Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Sheila Monroe argued that she stabbed a fellow bus passenger in the neck out of self-defense. She asserted her legal authority to do so without first retreating to a place of no escape. Yet, during the closing arguments of Monroe’s trial, the prosecution repeatedly argued that Monroe didn’t act reasonably in self-defense because she failed to retreat. Although the trial court admonished the jury that Monroe didn’t have a duty to retreat, it instructed the jury that it could consider Monroe’s failure to retreat as relevant to whether she actually believed that she faced an imminent use of unlawful force. The jury found Monroe guilty of first degree assault and attempted first degree murder. Monroe appealed, arguing that because she had no duty to retreat the trial court should not have permitted any argument regarding her failure to do so, even if it was ostensibly directed at undermining the reasonableness of her claim of self- defense. A division of the court of appeals reversed, concluding the prosecution's arguments impermissibly imposed on Monroe a duty to retreat. The matter was remanded for a new trial. The Colorado Supreme Court addressed the question the court of appeals did not address in its opinion: the prosecution could not argue that a defendant acted unreasonably in self-defense because she failed to retreat from an encounter. Thus, the trial court erred by permitting the prosecution’s arguments regarding Monroe’s failure to retreat. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment on different grounds, reversed Monroe’s judgment of conviction, and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Colorado v. Monroe" on Justia Law

In this tragic case involving a charge of child abuse resulting in death, the issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the defendant Sandra Archuleta was entitled to a modified unanimity instruction requiring jurors either unanimously agree that she committed the same act or acts underlying the child abuse charge or that she committed all of those acts. The prosecution charged and tried this case on the theory that Archuleta had committed the offense at issue by engaging in a single criminal transaction resulting in the child’s death. In light of the prosecution’s theory, the Supreme Court found no reasonable likelihood that the jurors disagreed on which specific act caused the child’s death, therefore, Archuleta was not entitled to a modified unanimity instruction here. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals judgment to the contrary, and remanded for consideration of Archuleta’s remaining contentions on appeal. View "Archuleta v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause in two cases out of Gilpin County, hoping to provide guidance on whether a trial court could grant the prosecution’s contested request for a continuance with a tolling of the statutory speedy trial period based on a public health crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic. In "Lucy," the prosecution has charged Maurice Lucy with criminal mischief, a class 2 misdemeanor. Lucy pled not guilty on June 12, 2019, but subsequently requested a continuance of his trial on October 9, 2019. As a result, his six-month speedy trial period was set to expire April 9, 2020. The county court scheduled his jury trial to commence on March 17, 2020, within the speedy trial deadline. In Meresa, the prosecution charged Desta Meresa with violation of a criminal protection order and unlawful sexual contact, both class 1 misdemeanors. Meresa pled not guilty on October 9, 2019, which meant that his six-month speedy trial period was set to expire on April 9, 2020. The county court scheduled Meresa’s jury trial to commence on March 17, the same day Lucy’s case was scheduled for trial. On March 16, 2020, the day before both cases were scheduled for trial, the Chief Judge of the First Judicial District issued an administrative order requiring that all jury trials set in the district through May 1, 2020, be vacated unless there were exigent circumstances presented or speedy trial constraints. The administrative order explained that this drastic measure was necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to the Chief Judge’s order, the county court vacated the trials in the two cases at issue. The prosecution immediately filed a motion to continue and requested a tolling of the speedy trial period in each case. It relied on section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) C.R.S. (2019), which required the tolling of the speedy trial period for up to six months under certain circumstances when the court grants a continuance at the prosecution’s request without the defendant’s consent. The Supreme Court held that, absent the defendant’s consent, section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) authorized a trial court to grant the prosecution a continuance with a tolling of the speedy trial period for up to six months if the prosecution established that: (1) as a result of a public health crisis, evidence material to its case is unavailable; (2) it has exercised due diligence to obtain that evidence; and (3) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the unavailable evidence will be available on the new trial date. Because the county court erred in these two cases, the decisions reversed and matters remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Lucy & Meresa" on Justia Law

