Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent Karl Baker and his business partner sought investors for a company called Aviara Capital Partners, LLC. According to promotional materials that Baker provided to potential investors, investment money would be used to purchase distressed banks that were being shut down and were under the control of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). In conjunction with the purchase of the distressed banks, Aviara would operate a “distressed assets fund” to purchase the assets of such banks. Aviara would then acquire additional banks under a business plan by which Aviara and its investors would collectively own eighty percent of the banks, while bank management, directors, advisors, and employees would own the other twenty percent. In the course of soliciting potential investors, Baker spoke, independently, with the purported victims in this case, Donna and Lyal Taylor, Dr. Alan Ng, and Stanley Douglas. The alleged victims’ investments did not work out as they claim to have been promised, and a grand jury subsequently indicted Baker on, among other charges, four counts of securities fraud, and three counts of theft. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the admission of a deputy securities commissioner’s expert testimony that Baker’s misstatements and omissions were material was reversible error. Because: (1) in presenting such opinions, the deputy commissioner also opined that certain disputed facts were true; (2) such testimony involved weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations, which were matters solely within the jury’s province; and (3) the error in admitting such testimony was not harmless, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that the admission of this testimony was reversible error. View "Colorado v. Baker" on Justia Law

Shaun Lawrence met D.B. at a casino, where she worked as a cashier. During their conversations, Lawrence told D.B. that he ran several successful businesses and that he was looking for people to work for him and for investors to help grow a private investigations business called Advert Investigations (“Advert”). The parties eventually signed two “Investment and Business Agreement,” which provided that D.B. would invest cash money in exchange for an ownership interest in Advert. At no time prior to D.B.’s investments did Lawrence tell her that he would use the money to pay for personal and gambling expenses. Nor did he ever advise her that he had outstanding civil judgments against him totaling over $100,000. D.B. filed a complaint with the State Division of Securities, which subsequently referred the case to the district attorney’s office for prosecution. The State then charged Lawrence with two counts of securities fraud, and one count of theft. The jury ultimately convicted Lawrence as charged, and Lawrence appealed. In his appeal, he contended, among other things, that (1) the evidence did not establish that the transaction at issue involved a security (namely, an investment contract); (2) Colorado Securities Commissioner Rome’s expert testimony usurped the jury’s role as factfinder because the Commissioner was improperly permitted to opine on the ultimate factual issues in this case; and (3) Lawrence was entitled to the ameliorative benefit of the amendments to the theft statute and, as a result, he could only stand convicted of a class 1 misdemeanor because that was the lowest degree of theft that the jury’s verdict supported. The Colorado Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court’s determination that: (1) the agreement at issue here was an investment contract, and therefore a security; (2) Commissioner’s testimony was admissible, and any error by the trial court in admitting that testimony was harmless; and (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the value of the property taken. View "Lawrence v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Aundre Moore was charged with first degree murder for the shooting death of Jamaica McClain. Moore pleaded not guilty and was awaiting trial. He claimed he acted in self-defense, and he intended to introduce evidence of his pre-existing mental illness to help show why he subjectively believed he was in imminent danger and needed to use deadly force to repel McClain. The prosecution moved to exclude evidence of Moore’s mental condition, arguing that it was inadmissible unless he plead not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”), an affirmative defense that Moore has said he doesn’t plan to invoke. The district court denied the prosecution’s motion, reasoning that Moore’s stated purpose in offering the mental condition evidence was to prove the subjective belief component of his self-defense claim, not to prove insanity. Therefore, the court ruled that it would allow, without an insanity plea, expert testimony by a psychologist and a forensic psychiatrist who examined Moore, so long as their testimony otherwise conformed to the rules of evidence. The prosecution petitioned for interlocutory review by the Colorado Supreme Court, which then concluded that absent an insanity plea, a trial court must exclude any evidence that is probative of insanity, as that term has been defined by the legislature, irrespective of the ostensible purpose for which it was offered. “This means that evidence of less-severe mental illness remains admissible, absent an insanity plea, if it otherwise conforms to the statutory requirements and the rules of evidence. The court must parse any proffered mental condition evidence, line by line if necessary, to distinguish what is probative of insanity under this exacting definition from what is not.” View "Colorado v. Moore" on Justia Law

Alma Vidauri was convicted of one count of theft and three counts of forgery in connection with filings she made with the Garfield County, Colorado Department of Human Services (“Department”) between 2009 and 2016 for medical assistance benefits. A division of the court of appeals concluded that the evidence was insufficient because the prosecution had not shown the difference in value between the total amount of certain public benefits Vidauri received and the amount for which she might have been eligible had she accurately reported her household income. Therefore, the division reversed the trial court and entered judgment for the lowest level of theft, a class 1 petty offense. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the division, finding the applicable theft statute placed no burden on the prosecution to establish that Vidauri would have been ineligible for any of the benefits she received. "Because an applicant is not entitled to, and so has no legally cognizable interest in, any benefits until she has submitted accurate information demonstrating as much, we conclude that all the benefits Vidauri received by submitting false information were obtained by deception. Therefore, the original judgment of conviction for a class 4 felony must be reinstated." View "Colorado v. Vidauri" on Justia Law

