Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Colorado Supreme Court revisited a question left open in Castillo v. Colorado, 421 P.3d 1141 (2018): When a trial court instructs the jury on the affirmative defense of self-defense, what quantum of proof is required to instruct the jury about an exception to that defense? The State urged the Supreme Court to adopt “some evidence” as the controlling standard. Defendant Jose L. Galvan, Sr. sought a heightened standard—substantial and sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that there were facts establishing the exception beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that when a trial court instructs the jury on the affirmative defense of self-defense, it should instruct the jury on an exception to that defense if there is some evidence to support the exception. In determining whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the provocation exception here, a division of the court of appeals correctly found that there was some evidence to support the exception. "the trial court’s provocation instruction, in addition to prudently tracking the governing statute and the Colorado Model Criminal Jury Instructions, made clear to the jury that for Galvan to forfeit the affirmative defense of self-defense, he had to have provoked the same person as to whom he was asserting self-defense. View "Galvan v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether, under prevailing Colorado equal protection principles, a defendant may be charged with second degree assault based on conduct involving strangulation under both the deadly weapon subsection of the second degree assault statute, section 18-3-203(1)(b), C.R.S. (2020), and the strangulation subsection of that same statute, section 18-3-203(1)(i). The State initially charged Dearies Deshonne Austin Lee with, among other things, two counts of second degree assault-strangulation pursuant to subsection 18-3-203(1)(i), following an incident in which he was alleged to have twice strangled his former girlfriend. Eight months later, the State added two counts of second degree assault-bodily injury with a deadly weapon (namely, hands), pursuant to subsection 18-3-203(1)(b), based on the same conduct. On Lee’s motion, the trial court dismissed the two charges of second degree assault-bodily injury with a deadly weapon on equal protection grounds. The State appealed, and in a unanimous, published opinion, a division of the court of appeals affirmed dismissal. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed: a defendant may not be charged with second degree assault based on conduct involving strangulation under both the deadly weapon subsection of the second degree assault statute, section 18-3-203(1)(b), and the strangulation subsection of that statute, section 18-3-203(1)(i). Rather, the defendant must be charged under the strangulation subsection. View "Colorado v. Lee" on Justia Law

The State of Colorado petitioned for review of a court of appeals' judgment reversing Barnett Williams' conviction for distributing a schedule II controlled substance. At trial, the district court admitted evidence pursuant to CRE 404(b) of a prior incident in which Williams pled guilty to selling cocaine. The court of appeals found that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence for the limited purposes of demonstrating “modus operandi and common plan, scheme, or design,” largely on the grounds that the evidence in question did not meet the strictures imposed by prior case law for admitting uncharged misconduct evidence pursuant to CRE 404(b) for these particular purposes, and because the error was not harmless. The Colorado Supreme Court determined that because the incremental probative value of the evidence relative to any material issue in the case was substantially outweighed by the danger that it would be unfairly prejudicial, the district court abused its discretion in admitting it. Although for different reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals was therefore affirmed. View "Colorado v. Williams" on Justia Law