Colorado has long followed the no-duty-to-retreat rule in self-defense cases. During the closing arguments of Shiela Monroe’s trial, the prosecution repeatedly argued that Monroe didn’t act reasonably in self-defense because she failed to retreat. Although the trial court admonished the jury that Monroe didn’t have a duty to retreat, it instructed the jury that it could consider Monroe’s failure to retreat as relevant to whether she actually believed that she faced an imminent use of unlawful force. The jury found Monroe guilty of first degree assault and attempted first degree murder. Monroe appealed, arguing that because she had no duty to retreat the trial court should not have permitted any argument regarding her failure to do so, even if it was ostensibly directed at undermining the reasonableness of her claim of self- defense. A division of the court of appeals reversed Monroe's convictions. The appellate court abstained from deciding whether it was ever proper to argue that a defendant's failure to retreat undermines the reasonableness of a defendant's self-defense claim, but it concluded the prosecution's arguments impermissibly imposed on Monroe a duty to retreat and remanded for a new trial. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court held the prosecution could not argue a defendant acted unreasonably in self-defense because she failed to retreat from an encounter. Thus, the trial court erred by permitting the prosecution’s arguments regarding Monroe’s failure to retreat. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals on different grounds. Monroe’s conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "Colorado v. Monroe" on Justia Law

Aldo Gabriel Gutierrez was driving a pickup truck, in which Julio Cesar Carrillo-Toledo was a passenger, on I-70 in Mesa County, Colorado. Colorado State Patrol Trooper Christian Bollen, who has extensive training in drug interdiction, noticed the truck, and initiated a traffic stop after witnessing two driving violations. Both passengers were asked to alight from the vehicle. The trooper asked and was given consent to search the truck. Trooper Bollen discovered three to five pounds of heroin in the tailgate of the truck. Both Gutierrez and Carrillo-Toledo were arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Before trial, Gutierrez and Carrillo-Toledo filed a joint motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the truck, alleging that Trooper Bollen stopped them without a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. After a hearing, the trial court granted the suppression motion, finding that Trooper Bollen's belief the truck made multiple traffic violations was not objectively reasonable. Granting interlocutory review, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the suppression order, finding that on the Court's interpretation of the plain language of the applicable statute and the factual record, the Trooper's stop was based on a reasonable suspicion a traffic violation had occurred. View "Colorado v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal brought by the State, the issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether the district court correctly granted Walter Wheeler’s pretrial motion to suppress after finding that deputies with the Huerfano County Sheriff’s Office conducted an unlawful investigatory stop of the Subaru in which he was a passenger. Although it was a close call, the Court ultimately concluded that the court erred: from the totality of the circumstances, and the rational inferences therefrom, provided the deputies reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that the occupants of the Subaru were committing, had committed, or were about to commit a crime. Therefore, the suppression order was reversed. View "Colorado v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

