Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Rachel Ann Niemeyer was questioned by police after her husband suffered a gunshot wound to the head. During the interrogation at the police station, Niemeyer made incriminating statements. She was charged with murdering her husband and moved to suppress these statements, arguing they were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona. The trial court denied her motion, concluding she was not in custody when she made the statements. A jury convicted her of second-degree murder and other offenses.The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The majority held that a reasonable person in Niemeyer's position would not have considered herself in custody, as her freedom of action was not curtailed to the degree associated with a formal arrest. The court reasoned that the hand-bagging procedure did not convert the situation into a custodial one. However, a dissenting judge argued that the police's actions and statements indicated that Niemeyer was in custody, as they would not consider taking her to the hospital until completing unspecified tasks.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that Niemeyer was in custody for Miranda purposes during the interrogation. The court found that a reasonable person in her position would have believed they were deprived of their freedom of action to a degree associated with a formal arrest. The court noted that Niemeyer was alone in an interrogation room late at night, repeatedly asked to go to the hospital, and was physically restrained with zip-tied bags on her hands. The court concluded that the trial court's error in admitting her statements was not harmless and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, remanding for further proceedings. View "Niemeyer v. People" on Justia Law

Richard Lewis was convicted of four misdemeanors, including two counts of unlawful sexual contact and two counts of unlawful sexual contact on a client by a psychotherapist. Initially, he was on a personal recognizance bond, but after his conviction, the county court revoked this bond, citing the seriousness of the case and Lewis's potential danger to the community. The court set a new cash bond of $5,000, which Lewis posted. At sentencing, the court denied Lewis's request for an appeal bond, finding that he posed a danger to the community.The County Court, City and County of Denver, denied Lewis's request for an appeal bond under section 16-4-201.5(2)(a), which requires denial of bail if the defendant poses a danger to the community. Lewis argued that his appeal should be governed by section 16-2-114(6), which mandates a stay of execution and an appeal bond. The county court disagreed, finding that Lewis posed a danger to the community and thus denied the appeal bond.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and upheld the county court's decision. The court clarified that section 16-2-114(6) requires a stay of execution but does not mandate the granting of an appeal bond. The court found no conflict between section 16-2-114(6) and section 16-4-201.5(2), which prohibits bail if the defendant is deemed a danger to the community. The Supreme Court concluded that the county court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appeal bond and discharged the order to show cause. The case was remanded to the county court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "People v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Jamie Edward Bock was charged with nine counts of theft for actions occurring between November 2014 and November 2016. He was accused of taking initial payments from homeowners for construction work, some of which he started but did not complete, and others he did not begin at all. Bock requested and received additional funds for four projects but failed to complete any of them or return the money.The trial court joined five cases into a single trial and instructed the jury that Bock could not be convicted of four counts unless the prosecution proved multiple acts of theft within six months of each other. Bock argued that this instruction constructively amended his charges, which were originally under a statute punishing single acts of theft, and claimed this amendment was a structural error requiring reversal. The jury convicted Bock on all counts, and he was sentenced to twenty years in prison. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals agreed that the jury instructions constituted a constructive amendment but held that it did not require reversal, applying plain error review.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and agreed that the jury instructions constructively amended the charges. However, the court held that such an amendment is not a structural error and should be reviewed for plain error. The court concluded that Bock did not demonstrate plain error because he had sufficient notice to mount a defense, and the prosecution's burden of proof was not materially lessened. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals and upheld Bock's convictions. View "Bock v. People" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a traffic stop that led to the discovery of drug paraphernalia and illegal substances. The defendant, Sean Terrance Johnson, was pulled over by police officers for two traffic violations. During the stop, officers noticed an empty shell casing in Johnson's vehicle and a bag frequently used to carry concealed weapons. Johnson admitted to having a shotgun in the trunk. The officers also found a pipe in Johnson's pocket, which he admitted to using the previous night. Based on these findings, the officers arrested Johnson.The district court initially suppressed the evidence found in Johnson's vehicle, ruling that the officers had unlawfully prolonged their investigatory stop by waiting for a drug-detection dog to arrive. The court reasoned that once the officers had found the pipe and confirmed there were no outstanding warrants for Johnson's arrest, the investigation had effectively concluded. Therefore, the officers needed additional reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop for the dog's sniff.