In March 2016, law enforcement contacted Charles Linnebur after receiving a call that he had crashed his vehicle into a fence and might have been driving under the influence of alcohol. Although he initially denied that he had been drinking, Linnebur eventually admitted that he had consumed whiskey that day. He was arrested, and a blood test revealed that his blood alcohol level was well above the legal limit. The State charged Linnebur with DUI and DUI per se, seeking felony convictions under sections 42-4-1301(1)(a) and (2)(a), which provided that DUI and DUI per se were felonies if they “occurred after three or more prior convictions” for, among other things, DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI. Prior to trial, Linnebur filed a motion in limine arguing that the fact of his prior convictions was a substantive element of felony DUI that had to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court denied the motion, concluding instead that Linnebur’s prior convictions were “merely sentence enhancers or aggravating factors” and could be proved to the court by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury found Linnebur guilty of the lesser included offense of DUI, DWAI, and DUI per se. The State submitted certified copies of Linnebur’s three prior impaired driving convictions and his state driving record. Rather than applying a preponderance of the evidence standard (as it had earlier indicated it would), the trial court instead concluded that these exhibits proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Linnebur had three prior convictions, and entered judgment for felony DWAI, merged the DUI per se conviction, and sentenced Linnebur to four years in community corrections. The Colorado Supreme Court held, contrary to the trial court, the statutory provisions that defined and provided penalties for felony DUI treated the fact of prior convictions as an element of the crime, which had be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, not as a sentence enhancer, which a judge could find by a preponderance of the evidence. Because the court of appeals erred in arriving at the opposite conclusion, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for sentencing on the misdemeanor DUI charges that were properly proved to the jury in this case. View "Linnebur v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Michael Struckmeyer was convicted by jury of class 3 felony child abuse (knowingly or recklessly), and class 4 child abuse (criminal negligence). A division of the court of appeals concluded that the verdicts were logically and legally inconsistent and could not be sustained because the class 3 felony child abuse conviction required the jury to determine that Struckmeyer was aware of the risk of serious bodily injury to the child victim, while the class 4 felony child abuse conviction required the jury to find that Struckmeyer was unaware of the risk of serious bodily injury to the child victim. Because the division believed that the trial court had accepted mutually exclusive guilty verdicts, it found plain error, reversed the judgment of conviction, and remanded for a new trial. The State appealed. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed. Following Colorado v. Rigsby, 471 P.3d 1068, the guilty verdict for child abuse (knowingly or recklessly) and the guilty verdict for child abuse (criminal negligence), even if logically inconsistent, are not legally inconsistent. "By proving that Struckmeyer acted knowingly or recklessly, the People necessarily established that he acted with criminal negligence. It follows that by returning a guilty verdict on child abuse (knowingly or recklessly), the jury, as a matter of law, necessarily found that he acted with criminal negligence. Therefore, even if there is a logical inconsistency between acting knowingly and acting with criminal negligence, and between acting recklessly and acting with criminal negligence, no legal inconsistency exists in either scenario based on section 18-1-503(3) [C.R.S. 2019]. After all, inasmuch as criminal negligence is subsumed within knowingly and within recklessly, acting with criminal negligence cannot be legally inconsistent with acting knowingly or acting recklessly. And guilty verdicts that are legally consistent are not mutually exclusive and do not require a new trial." View "Colorado v. Struckmeyer" on Justia Law

Brandon Jackson was convicted, as a complicitor, of both first degree murder and attempted first degree murder after his codefendant aimed at, shot, and killed Y.M. under the mistaken belief that Y.M. was E.O. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and state constitutions dictated that Jackson could not stand convicted of both first degree murder and attempted first degree murder because elements of attempted first degree murder were a subset of the elements of first degree murder, and this particular attempted first degree murder was not factually distinct from this particular first degree murder. Contrary to the State's assertion, the shooter did not attempt to kill E.O. when he aimed at and shot Y.M. Rather, in aiming at and shooting Y.M., the shooter intended and attempted to kill Y.M., the same person he actually killed. "That the shooter wanted to kill E.O. and mistakenly believed Y.M. was E.O. is of no moment." Therefore, Jackson’s convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder were based on the same criminal conduct and relate to the same victim (Y.M.). The Court held the trial court plainly erred in entering convictions and imposing sentences for both offenses at issue here. The matter was remanded to the trial court to vacate Jackson's conviction and sentence for attempted first degree murder. View "Colorado v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Derek Rigsby was charged with three counts of second degree assault for smashing a glass into someone’s face during a bar fight. The three charges represented alternative methods of committing the same crime. The jury found Rigsby guilty as charged on the first two counts: (1) second degree assault (acting with intent to cause bodily injury and causing serious bodily injury); and (2) second degree assault (acting recklessly and causing serious bodily injury with a deadly weapon). On the third count, second degree assault (acting with intent to cause bodily injury and causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon), the jury returned a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense of third degree assault (acting with criminal negligence and causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon), a misdemeanor; in so doing, the jury effectively acquitted Rigsby of the charged offense on that count. Concluding that the guilty verdicts for second degree assault, and the guilty verdict for third degree assault, were mutually exclusive, a division of the Colorado court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial. On appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, the state conceded the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court was defective, but argued the error was one of multiplicity, not mutually exclusive verdicts, and that it should have been corrected by merging the three guilty verdicts. To this, the Supreme Court agreed. The matter was remanded to the court of appeals with instructions to return the case to the trial court to merge all of the convictions into a single conviction for second degree assault and to leave in place only one sentence (one of the two concurrent five-year prison sentences imposed). View "Colorado v. Rigsby" on Justia Law