De Etta Wester-Gravelle worked as a certified nursing assistant for a company called Interim Healthcare. During the time period in question, the company assigned her to care for a patient, W.M., who had suffered a stroke and needed assistance with tasks like bathing. W.M.’s partner, E.G., was also in poor health and could not perform such tasks for W.M. Interim Healthcare assigned Wester-Gravelle to visit W.M. five times per week for two hours each day. At the conclusion of each shift, Wester-Gravelle was required to have either W.M. or E.G. sign Wester-Gravelle’s shift chart to verify that she had been there. The charts would then serve as a record pursuant to which Interim Healthcare would pay Wester-Gravelle for her work. Wester-Gravelle had been assigned to work with W.M. for several months when, in late July or early August of 2015, her supervisor, Lisa Conley, made a routine visit to W.M.’s house during a time when Wester-Gravelle had been scheduled to be there. When Conley arrived, however, Wester-Gravelle was not there. Conley performed routine tasks of her own that day, and in the course of her conversation with W.M. and E.G., they said that they had not seen Wester-Gravelle in several weeks. After an investigation, the matter was transferred to the Colorado Attorney General, who prosecuted Wester-Gravelle on one count of forgery. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether the court of appeals erred in concluding the prosecution had an obligation to elect the specific document or documents on which it would rely for conviction or, alternatively, that Wester-Gravelle was entitled to a "modified unanimity instruction" requiring the jurors to agree unanimously that she had committed the same underlying act of forgery or that she had committed all of the underlying acts. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not plainly err when it did not, sua sponte, require an election or give a modified unanimity instruction because any error was neither obvious nor substantial. The court of appeals' judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for consideration of Wester-Gravelle's remaining contentions on appeal. View "Colorado v. Wester-Gravelle" on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Sandra Archuleta took care of her four-month-old grandson, D.A., for one week. Several hours after D.A.’s mother picked him up, she returned to Archuleta’s home with D.A. Archuleta noticed that D.A. did not appear to be breathing, so she attempted CPR and called 911. First responders arrived shortly thereafter and transported D.A. to the hospital, but he died the following morning. An autopsy revealed that D.A. had been suffering from dehydration and a bacterial infection that had started as pneumonia and that had spread to his blood. The prosecution subsequently charged Archuleta with one count of “child abuse resulting in death,” alleging that she caused D.A.’s death over the course of the week in which she took care of him. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on when a trial court must give a jury a so-called "modified unanimity instruction." Specifically, the issue reduced to whether defendant was entitled to such an instruction requiring that the jurors either unanimously agree that she committed the same act or acts underlying the child abuse charge or that she committed all of those acts. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution charged and tried this case on the theory that Archuleta had committed the offense at issue by engaging in a single criminal transaction resulting in the child’s death. And because, in light of the prosecution’s theory, the Court found no reasonable likelihood that the jurors disagreed on which specific act caused the child’s death, the Court concluded Archuleta was not entitled to a modified unanimity instruction here. View "Archuleta v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Both the State and respondent-defendant Eswin Figueroa-Lemus petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming the denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was arrested in 2012, and charged with one count each of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving under the influence. In 2013, he pled guilty to the controlled substance count pursuant to a statutorily sanctioned stipulation with the district attorney for the deferral of judgment for a period of two years, pending satisfaction of the conditions of his deferral. At the providency hearing at which his plea was taken, the defendant acknowledged his awareness that his plea could make him deportable, and defense counsel affirmatively stated on the record that he and the defendant had a lengthy conversation about immigration consequences, after which the defendant understood that this drug offense would render him deportable. When expressly asked by the trial court whether plea counsel’s statement was true, the defendant responded affirmatively. Weeks thereafter, the State moved to revoke the deferred judgment, alleging that defendant had been arrested by federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers and therefore could no longer comply with the requirements of his deferred judgment. Defendant then moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The State challenged the appellate court’s jurisdiction on the grounds that until defendant was actually sentenced and judgment of conviction enters, there could be no final judgment from which an appeal would lie. Defendant challenged the appellate court’s ultimate conclusion on the merits that he was not entitled to an advisement by his counsel to the effect that he would be detained without bond during the pendency of any deportation proceedings initiated against him by the federal government. The Colorado Supreme Court found that because a guilty plea taken pursuant to a statutorily sanctioned stipulation to defer judgment and sentence does not become a final, appealable judgment unless and until the deferral is revoked, sentence is actually imposed, and judgment of conviction enters, defendant was without any immediate right to appeal the denial of his motion, and the court of appeals was therefore not authorized to entertain the defendant’s claim. Choosing, nevertheless, to exercise its original jurisdiction in this case, the Supreme Court found the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion. The court of appeals' judgment was vacated. View "Colorado v. Figueroa-Lemus" on Justia Law

The Colorado Court of Appeals dismissed Christopher Sullivan's appeal, finding that it was barred by the plea proviso, rejecting Sullivan's claim the plea proviso did not apply because his appeal involved the manner in which the sentence was imposed, not "the propriety of the sentence." The appellate court surmised an appeal related to the manner in which the sentence was imposed was an appeal regarding the propriety of the sentence. The issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether "propriety of the sentence" as that phrase was used in C.R.S. 18-1-409(1), encompassed the manner in which the sentence was imposed. The Supreme Court held that “the propriety of the sentence,” as that phrase was used in the plea proviso, did not comprehend the manner in which the sentence was imposed (i.e., the propriety of the sentencing proceeding). Because Sullivan’s appeal concerned the manner in which his sentence was imposed, it was not barred by the plea proviso. Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate court's judgment. View "Sullivan v. Colorado" on Justia Law