Delano Medina sought review of the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition by a district court magistrate. Because a district court magistrate was authorized to rule on a habeas corpus petition only when the parties consent to proceeding before the magistrate and Medina did not so consent here, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the dismissal order was entered without authority. Accordingly, the Court reversed that order, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to assign the petition to a district court judge for further proceedings. View "Medina v. Williams" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the court of appeals was correct in holding the trial court improperly admitted lay opinion testimony and, therefore, reversed Justine Murphy’s convictions for distributing methamphetamine and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and remanded the case for a new trial. Specifically, the Court considered whether the trial court properly admitted as lay opinion a police officer’s testimony regarding the conclusions he drew from his observations of a witness’s body language. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the police officer’s testimony regarding the witness’s body language constituted lay opinion testimony. Furthermore, the Court concluded the officer did not improperly comment on the credibility of another witness. Accordingly, the officer’s testimony was properly admitted, the appellate court's judgment was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Murphy" on Justia Law

After dating for a few weeks, Vincent Compos and his ex-girlfriend ended their relationship; the ex-girlfriend obtained a protection order prohibiting Compos from contacting her. Shortly after the relationship ended, Compos appeared at a Super Bowl party that the ex-girlfriend and her children were also attending. Later that evening, Compos arrived uninvited at the ex-girlfriend’s home and let himself inside. The two began arguing, and during this argument, Compos threatened to kill the ex-girlfriend and her family. Compos then pulled out a gun and pointed it at the ex-girlfriend and her son. The ex-girlfriend called police; police were given permission to enter her house. There, police found Compos , and took him into custody. One of the officers spoke with Compos outside a patrol car. The officer asked Compos his name, to which Compos falsely responded “John Rocha” and provided a birthdate. Although the officer was aware of at least one protection order restricting Compos’s activities, and although the officer also knew that Compos was on bond, he did not provide Miranda warnings before asking Compos his name. The issues presented for the Colorado Supreme Court were: (1) whether Compos’s Miranda rights were violated when, after taking him into custody but prior to providing him with Miranda warnings, the police asked him his name; and (2) whether the division below erred in establishing a “new crime exception” to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and applying it here. The Supreme Court concluded the question as to Compos’s name amounted to a custodial interrogation, but, on the facts presented here, Compos’s response was admissible at trial because the question was akin to the type of routine booking question that has been deemed to be excepted from Miranda’s reach. For this reason, the Court affirmed the judgment of the division below, albeit on other grounds, and in light of this determination, the Court did not consider, and thus vacated, the portion of the division’s judgment establishing, sua sponte, a new crime exception to Miranda. View "Compos v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Two detectives questioned defendant Jose Padilla about his involvement in a potential sexual assault. In response, Padilla stated that he did not have sex with the victim, J.M., and that J.M. was extremely intoxicated on the night in question. He later moved to suppress these statements, arguing they were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The district court agreed and granted the motion to suppress, finding that Padilla was subjected to custodial interrogation without the required warnings. The State filed this interlocutory appeal, challenging the district court’s order. Because the Colorado Supreme Court concluded Padilla was not in custody for Miranda purposes, it reversed the portion of the district court’s order suppressing the statements, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Padilla" on Justia Law

In 2019, several parole officers approached a home that they believed was the residence of Susan Damico. Damico was a parolee whose parole agreement allowed officers to search “her person, residence, and/or vehicle” without a warrant as a condition of parole. When the officers arrived at the home, they found Damico in the front yard getting into her car. The officers identified themselves, informed Damico that they were conducting a parole visit, obtained a house key from her, and asked whether there was anyone inside the home. Damico told the officers that defendant-appellant Aaron Peluso was inside in bed. While the other officers entered the home, Damico's parole officer, Brook Hathaway, remained outside with Damico for several minutes. The officers who first entered the home found Peluso in bed and informed him of the purpose of their visit. After Peluso got dressed and out of bed, officers searched the room and found methamphetamine, THC, glass pipes, rolling papers, and a digital scale. Officers arrested Peluso and then searched his wallet, which contained additional methamphetamine. During the drive to jail, Peluso told officers that he had been using methamphetamine. Peluso was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. He moved to suppress both the evidence recovered from his home and the statements he made after his arrest, arguing that the warrantless search of his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights. At the hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that Damico did not actually live at Peluso's home at the time of the search, and Hathaway could have done more to verify Damico's address. The court further found that there was insufficient evidence to determine whether Peluso might have objected to the search once the officers entered his home. The State moved for reconsideration, arguing that the court incorrectly analyzed Damico’s actual, not apparent, authority to consent to the search. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence and reversed the order. "Because parole officers reasonably believed Damico had authority to consent to a search of Peluso’s residence, her apparent authority was sufficient to validate the warrantless search, and Peluso’s motion to suppress should have been denied." View "Colorado v. Peluso" on Justia Law

The State challenged the trial court's order suppressing evidence seized from Defendant Asha Thompson's cell phone on Fourth Amendment grounds. Lakewood, Colorado police were dispatched to the Blue Sky Motel in response to a shooting. Upon their arrival, they found the victim, B.T., unresponsive in a motel room with a gunshot wound to her head. She was transported to the hospital but died a short time later. A witness to the shooting subsequently identified Thompson, who was known to Lakewood police, as the shooter, and the county court issued a warrant for Thompson’s arrest. police received an anonymous tip that Thompson was staying at a specified room in a different motel. They found and arrested Thompson there and then obtained a search warrant to allow them to search the room in which Thompson was arrested. As pertinent here, the warrant authorized the police to seize, among other things, cell phones and other electronic devices and provided that any seized cell phones “may be downloaded and examined either manually or forensically.” Based on this warrant, the police ultimately seized Thompson’s cell phone and sent it to a forensic laboratory where technicians subsequently unlocked it and downloaded all of the data on it. The State contended the independent source doctrine applied to the circumstances of this case, and therefore suppression was unwarranted. Because the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the State did not present sufficient evidence to establish the applicability of the independent source doctrine, the trial court's suppression order was affirmed. View "Colorado v. Thompson" on Justia Law