Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to a warrant, Denver police officers searched defendant Scott McKay’s home and car. During the search, police allegedly found more than four pounds of methamphetamine and a handgun. The State charged McKay with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of a weapon by a previous offender. In an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order granting McKay's motion to suppress evidence gathered during the execution of that warrant, the State argued the trial court erred in finding the issuing magistrate’s probable cause determination lacked a substantial basis. The Colorado Supreme Court found the magistrate had a substantial basis to find probable cause existed. "Put simply, a fair probability existed that a search of McKay’s car and home would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime." Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. McKay" on Justia Law

In a split decision from a division of the court of appeals, the majority concluded the trial court deprived defendant Levi Hall of his right to a fair trial because the trial court "crossed the line from impartial judge to partisan advocate" when it requested additional argument after closing arguments. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that a trial court presiding over a bench trial acts within its discretion and does not abandon its role as a neutral arbiter when it asks both parties for additional argument about properly admitted evidence before rendering a verdict. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the case remanded with directions to reinstate the defendant’s judgment of conviction and sentence. View "Colorado v. Hall" on Justia Law

The trial court in this case restricted the generalized expert testimony offered by the State regarding the dynamics of domestic violence. After considering the victim’s testimony, the proposed expert opinions, and the reasons why the State sought to educate the jury, the trial court allowed only those opinions which it viewed as having a sufficient logical relation to the facts to be helpful to the jury without violating CRE 403. "Since generalized expert testimony, by definition, seeks to inform the jury about generic concepts or principles without knowledge of the facts, it is almost inevitable that parts of such testimony will not be logically connected to the case. For that reason, the fit inquiry must be flexible. A trial court should certainly not be expected to parse the proposed testimony and determine whether each statement the expert intends to utter is logically connected to a fact in the case. If the generalized expert testimony’s logical connection to the factual issues is sufficient to be helpful to the jury without running afoul of CRE 403, the testimony fits the case." Because the trial court properly exercised its discretion in carrying out its gatekeeping function, and because the standard of review pertaining to the admission of expert testimony is highly deferential, the court of appeals erred in reversing the judgment of conviction of defendant Kerry Cooper. View "Colorado v. Cooper" on Justia Law

The trial court in this case admitted the generalized expert testimony offered by the State on the dynamics of domestic violence, ruling that it would be helpful to the jury and impliedly finding that it passed muster under CRE 403. A jury then returned guilty verdicts against the defendant Dylan Coons, for sexual assault, extortion (involving an unlawful act), extortion (involving a third party), and assault in the third degree. But a division of the court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction, concluding that some of the State's generalized expert testimony did not fit the case. More specifically, the division ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony about some aspects of the Power and Control Wheel (a tool adopted by social scientists to explain the common dynamics of domestic violence), including “certain of the examples of abusive acts that abusers may commit.” According to the division, since this testimony had no logical relation to the facts of the case, it should have been excluded and the trial court’s failure to do so was reversible error. The Colorado Supreme Court held that generalized expert testimony fits a case if it has a sufficient logical connection to the factual issues to be helpful to the jury while still clearing the ever-present CRE 403 admissibility bar. "In evaluating the fit of generalized expert testimony, a trial court must be mindful of the purposes for which such testimony is offered—that is, the reasons why the proponent of the evidence has asked the expert to educate the jury about certain concepts or principles." Because the court of appeals employed a fit standard "inflexible and overly exacting," and because the trial court's decision to admit the challenged evidence was entitled to deference, the division erred. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Coons" on Justia Law

A division of the Colorado Court of Appeals, purporting to apply Colorado v. Morehead, 442 P.3d 413 (2019) announced a new two-step, multifactor test that trial courts would be required to apply when exercising discretion to entertain new arguments and evidence from either party in resolving any remaining suppression-related issues not foreclosed by appeal. In 2007, respondent Tallent spontaneously ran when he saw nearby police officers, eluded the officers in a chase through several backyards, and hid on a covered porch. After the arrest, police discovered an outstanding felony warrant for Tallent. Before trial, Tallent moved to suppress all evidence and statements obtained as a result of his arrest, his interactions with police, and the various searches they had conducted. The trial court issued an oral ruling that the police lacked probable cause for the arrest. At that hearing, the court acknowledged that “perhaps [the State] would want to make additional comments in light of the actual ruling as to the arrest.” The State indicated that it might want to take an interlocutory appeal of the ruling. On July 20, 2007, however, the court, “upon further analysis,” issued a written order concluding that Tallent’s arrest was in fact constitutional. The court thus admitted the evidence at trial. Tallent was convicted as charged. On direct appeal, a division of the court of appeals reversed Tallent’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding that “[b]ecause Tallent was arrested without probable cause, evidence obtained as a result of that arrest should not have been admitted at trial.” Because the trial court relied on new arguments without explicitly applying that novel test, the division reversed Tallent’s conviction and remanded for the trial court to apply the test retroactively. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the appellate division’s approach, which the Court found strayed from its decision in Morehead and imposed unnecessary constraints on trial courts. "Further, based on the existing record in Tallent’s case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in considering the State's new arguments on remand. We therefore reverse the division’s judgment and remand for consideration of Tallent’s remaining arguments on appeal." View "Colorado v. Tallent" on Justia Law

