Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant William Hunsaker, Jr. missed the deadline for filing his Crim. P. 35(c) motion. However, his original sentence was illegal, and the district court corrected it. The Colorado Supreme Court found his late filing of a collateral attack related to the illegality in his sentence, and was justifiably excused. The Court affirmed the court of appeals’ conclusion that one of Hunsaker’s Crim. P. 35(c) arguments was related to the illegality in his sentence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hunsaker v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State charged Kevin Viburg with driving under the influence with three or more prior alcohol-related traffic offenses (i.e., felony DUI). Prior to trial, Viburg moved to treat his prior convictions as an element of the crime, which would require the jury to find them beyond a reasonable doubt. The court denied the motion, ruling that Viburg’s prior convictions were a sentence enhancer that need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence at a hearing after a trial on the merits. As a result, evidence of his prior convictions was not introduced to the jury; instead, at trial, the court instructed the jury only on the elements of misdemeanor DUI. The jury then found Viburg guilty of misdemeanor DUI. Subsequently, at a post-conviction hearing, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Viburg had three prior alcohol-related traffic offenses, and it entered a conviction for felony DUI. On direct appeal, a division of the court of appeals reversed, holding that prior convictions were an element of felony DUI (meaning they must be presented to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt). The appeals court further stated that if the prosecution sought retrial and Viburg raised a double jeopardy defense, the trial court had to rule on the defense; it declined to express an opinion on the merits of the defense. The Colorado Supreme Court held double jeopardy did not bar retrial because the defendant was not previously acquitted of felony DUI. View "In re Viburg v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Eddie Johnson died of natural causes before completing the direct appeal of his criminal convictions in this case. A division of the court of appeals applied the doctrine of abatement ab initio to vacate Johnson’s underlying convictions and a large restitution order associated with them. The prosecution claimed that certain statutory changes and policy considerations should have allowed the district court’s restitution order to survive Johnson’s death. The Colorado Supreme Court found that because the General Assembly did not clearly abrogate the doctrine as to restitution, the Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision in Colorado v. Johnson, 487 P.3d 1262, vacating the district court’s restitution order. View "Colorado v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant Jonathan Roddy and his ex-wife have been embroiled in post-decree domestic-relations litigation for more than a decade. In exchange for dismissal of the original criminal charges, Roddy pled guilty to first degree criminal trespass, a crime that he committed in his ex-wife’s home. He received a deferred judgment and sentence, and the court ordered him to pay restitution to his ex-wife as the victim. Roddy contended that the district court erred when it: (1) entered the restitution order beyond the ninety-one-day time limit prescribed by statute; and (2) included losses proximately caused by conduct related to the dismissed charges as well as the charge to which he pled guilty. A division of the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to enter the order after the ninety-one-day limit had expired. But the division also limited restitution to only “the losses caused by the conduct to which [Roddy] pleaded guilty.” The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that though the trial court exceeded the statutory ninety-one-day period for ordering restitution, the trial court made a good cause finding, albeit, well after the ninety-one-day window had closed. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for findings on whether the trial court’s late good cause finding was adequate in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Colorado v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, __ P.3d __. View "Colorado v. Roddy" on Justia Law

A jury found Benjamin Weeks guilty of aggravated robbery and felony menacing. At his sentencing hearing, which was held approximately a month later, the prosecutor asked that the issue of restitution “remain open.” Notably, the prosecutor informed the court that he’d determined he would be seeking restitution but hadn’t filed a motion yet. He promised to follow up with a written motion within ninety-one days. Defense counsel indicated that he would address restitution “when there’s a motion filed.” The court granted the prosecutor’s request, reserved the issue of restitution for ninety-one days, and set a briefing schedule. The prosecutor filed a motion for restitution for the amount stolen in the robbery, plus prejudgment interest. The prosecutor informed the court he was still investigating whether there were grounds to seek additional restitution. Twenty-three days later, Weeks filed a response in which he argued the actual losses were less than was proposed by the prosecution, and that the issue of restitution should not remain open indefinitely. At a restitution hearing eight months later, Weeks countered the prosecution’s restitution request by contending the court no longer had jurisdiction to require him to pay since the ninety-one day deadline in C.R.S. 18-1.3-603(1)(b). The trial court ultimately rejected Weeks’ contention and ordered restitution. The Colorado Supreme Court determined the trial court issued its order without making an express and timely finding of good cause for extending the deadline. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that by the trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution, it lacked authority to do so. View "Colorado v. Weeks" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a warrant, Denver police officers searched defendant Scott McKay’s home and car. During the search, police allegedly found more than four pounds of methamphetamine and a handgun. The State charged McKay with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of a weapon by a previous offender. In an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order granting McKay's motion to suppress evidence gathered during the execution of that warrant, the State argued the trial court erred in finding the issuing magistrate’s probable cause determination lacked a substantial basis. The Colorado Supreme Court found the magistrate had a substantial basis to find probable cause existed. "Put simply, a fair probability existed that a search of McKay’s car and home would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime." Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. McKay" on Justia Law

