Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After Marcus Perez led police on a "lengthy foot pursuit," officers found two live shotgun shells in Perez's pocket. Without giving Perez Miranda warnings, the officer asked him, “Where’s the gun?” Perez answered that he had thrown the gun away. At a suppression hearing, Perez argued that his answer should have been suppressed because he was not Mirandized before the officer questioned him. The trial court disagreed, finding that the public safety exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), applied. A jury convicted Perez of second-degree assault on a peace officer and four counts of possession of a dangerous weapon by a previous offender (“POWPO”). Perez appealed, contending that the public safety exception did not apply. The court of appeals agreed but deemed the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the convictions. Under the facts of this case, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the public safety exception applied, and the arresting officer was not required to give Miranda warnings before inquiring about the gun's location. View "Perez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In two cases consolidated for review, the common issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether a a criminal defendant who was unable to post bond on a class 4 felony charge was “in custody” and therefore entitled to a preliminary hearing on that charge under section 16-5-301(1)(b)(II), C.R.S. (2020), and Crim. P. 7(h)(1), even if that defendant was also in custody for separate, unrelated offenses. While serving sentences in the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) for unrelated offenses, David Subjack and Darryl Lynch were each arrested and charged with possession of contraband in the first degree, which is a class 4 felony. In both cases, the court set cash-only bonds, which neither defendant posted. Subjack and Lynch each requested a preliminary hearing pursuant to section 16-5-301(1)(b)(II) and Crim. P. 7(h)(1). The district court denied their requests, reasoning that the current charges did not form the “primary basis” of their custody. The Supreme Court concluded defendants were “in custody for the offense for which the preliminary hearing is requested” and therefore entitled to a preliminary hearing on their current charges. View "In re Colorado v. Subjack" on Justia Law

In 2015, Phillip Ross visited a website showing advertisements posted by individuals willing to perform sexual acts in exchange for money. Two girls under the age of eighteen, C.W. and M.O., listed varying ages in their advertisements, but consistently indicated that they were at least nineteen years old, and that any activities would be between two adults. Ross sent the girls sexually explicit text messages and negotiated the price he would pay in exchange for sexual acts. During his communications with M.O., Ross specifically inquired about her age, and she replied that she was twenty years old. Though Ross did not ask C.W. her age, her photograph appeared in the advertisements. When he was subsequently arrested, Ross admitted to texting the girls and agreeing to pay for sexual acts but maintained that he had not intended to solicit them for the purpose of child prostitution. In this appeal, the State asked the Colorado Supreme Court to determine whether the phrase “for the purpose of” in two statutory provisions defining the crime of soliciting for child prostitution, sections 18-7-402(1)(a), (b), C.R.S. (2020), described a culpable mental state. A division of the court of appeals said it does and then equated the phrase with the culpable mental state of intentionally or with intent. The State contended the phrase “for the purpose of” in subsections (a) and (b) did not describe a culpable mental state or mens rea, but instead qualified the prohibited conduct or the actus reus - soliciting another or arranging (or offering to arrange) a meeting - by specifying the reason for which such conduct must have been undertaken: for the purpose of prostitution of a child or by a child. Contrary to the State's assertion, the Supreme Court determined the lower court correctly determined that neither the victim’s age nor the defendant’s knowledge of, or belief concerning, the victim’s age was an element of soliciting for child prostitution. The Supreme Court concluded that while section 18-7-407, C.R.S. (2020), precluded a defendant from raising a defense based on either his lack of knowledge of the child’s age or his reasonable belief that the child was an adult, it did not relieve the State of its burden of proof under subsections (a) and (b). "Thus, section 18-7-407 does not give the People a pass on their obligation to prove that, in soliciting another or arranging (or offering to arrange) a meeting, the defendant’s purpose was child prostitution." View "Colorado v. Ross" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Garcia was convicted of violating a protection order. On appeal, the district court concluded the county court violated Garcia’s confrontation right by admitting a notarized return of service into evidence at trial without the process server testifying. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the return of service wasn’t testimonial hearsay, and therefore its admission didn’t violate Garcia’s constitutional right to confrontation. The district court’s judgment was reversed. View "Colorado v. Garcia" on Justia Law

