Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Colorado Supreme Court
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In 2008, Kelly James Schnorenberg formed KJS Marketing, Inc. to secure funding and recruit agents for insurance companies. Between 2009 and 2015, KJS solicited over $15 million from approximately 250 investors, promising a 12% annual return. Schnorenberg failed to disclose to investors his past legal and financial troubles, including a lawsuit by the Colorado Division of Securities, a permanent injunction from selling securities in Colorado, a bankruptcy filing, and unpaid civil judgments.Schnorenberg was charged with twenty-five counts of securities fraud under section 11-51-501, with twenty-four counts based on materially false statements or omissions and one count based on a fraudulent course of business. He planned to defend himself by arguing that he acted in good faith reliance on the advice of his securities lawyer, Hank Schlueter. However, the trial court denied his motions for a continuance to secure Schlueter's testimony and excluded Schnorenberg's testimony about the specific advice he received, ruling it as hearsay.The Colorado Court of Appeals vacated seven of Schnorenberg's convictions as time-barred, reversed the remaining convictions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding Schnorenberg's testimony about his lawyer's advice and in not instructing the jury that good faith reliance on the advice of counsel could negate the mens rea element of the securities fraud charges.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the mens rea of "willfully," synonymous with "knowingly," applies to each element of securities fraud under subsections 11-51-501(1)(b) and (c). The court concluded that Schnorenberg's testimony about his lawyer's advice was relevant to whether he had the requisite mens rea and that the trial court erred in excluding this testimony. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for a new trial. View "People v. Schnorenberg" on Justia Law

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Deshawn Lynn Randolph was charged with two counts of soliciting for child prostitution under Colorado law. The charges stemmed from interactions with an undercover investigator posing as a minor on a social networking platform. Randolph offered to arrange sex work for the investigator, who had claimed to be underage. At trial, Randolph argued that he did not intend to arrange sex work but was merely boasting to delay any action until the investigator turned eighteen.The district court instructed the jury that the applicable mental state for the charges was "knowingly," rejecting Randolph's proposed instruction that would have required proof of "intentionally." The jury found Randolph guilty, and he was sentenced to two concurrent nine-year terms. Randolph appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were incorrect. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that "knowingly" was the correct mental state.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case to resolve the appropriate mental state for the crime of soliciting for child prostitution. The court held that the culpable mental state for the crime under subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of the statute is "knowingly," aligning with the mental state explicitly designated in subsection (1)(c). The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, concluding that the district court did not err in its jury instructions. View "Randolph v. People" on Justia Law

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Kenneth Alfonso Gallegos and three friends attempted to obtain vaping products from a high school classmate, L.C. During the encounter, a struggle ensued, and one of Gallegos's friends fatally shot L.C. Gallegos was charged with felony murder, with predicate felonies of aggravated robbery, attempted robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. At trial, Gallegos denied planning to rob L.C. or knowing about the gun. He requested a jury instruction on the affirmative defense to felony murder, which the trial court denied, deeming it incompatible with his outright denial of involvement in the crime.The jury found Gallegos guilty, and he appealed. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed his felony murder conviction, holding that defendants may both deny the predicate felony and raise the affirmative defense to felony murder. The court found that the trial court erred by not giving Gallegos's requested instruction.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that a defendant need not admit the predicate felony to raise the affirmative defense to felony murder. The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, concluding that the plain language of the affirmative defense statute does not require an admission of the underlying felony. The court emphasized that the affirmative defense to felony murder can be raised even if the defendant denies committing the predicate felony, as long as there is some credible evidence supporting the defense's conditions. View "People v. Gallegos" on Justia Law