Because the police suspected Rafael Tafoya of drug trafficking, they mounted a camera on a utility pole across the street from his house without first securing a warrant. For approximately three months, the pole camera continuously recorded footage of Tafoya’s property, which included the backyard, which was otherwise hidden by a six-foot-high privacy fence. The camera could pan, tilt and zoom: all features that police could control while viewing the footage live. Police also indefinitely stored the footage for later review. Based on activity they observed from the footage, police obtained a warrant to search Tafoya’s property. During the subsequent search pursuant to the warrant, the police found large amounts of methamphetamine and cocaine. The State charged Tafoya with two counts of possession with intent to distribute and two counts of conspiracy. Before trial, Tafoya moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the pole camera surveillance, including the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant, arguing that police use of the camera violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied his motion and found that police use of the camera was not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Tafoya was subsequently convicted on all counts. A division of the court of appeals reversed, finding that police use of the pole camera under the facts of this case was a warrantless search. The State appealed, and the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari review. The Supreme Court held that police use of the pole camera to continuously video surveil Tafoya’s fenced-in curtilage for three months, with the footage stored indefinitely for later review, constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, it affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Colorado v. Tafoya" on Justia Law

The State challenged the court of appeals decision reversing defendant Gabriel Sanchez’s convictions for two counts of possession. Specifically, the State argued that police use of a pole camera to surveil Rafael Tafoya’s property - which Sanchez routinely visited - did not violate Sanchez’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. Before trial, Sanchez moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the pole camera surveillance, including the evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant based on activity police observed from the camera’s footage. The trial court found that, while Sanchez had standing to move to suppress, the use of the camera did not constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The court of appeals reversed, agreeing that Sanchez had standing, and held that the use of the camera constituted a warrantless search. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the use of the camera constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In this and a companion opinion, Colorado v. Tafoya, 2021 CO __, __ P.3d __, the Court held police use of the pole camera constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Colorado v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Marquis McDonald was convicted by jury of violating the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act ("COCCA"), a class 2 felony for which McDonald ultimately received a ninety-six year sentence in prison. In challenging his conviction, McDonald has focused on COCCA’s requirement that a defendant participate in an “enterprise.” He asserted no enterprise existed: the main evidence presented against him was the theft of a van and a smash-and-grab at a jewelry store. According to McDonald, a division of the court of appeals erred when it declined to interpret "enterprise" as the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the same phrase in the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). McDonald claimed that an associated-in-fact enterprise under COCCA had to have the structural features that the Supreme Court deemed necessary under RICO. To this, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed, and therefore reversed the judgment of the appellate division. The Supreme Court held that COCCA required an associated-in-fact enterprise to have: (1) a minimum amount of structure - namely, a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit the associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose; and (2) an ongoing organization of associates, functioning as a continuing unit, that existed separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engaged. View "McDonald v. Colorado" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Colorado Supreme Court approved the addition of paragraph (c)(4) to Crim. P. 24 (“Trial Jurors”) to permit a trial court, either upon motion of a party or on its own motion, to declare a mistrial at any time before trial on the ground that a fair jury pool cannot be safely assembled as a result of a public health crisis or limitations brought about by such crisis. The issue this case presented for the Court's review centered on how to calculate the new speedy trial deadline following a mistrial (including one declared under Rule 24(c)(4)). The Court held that a mistrial triggered a tolling, not an extension, of the speedy trial period. Further, the Court held that when a trial court declares a mistrial, section 18-1-405(6)(e) required only reasonable delays attributable to the mistrial, not to exceed three months, to be excluded from the computation of time within which a defendant must be brought to trial. In this case, the trial court believed that its March 1, 2021 mistrial declaration pursuant to Rule 24(c)(4) automatically extended the six-month statutory speedy trial period by three months from the date of the mistrial, presumably until June 1. The Supreme Court held this was error. The mistrial merely tolled the six-month speedy trial period for up to three months from the mistrial date. And, because the delay between the date of the mistrial (March 1) and the new trial date (April 26) was reasonable, attributable to the mistrial, and not in excess of three months, it had to be excluded in its entirety from the speedy trial period. View "In re Colorado v. Sherwood" on Justia Law

T.B. committed two sexual offenses as a minor: the first when he was eleven years old and the second when he was fifteen. Because he was twice adjudicated delinquent for unlawful sexual behavior, the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (“CSORA”), required T.B. to register as a sex offender for the remainder of his natural life. Now an adult, T.B. sought review of the juvenile court’s denial of his petition to deregister, arguing that CSORA’s mandatory lifetime sex offender registration requirement for offenders with multiple juvenile adjudications violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. To this, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed: "Mandatory lifetime sex offender registration brands juveniles as irredeemably depraved based on acts committed before reaching adulthood. But a wealth of social science and jurisprudence confirms what common sense suggests: Juveniles are different. Minors have a tremendous capacity to change and reform. As such, mandating lifetime sex offender registration for juveniles without providing a mechanism for individualized assessment or an opportunity to deregister upon a showing of rehabilitation is excessive and violates the Eighth Amendment." The matter was remanded for further proceedings on T.B.'s petition to deregister. View "Colorado in Int. of T.B." on Justia Law