After the victim’s murder in this case, his sister-in-law discovered a peculiar microcassette among his belongings. On that cassette was a recording of a potentially incriminating voicemail message. A police detective later testified at trial that the message featured a voice like that of defendant Daniel Gonzales, whom the detective had interviewed while investigating the murder. Over Gonzales’s objection, the court admitted the recorded message into evidence at Gonzales’s trial. The detective was not present when the recorded statements were made, and neither he nor anyone else testified about the reliability of the recording process. Even so, after considering the recording and other evidence, a jury found Gonzales guilty of, among other things, first degree murder. After review of Gonzales' arguments on appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court held that in the absence of evidence suggesting that a proffered voice recording has been altered or fabricated, a proponent may authenticate a recording by presenting evidence sufficient to support a finding that it is what the proponent claims. "Once this prima facie burden is met, authenticity becomes a question for the factfinder, in this instance, the jury." The Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the voicemail, and therefore affirmed the court of appeals. View "Gonzales v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Steven Thompson was a real estate developer and sole member and manager of SGD Timber Canyon, LLC (“Timber Canyon”), a real estate company that held an interest in a number of undeveloped lots in Castle Rock, Colorado. To buy those properties, Timber Canyon initially obtained a $11.9 million loan from Flagstar Bank. The properties went into foreclosure in October 2009. In February 2010, Timber Canyon filed for bankruptcy; Flagstar Bank sought relief from the automatic stay to allow it to proceed with the foreclosure. In the spring of 2010, Thompson met John Witt (“John”), who had worked in the construction industry in Denver but wanted to become a real estate developer. John eventually began working with Thompson and signed a letter of intent indicating that John would eventually obtain an ownership interest in Thompson’s company. Shortly thereafter, and without disclosing the fact that the Timber Ridge properties were in foreclosure and subject to a forbearance agreement, Thompson obtained an “investment” from John’s parents, Thomas and Debra Witt (“the Witts”). Ultimately, the Witts agreed to increase their initial $400,000 investment to $2.4 million. At no point did Thompson disclose to the Witts that Timber Canyon's properties were already highly leveraged; the company was in bankruptcy, the properties were in foreclosure, and the properties had been valued at only $6.75 million (an amount significantly less than the $31 million value that Thompson had represented to the Witts during negotiations). When the Witts’ note ultimately came due in the winter of 2011, Thompson defaulted. The Witts filed a civil lawsuit against him and contacted law enforcement. Thereafter, the State charged Thompson with two counts of securities fraud and one count of theft. A jury convicted Thompson on all counts, and the court sentenced him to the Department of Corrections for twelve years on each of the securities fraud counts, to be served concurrently, and eighteen years on the theft count, to be served consecutively to the securities fraud counts. As pertinent here, Thompson argued on appeal: (1) because the note at issue was not a security, insufficient evidence supported his securities fraud convictions; (2) the trial court erred by tendering an incorrect jury instruction regarding the meaning of “security”; and (3) his theft conviction had to run concurrently with his securities fraud convictions. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether: (1) the promissory note at issue was a security under the "family resemblance" test; (2) any error in the jury instruction defining “security” was not plain; and (3) consecutive sentences were permissible because different evidence supported defendant Steven Thompson’s securities fraud and theft convictions. Finding the note at issue was indeed a security under Colorado law, and no other reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Thompson's convictions. View "Thompson v. Colorado" on Justia Law

On the third day of Gregory Fisher’s trial for five counts of sexual assault on a child, and after the prosecution had presented the majority of its case, the prosecution moved to amend the date range of the charged offenses. The proposed amendment expanded the date range for the charged offenses by approximately six weeks from the original complaint and information. The trial court granted the motion over defense counsel’s objection. The jury ultimately found Fisher guilty on all five counts. On appeal, Fisher contended the amendment prejudiced his right to present his defense. A divided Colorado court of appeals disagreed with this contention and affirmed conviction, holding that the amendment was not one of substance and did not prejudice Fisher's substantial rights. The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed, holding that while expanding the date range does not automatically prejudice a defendant’s substantial rights, under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the mid-trial amendment here prejudiced Fisher’s substantial right to fully prepare and present his alibi defense. Judgment was reversed, the conviction vacated, and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "Fisher v. Colorado" on Justia Law