As Marcus Perez was being arrested after a lengthy foot pursuit, the arresting officer found two live shotgun shells in Perez’s pocket. Without giving Perez Miranda warnings, the officer asked him, “Where’s the gun?” Perez answered that he had thrown the gun away. At a suppression hearing, Perez argued that his answer should have been suppressed because he was not Mirandized before the officer questioned him. The trial court disagreed, finding that the public safety exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), applied. A jury convicted Perez of second-degree assault on a peace officer and four counts of possession of a dangerous weapon by a previous offender (“POWPO”). Perez appealed, contending that the public safety exception did not apply. The court of appeals agreed but deemed the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the convictions. Under the facts of this case, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the public safety exception applied, and the arresting officer was not required to give Miranda warnings before inquiring about the gun's location. View "Perez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals vacated eleven of Joshua Bott's twelve convictions for sexual exploitation of a child by possession of sexually exploitative material. Relying on language from the statute's legislative declaration and appellate decisional law predating then-current amendments to the statute, the trial court denied Bott’s motion to dismiss all but one of these exploitation counts as multiplicitous, finding that the legislature intended to permit conviction for each single incident of victimization. The court of appeals disagreed, finding instead that the applicable unit of prosecution was determined by the legislature when it chose to amend the statute to designate the act of possessing more than twenty different items qualifying as sexually exploitative material a class 4 felony. Accordingly, the court of appeals held Bott’s conviction of multiple class 4 felonies for possessing separate items numbering multiple times greater than twenty violated his constitutional protection against being subjected to jeopardy more than once for the same crime. Finding that the statute at issue "makes clear" the legislature's intent that possession of any number of items exceeding twenty that qualified as sexually exploitative material constituted a single offense. Accordingly, the appellate court's judgment was affirmed. View "Colorado v. Bott" on Justia Law

Several boys broke into two homes, one of which was owned by a man old enough to be considered an “at-risk” victim. When that man returned home, he happened upon one of the boys holding the "spoils of an ill-conceived, juvenile burglary." The others, including B.D., remained outside, oblivious to the elderly man’s arrival. All the boys quickly fled. By this opinion, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed the scope of complicitor liability for a fact that aggravates the punishment for theft; namely, an at-risk victim’s presence. Based on the plain language of the controlling statutes, the Supreme Court concluded that a complicitor need not be aware that an at-risk victim was present because it was a strict liability sentence enhancer and not an element of the offense. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for the district court to reinstate the adjudication and sentence. View "Colorado in the Interest of B.D." on Justia Law

In March 2016, law enforcement contacted Charles Linnebur after receiving a call that he had crashed his vehicle into a fence and might be driving under the influence of alcohol. Although he initially denied that he had been drinking, Linnebur eventually admitted that he had consumed whiskey that day. He was arrested, and a blood test revealed that his blood alcohol level was well above the legal limit. The State charged Linnebur with DUI and DUI per se, and sought felony convictions under sections 42-4-1301(1)(a) and (2)(a), C.R.S. (2020), which provided that DUI and DUI per se were felonies if they “occurred after three or more prior convictions” for, among other things, DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI. Prior to trial, Linnebur filed a motion in limine arguing that the fact of his prior convictions was a substantive element of felony DUI that had to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court denied the motion, concluding instead that Linnebur’s prior convictions were “merely sentence enhancers or aggravating factors” and could be proved to the court by a preponderance of the evidence. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the fact of prior convictions as an element of the crime had to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, not as a sentence enhancer, which a judge might find by a preponderance of the evidence. Because the court of appeals erred in arriving at the opposite conclusion, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Linnebur v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review in this interlocutory appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion in disqualifying the Fourth Judicial District Attorney's office. Erica Arellano was charged with second degree murder for shooting and killing her boyfriend, M.H. Arellano claimed that, during the relationship, M.H. perpetrated domestic violence on her and that self-defense would be a critical issue and the crux of Arellano’s defense. A.H. was an employee of the district attorney’s office and was married to, but separated from, M.H. at the time of his death. A.H. was a potentially significant witness in this case because she had (and already provided to the district attorney’s office) information tending to undermine Arellano’s claim of self-defense. In light of A.H.’s relationship with the district attorney’s office and the significance of her testimony to this case, Arellano filed a motion to disqualify the district attorney’s office under section 20-1-107(2), C.R.S. (2020). The district court held a hearing on this motion and, in a lengthy and detailed bench ruling, found that, on the facts presented, special circumstances existed making it unlikely that Arellano could receive a fair trial. The court thus granted Arellano’s motion to disqualify. The State then filed this interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court determined the district court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying the district attorney's office, thus affirming the court's order and remanding this case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Arellano" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review in this interlocutory appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion in disqualifying the Fifth Judicial District Attorney's office. The district attorney and the elected coroner of Lake County, Colorado, Shannon Kent, did not get along. Brown prosecuted Kent for perjury, a class 4 felony, and second degree official misconduct, a class 1 petty offense. After the case had been pending for approximately nine months, Kent filed a motion to disqualify Brown’s office, arguing that he was unlikely to receive a fair trial based on Brown’s personal interest in the case and the existence of special circumstances. Following briefing and an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the motion. The trial court determined each special circumstance, “in and of itself,” did not warrant disqualification, but “viewed as a totality,” sufficed for the exceptional remedy sought by Kent. The Supreme Court determined the district attorney's office should not have been disqualified, finding the trial court failed to adequately explain how the circumstances in question, though individually inadequate to warrant disqualification, justified the extraordinary relief requested when considered together. "And the record before us reflects that Kent plainly failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that he would be unlikely to receive a fair trial if Brown’s office continues prosecuting this case. ... Even assuming the circumstances at issue 'may cast doubt' upon Brown’s 'motives and strategies' in this case, 'they do not play a part in whether [Kent] will receive a fair trial.'" View "Colorado v. Kent" on Justia Law