure did not convert the situation into a custodial one. However, a dissenting judge argued that the police's actions and statements indicated that Niemeyer was in custody, as they would not consider taking her to the hospital until completing unspecified tasks.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that Niemeyer was in custody for Miranda purposes during the interrogation. The court found that a reasonable person in her position would have believed they were deprived of their freedom of action to a degree associated with a formal arrest. The court noted that Niemeyer was alone in an interrogation room late at night, repeatedly asked to go to the hospital, and was physically restrained with zip-tied bags on her hands. The court concluded that the trial court's error in admitting her statements was not harmless and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, remanding for further proceedings. View "Niemeyer v. People" on Justia Law

Richard Lewis was convicted of four misdemeanors, including two counts of unlawful sexual contact and two counts of unlawful sexual contact on a client by a psychotherapist. Initially, he was on a personal recognizance bond, but after his conviction, the county court revoked this bond, citing the seriousness of the case and Lewis's potential danger to the community. The court set a new cash bond of $5,000, which Lewis posted. At sentencing, the court denied Lewis's request for an appeal bond, finding that he posed a danger to the community.The County Court, City and County of Denver, denied Lewis's request for an appeal bond under section 16-4-201.5(2)(a), which requires denial of bail if the defendant poses a danger to the community. Lewis argued that his appeal should be governed by section 16-2-114(6), which mandates a stay of execution and an appeal bond. The county court disagreed, finding that Lewis posed a danger to the community and thus denied the appeal bond.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and upheld the county court's decision. The court clarified that section 16-2-114(6) requires a stay of execution but does not mandate the granting of an appeal bond. The court found no conflict between section 16-2-114(6) and section 16-4-201.5(2), which prohibits bail if the defendant is deemed a danger to the community. The Supreme Court concluded that the county court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appeal bond and discharged the order to show cause. The case was remanded to the county court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "People v. Lewis" on Justia Law