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed with the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Johnson for possession of drug paraphernalia, and thus, his continued detention was justified as an arrest, not an investigatory stop. The court concluded that the officers did not unlawfully prolong their investigatory stop of Johnson. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order suppressing the evidence discovered in Johnson's vehicle and remanded the case for the court to consider whether that evidence was lawfully discovered following Johnson's arrest. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the question of whether a search for internet-related evidence that extended to a previously unknown basement apartment was reasonable, even though the apartment was not specified in the warrant. The police had obtained a warrant to search a property after receiving information that child pornography had been downloaded to a particular IP address associated with that address. The property appeared to be a single-family home. However, during the execution of the warrant, the police encountered Kevin Matthew Dhyne, who lived in a basement apartment on the property and used the same internet access as the rest of the house. The police searched Dhyne’s apartment and found sexually explicit material involving children on his laptop.The trial court agreed with Dhyne's argument that the search violated the U.S. and Colorado constitutions because the warrant was not specific to his basement apartment. However, the court denied Dhyne’s motion to suppress the evidence, reasoning that even if the officers had not searched his apartment in conjunction with the original warrant, they would have executed the same search later that day under a warrant specific to the basement apartment, and the evidence would therefore have inevitably been discovered. Dhyne was convicted of two counts of sexual exploitation of a child.The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion, though it did so by upholding the search rather than by applying the inevitable discovery exception. The court of appeals agreed that for a multi-dwelling unit, separate dwellings normally require separate, specific warrants. However, the court justified the search of Dhyne’s apartment based on the shared use of the IP address.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the outcome, holding that the warrant's reference to the property's "[h]ouse, garage, and any outbuildings" was sufficiently specific because there were no outward indicators that the basement apartment existed. The court also held that the execution of the warrant was reasonable in this specific scenario, where the warrant was for all buildings on the property and the defendant told the police that he lived in the basement and used the IP address that provided grounds for the search. View "Dhyne v. People" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the definition of a "dwelling" in the context of Colorado's "force-against-intruders" statute. The defendant, Joseph Howell, was involved in a physical altercation with J.M. outside his mother's apartment. At some point, Howell went inside the apartment, leaving J.M. outside on the doorstep. Howell fired a shot from inside the apartment, hitting J.M. in the face. Howell was charged with two counts of attempted first-degree murder, among other crimes. He moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the "force-against-intruders" statute immunized him from prosecution.The district court denied Howell's motion to dismiss, finding that because J.M. never entered inside the threshold of the doorway, there was never an "unlawful entry into a dwelling," and thus, the statute does not apply. Howell appealed this decision, leading to the case being reviewed by the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that an uncovered, unenclosed, and unsecured doorstep is not part of a “dwelling” for the purposes of the "force-against-intruders" statute. The court reasoned that a “dwelling” must be a “building,” and a “building” is “a structure which has the capacity to contain.” Since the doorstep has no roof, walls, or gate, it does not have the capacity to contain, and therefore, it is not a “building.” The court concluded that Howell's use of force against J.M., who was standing on the doorstep and was a “non-entrant,” was not shielded by immunity under the "force-against-intruders" statute. Therefore, the court discharged the rule to show cause. View "People v. Howell" on Justia Law