In a split decision from a division of the court of appeals, the majority concluded the trial court deprived defendant Levi Hall of his right to a fair trial because the trial court "crossed the line from impartial judge to partisan advocate" when it requested additional argument after closing arguments. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that a trial court presiding over a bench trial acts within its discretion and does not abandon its role as a neutral arbiter when it asks both parties for additional argument about properly admitted evidence before rendering a verdict. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the case remanded with directions to reinstate the defendant’s judgment of conviction and sentence. View "Colorado v. Hall" on Justia Law

The trial court in this case restricted the generalized expert testimony offered by the State regarding the dynamics of domestic violence. After considering the victim’s testimony, the proposed expert opinions, and the reasons why the State sought to educate the jury, the trial court allowed only those opinions which it viewed as having a sufficient logical relation to the facts to be helpful to the jury without violating CRE 403. "Since generalized expert testimony, by definition, seeks to inform the jury about generic concepts or principles without knowledge of the facts, it is almost inevitable that parts of such testimony will not be logically connected to the case. For that reason, the fit inquiry must be flexible. A trial court should certainly not be expected to parse the proposed testimony and determine whether each statement the expert intends to utter is logically connected to a fact in the case. If the generalized expert testimony’s logical connection to the factual issues is sufficient to be helpful to the jury without running afoul of CRE 403, the testimony fits the case." Because the trial court properly exercised its discretion in carrying out its gatekeeping function, and because the standard of review pertaining to the admission of expert testimony is highly deferential, the court of appeals erred in reversing the judgment of conviction of defendant Kerry Cooper. View "Colorado v. Cooper" on Justia Law

The trial court in this case admitted the generalized expert testimony offered by the State on the dynamics of domestic violence, ruling that it would be helpful to the jury and impliedly finding that it passed muster under CRE 403. A jury then returned guilty verdicts against the defendant Dylan Coons, for sexual assault, extortion (involving an unlawful act), extortion (involving a third party), and assault in the third degree. But a division of the court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction, concluding that some of the State's generalized expert testimony did not fit the case. More specifically, the division ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony about some aspects of the Power and Control Wheel (a tool adopted by social scientists to explain the common dynamics of domestic violence), including “certain of the examples of abusive acts that abusers may commit.” According to the division, since this testimony had no logical relation to the facts of the case, it should have been excluded and the trial court’s failure to do so was reversible error. The Colorado Supreme Court held that generalized expert testimony fits a case if it has a sufficient logical connection to the factual issues to be helpful to the jury while still clearing the ever-present CRE 403 admissibility bar. "In evaluating the fit of generalized expert testimony, a trial court must be mindful of the purposes for which such testimony is offered—that is, the reasons why the proponent of the evidence has asked the expert to educate the jury about certain concepts or principles." Because the court of appeals employed a fit standard "inflexible and overly exacting," and because the trial court's decision to admit the challenged evidence was entitled to deference, the division erred. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Coons" on Justia Law

A division of the Colorado Court of Appeals, purporting to apply Colorado v. Morehead, 442 P.3d 413 (2019) announced a new two-step, multifactor test that trial courts would be required to apply when exercising discretion to entertain new arguments and evidence from either party in resolving any remaining suppression-related issues not foreclosed by appeal. In 2007, respondent Tallent spontaneously ran when he saw nearby police officers, eluded the officers in a chase through several backyards, and hid on a covered porch. After the arrest, police discovered an outstanding felony warrant for Tallent. Before trial, Tallent moved to suppress all evidence and statements obtained as a result of his arrest, his interactions with police, and the various searches they had conducted. The trial court issued an oral ruling that the police lacked probable cause for the arrest. At that hearing, the court acknowledged that “perhaps [the State] would want to make additional comments in light of the actual ruling as to the arrest.” The State indicated that it might want to take an interlocutory appeal of the ruling. On July 20, 2007, however, the court, “upon further analysis,” issued a written order concluding that Tallent’s arrest was in fact constitutional. The court thus admitted the evidence at trial. Tallent was convicted as charged. On direct appeal, a division of the court of appeals reversed Tallent’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding that “[b]ecause Tallent was arrested without probable cause, evidence obtained as a result of that arrest should not have been admitted at trial.” Because the trial court relied on new arguments without explicitly applying that novel test, the division reversed Tallent’s conviction and remanded for the trial court to apply the test retroactively. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the appellate division’s approach, which the Court found strayed from its decision in Morehead and imposed unnecessary constraints on trial courts. "Further, based on the existing record in Tallent’s case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in considering the State's new arguments on remand. We therefore reverse the division’s judgment and remand for consideration of Tallent’s remaining arguments on appeal." View "Colorado v. Tallent" on Justia Law