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The case involves Robert Keith Ray, who was charged with multiple offenses related to the murders of Javad Marshall-Fields and Vivian Wolfe in a drive-by shooting. Marshall-Fields was set to testify against Ray in a separate shooting incident at Lowry Park, where Ray and his associate, Sir Mario Owens, were involved. Ray was convicted of nearly all charges related to the Dayton Street shooting and was initially sentenced to death. However, after Colorado abolished the death penalty, the Governor commuted Ray's sentence to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).The Arapahoe County District Court entered the judgment of conviction and sentenced Ray to death, which was later commuted to LWOP. Ray appealed his convictions and sentence directly to the Colorado Supreme Court, challenging several evidentiary rulings, prosecutorial misconduct, and the constitutionality of his LWOP sentence. He also alleged juror misconduct and sought to subpoena jurors to investigate these claims.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed Ray's appeal and found that while the district court made some errors in admitting certain evidence and that some of the prosecution's comments were improper, none of these errors warranted reversal. The court concluded that the district court properly denied inquiry into alleged juror misconduct under CRE 606(b) and upheld the constitutionality of Ray's LWOP sentence. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction and the commuted sentence. View "People v. Ray" on Justia Law

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Isaiah Ismael Rios was charged with multiple counts, including first-degree murder, related to a series of crimes over eighteen days. His trial, initially set for July 2020, was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial court, following public health guidelines, excluded all spectators from the physical courtroom, providing virtual access instead. Rios objected, arguing this violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The trial proceeded with these restrictions, and Rios was convicted.The Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed the case and determined that the exclusion of the public from the courtroom constituted a nontrivial partial closure. However, it concluded that Rios's right to a public trial was not violated because the closure was justified under the Supreme Court's standard in Waller v. Georgia. The court found that the closure was warranted due to the public health crisis, was no broader than necessary, and that reasonable alternatives were considered.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that virtual access alone does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The court determined that a courtroom closure occurred but concluded that the closure did not violate Rios's right to a public trial. The court found that the closure was justified under the Waller factors due to the public health concerns related to COVID-19. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Rios v. People" on Justia Law

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Ryan Wallace Bonde was sentenced to two concurrent, four-year community corrections sentences as part of a plea agreement. After successfully completing the residential portion, he was transferred to nonresidential status. However, following his arrest for new offenses, his nonresidential status was terminated, and he was resentenced to the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC). Bonde requested presentence confinement credit (PSCC) for the 355 days served during the nonresidential portion of his community corrections sentences, which the district court denied based on the precedent set in People v. Hoecher.The district court ruled that Bonde was not entitled to PSCC for time served on nonresidential status but could qualify for good time and earned time credit. Bonde was resentenced to two concurrent, four-year sentences in the CDOC, receiving PSCC for time served in jail and during the residential portion of his community corrections sentences, along with 153 days of earned time credit. Bonde appealed, arguing that the reasoning in Hoecher had been undermined by subsequent legislative amendments, which now support granting PSCC for time served on nonresidential status.The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that it was bound by the express holding in Hoecher, which denies PSCC for time served during nonresidential community corrections sentences. The court noted that Bonde did not demonstrate that nonresidential offenders face liberty restraints that constitute "confinement" under the PSCC statute.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, reaffirming the holding in Hoecher. The court concluded that nonresidential community corrections sentences do not qualify for PSCC, as the freedoms associated with nonresidential status are inconsistent with the notion of confinement under section 18-1.3-405. The court emphasized that any policy-based changes to grant PSCC for nonresidential community corrections sentences should be directed to the legislature. View "Bonde v. People" on Justia Law

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Shaun Jeff Snow was charged with multiple offenses, including first-degree murder and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. He entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for the dismissal of other charges and a stipulated sentencing range of sixteen to twenty-four years. The plea agreement did not mention restitution. At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed a twenty-year prison sentence and deferred the issue of restitution for sixty days. Seventy-eight days later, the prosecution filed a motion for restitution, and 108 days after sentencing, the court entered a post-sentencing restitution order for $13,852.60.Snow did not appeal his conviction or sentence but later filed a motion to waive restitution, which the district court denied. Snow then appealed, arguing that his sentence was illegal under the precedent set by People v. Weeks. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the post-sentencing restitution order, concluding that Snow's Crim. P. 35(a) claim was an illegal manner claim and thus time-barred.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the district court's deferral of the restitution issue in its entirety at sentencing was not authorized by law, making Snow's sentence illegal. The court concluded that the post-sentencing restitution order must be vacated. The court remanded the case with instructions to the district court to enter an order reflecting that Snow owes no restitution. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory requirements for restitution orders and ensuring timely and effective assessment of restitution. View "Snow v. People" on Justia Law