The defendant, Donald L. Garcia, was convicted of first-degree motor vehicle theft by a jury. On appeal, Garcia argued that the judge who presided over his case was disqualified due to her previous involvement as a managing public defender, where she briefly covered for his lawyer in a pretrial proceeding. The court of appeals agreed with Garcia and reversed his conviction.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, however, disagreed with the court of appeals. The Supreme Court agreed that the judge was disqualified, but concluded that the defendant waived his claim of judicial disqualification by failing to object. The court reasoned that the defendant's attorneys were likely aware of the judge's disqualification, and their failure to object amounted to the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Therefore, the court concluded that the defendant's claim of judicial disqualification was waived.Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, reinstating Garcia's conviction and sentence. The court did not need to decide whether it is structural error requiring automatic reversal for a statutorily disqualified judge to preside over a case under the circumstances presented here, as it concluded that the defendant had waived his claim. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reviewed a case involving a defendant, Charles James Crabtree, who was convicted of felony DUI. The key issue was whether the trial court erred by not presenting the element of Crabtree's relevant convictions to the jury. At the time of Crabtree's trial, the law was settled that the defendant was not entitled to have his prior convictions for alcohol-related driving offenses tried to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. However, this law was later overturned by the Supreme Court in a separate case, Linnebur v. People, which held that the fact of a defendant’s relevant convictions in a felony DUI trial is an element of the offense that must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.The Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed Crabtree's case for plain error and found that the trial court's error was plain at the time of appeal, even though it was not plain at the time of trial. The Court of Appeals based its decision on the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings in Johnson v. United States and Henderson v. United States, which held that an error can be considered plain if it is obvious at the time of appeal, regardless of whether it was obvious at the time of trial.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed with the Court of Appeals' application of the Johnson and Henderson rulings. The Supreme Court held that, under Colorado law, an error must be plain at the time of trial, not at the time of appeal. The Supreme Court also clarified that the trial court's error in failing to present the element of Crabtree's relevant convictions to the jury was not a structural error requiring automatic reversal, but a trial error subject to plain error review. Because the error was not plain at the time of trial, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for reinstatement of Crabtree's felony DUI conviction and sentence. View "People v. Crabtree" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Christopher Oneil Tarr, who struck a pedestrian with his car while allegedly intoxicated. At the hospital, Tarr refused to have his blood drawn for alcohol testing, despite being informed that under Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute, he had already consented to such a test by driving. The police proceeded with the blood draw without a warrant, and the results were used to charge Tarr with several crimes, including vehicular homicide—DUI. Tarr moved to suppress the results of the blood draws, arguing they were unconstitutional as he had clearly revoked his consent and the police did not yet have a warrant when his blood was drawn. The trial court denied the motion, and Tarr was found guilty.The trial court's decision was based on a previous case, People v. Hyde, which held that there is no constitutional right to refuse a blood-alcohol test. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing with its interpretation of Hyde. Tarr then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado for certiorari review.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the lower courts' decisions. It held that a conscious driver can revoke their statutory consent to a blood draw. Once consent has been revoked, the police are generally required to obtain a warrant before trying to conduct a blood draw. Otherwise, any evidence obtained from the blood draw should be excluded from trial unless one of the recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies. The case was remanded for consideration of any outstanding arguments concerning the admissibility of the evidence. View "Tarr v. People" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Sterling Dwayne Austin, who was convicted of first-degree murder. Austin's first trial ended in a mistrial due to the jury's inability to reach a unanimous verdict. During the second trial, the prosecutor used a peremptory strike to excuse a potential juror, Juror 32, due to her activism to reform the Denver Police Department. Austin challenged this strike under Batson v. Kentucky, arguing that the strike was racially motivated. The trial court denied Austin's challenge, and Juror 32 was excused.On appeal, the appellate court only addressed one of Austin's four issues, concluding that the trial court's denial of Austin's Batson challenge entitled him to a new trial. The appellate court held that the prosecutor's reason for striking Juror 32 was not race-neutral, as it was based on Juror 32's negative experiences with law enforcement, which were racially charged.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the appellate court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the prosecutor's reason for striking Juror 32 was race-neutral, as it was based on Juror 32's potential bias against law enforcement, not her race. However, the Supreme Court also found that the trial court's findings were insufficient for an appellate court to review whether the trial court had considered all the pertinent circumstances in concluding that the strike was not made with a discriminatory purpose. Therefore, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Austin" on Justia Law