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The police were conducting an operation to arrest Anthony Veloz at a motel when they encountered Oscar Jonas Ganaway walking toward the motel. An officer asked Ganaway where he was going, and Ganaway pointed to Veloz's room. A detective then asked Ganaway if he could pat him down for weapons, and Ganaway consented. During the patdown, the detective found methamphetamine and arrested Ganaway. Ganaway moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the initial encounter was a seizure and the evidence should be suppressed.The Arapahoe County District Court granted Ganaway's motion to suppress, finding that the initial encounter was a seizure and that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion. The court concluded that the evidence obtained from the search must be suppressed. The People appealed the trial court's order.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the initial encounter between the police and Ganaway was not a seizure, meaning it did not trigger Fourth Amendment protections. The court further held that Ganaway voluntarily consented to the patdown. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "People v. Ganaway" on Justia Law

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Audrey Lee Tennyson committed a series of robberies in 2007 and was charged with fifty counts. He entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery in exchange for a sentencing range of ten to thirty-two years in the Department of Corrections, to be served concurrently with sentences in three other felony cases. The plea agreement included a stipulation that Tennyson was liable for restitution, with the amount to be determined within ninety days of sentencing.The district court sentenced Tennyson to twenty-six years for each count of aggravated robbery, to run concurrently, and deferred the determination of the restitution amount. The prosecution submitted a proposed restitution order within the ninety-day period, which the court approved 136 days after sentencing. Tennyson did not object to the restitution amount within the given timeframe. Approximately ten years later, Tennyson filed a Crim. P. 35(a) claim, arguing that his sentence was illegal due to the untimely determination of the restitution amount.The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Tennyson's claim was an illegal manner claim, not an illegal sentence claim, and was therefore time-barred as it was not filed within 120 days after sentencing.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the district court's failure to set the restitution amount within the statutory deadline did not render Tennyson's sentence illegal. Instead, it constituted an illegal manner claim, which must be brought within 120 days after sentencing. Since Tennyson did not file his claim within this period, it was time-barred. The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Tennyson v. People" on Justia Law

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David Samuel Crawford and A.L. ended their four-year relationship in 2018. Despite A.L.'s firm decision to end the relationship, Crawford persistently contacted, surveilled, and approached her for over four years. His actions included calling, emailing, texting, messaging on social media, contacting her friends and family, sending letters and gifts to her workplace, and showing up uninvited at her home. A.L. reported serious emotional distress due to Crawford's conduct, but law enforcement determined there was no imminent threat of harm as Crawford's actions did not include true threats.The Jefferson County District Court charged Crawford with two counts of stalking under section 18-3-602(1)(c), C.R.S. (2024). The prosecution sought to introduce evidence of Crawford's repeated contacts with A.L. Crawford challenged the charges, arguing they violated the First Amendment based on the precedent set in Counterman v. Colorado. The district court concluded that the prosecution needed to prove Crawford had recklessly disregarded that his repeated contacts would cause A.L. serious emotional distress.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that stalking charges based on repeated actions, including contacts but not their contents, do not require proof of a reckless state of mind. The court reversed the district court's order expanding Counterman's holding and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court clarified that Counterman's recklessness mens rea requirement applies only to true-threats cases based on the content of speech, not to cases involving repeated, unwelcome, and content-neutral conduct. View "People v. Crawford" on Justia Law