Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The State of Colorado filed a delinquency petition against B.B.A.M., charging him with one count of third degree burglary and three counts of criminal mischief. B.B.A.M.’s counsel filed a motion to determine competency. Because the court felt it lacked adequate information to make a preliminary finding regarding B.B.A.M.’s competency, it ordered the Colorado Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to conduct an outpatient competency evaluation. The competency evaluator filed a report in which she concluded B.B.A.M. was incompetent to proceed, determined there was a likelihood of restoring him to competency, and recommended the restoration services she deemed appropriate. Based on the evaluator’s report, the court made a preliminary finding of incompetency. Since neither party requested a competency hearing within ten days, the court made the preliminary finding of incompetency a final determination. Proceedings were suspended, and B.B.A.M. was ordered to receive outpatient services designed to restore him to competency. Following the provision of those services, the court ordered, over his objection, a second competency evaluation to determine whether he had been restored to competency. B.B.A.M. appealed, but the district court upheld the juvenile court’s order. The Colorado Supreme Court determined the relevant statutes did not permit a juvenile court to order a second competency evaluation to determine whether a juvenile has been restored to competency; the district court erred in affirming the juvenile court’s order. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to return the case to the juvenile court for a restoration review or a restoration hearing. View "In re Colorado v. B.B.A.M." on Justia Law

Marcus Robinson was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault at a gathering of co-workers and friends at one of the victims' apartment. The issue his case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the court of appeals erred by concluding a prosecutor's race-based comments in her opening statement at trial constituted reversible plain error. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded they did: comments on the contrasting skin tones of Robinson and the victim were improper because any probative value they might have had was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Robinson. Furthermore, on the facts presented, the prosecutor’s comments did not rise to the level of reversible plain error because even if obvious, the error did not "so undermine the fundamental fairness of Robinson’s trial as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of his judgment of conviction." The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Ruth Williams allegedly stole $10,000 from her employer. She pled guilty to felony theft in exchange for a four-year deferred judgment and sentence. The district court placed her on probation for the deferral period and required that she pay $10,000 in restitution. Roughly three years into her deferred sentence, Williams had only paid about $500. Based on that failure to pay, the district attorney moved to impose judgment and sentence. The district court concluded that Williams had violated the restitution order, so it revoked the deferred judgment and entered a conviction for felony theft. Williams appealed, contending that the prosecution failed to meet its burden to prove that she had the financial ability to pay restitution. Applying Colorado Supreme Court precedent, a division of the court of appeals concluded that the prosecution had no such burden. Instead, if Williams wanted to avoid becoming a convicted felon, she had to prove that she couldn’t pay. The Supreme Court reversed: when a defendant introduces some evidence of an inability to pay restitution. A district court must make ability-to-pay findings pursuant to 18-1.3-702(3)(c), C.R.S. (2019), before revoking a deferred judgment for failure to pay. Furthermore, the Court held the prosecution bore the burden of proving by a preponderance the defendant had an ability to comply with the restitution order without undue hardship to the defendant or the defendant's dependents; and defendant had not made a goof-faith effort to comply. Because Williams introduced some evidence of an inability to pay, the Supreme Court remanded for a new deferred judgment revocation hearing. View "Williams v. Colorado" on Justia Law

While in a friend’s apartment, Lance Margerum made sexual advances towards E.S. When she rebuffed him, he pushed her onto a bed and groped her. E.S. fought back and promised that she would not tell anyone, and Margerum allowed her to leave. Margerum then invited his sister, T.M., to the apartment to pick up some clothes. When she arrived, Margerum grabbed her, choked her, and punched her. A jury found Margerum guilty of unlawful sexual contact with respect to E.S. and both third-degree assault and felony menacing with respect to T.M. The court of appeals affirmed Margerum’s convictions. E.S. testified at Margerum’s trial while she was on probation for an unrelated offense. The trial court refused to allow Margerum to impeach E.S.’s credibility based on her probationary status. Margerum argued the trial court’s refusal to allow defense counsel to impeach E.S.’s credibility based on her probationary status required reversal. He also argued he could not be convicted of both assault and menacing based on the same conduct. This case those presented two issues for the Colorado Supreme Court's review: (1) whether a witness’s credibility could be impeached based on her probationary status at the time she testifies; and (2) whether Margerum could be convicted of both assault and menacing based on the same conduct. The Court answered both questions yes, but because it concluded the trial court’s error in not allowing defense counsel to impeach E.S. based on her probationary status was harmless, the Supreme Court concluded reversal was not required. View "Margerum v. Colorado" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant Paul Rail guilty of sexual assault on a child. In response to a special interrogatory, the jury also found, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, that Rail committed the offense as part of a pattern of abuse and that the State had proved each of the listed incidents of sexual contact, including “[a]ll of the alleged incidents of sexual contact” testified to by the victim. However, in response to a separate unanimity interrogatory, the jury indicated that these same incidents of sexual contact (excluding one that appeared only on the pattern of abuse interrogatory) were “[n]ot [p]roved.” Rail argued on appeal of his conviction that, under Sanchez v. Colorado, 325 P.3d 553 (2014), this inconsistency required reversal of his conviction for sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of abuse. After its review, the Colorado Supreme Court disagreed: "Unlike in Sanchez, the jury here returned a unanimous verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, any ambiguity in this verdict created by the jury’s response on the unanimity interrogatory was resolved by individual polling of the jurors, each of whom confirmed their intent to find the defendant guilty of sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of abuse, and their express findings that the People had proved all the alleged incidents of sexual contact beyond a reasonable doubt." View "Rail v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Two separate criminal cases gave rise to the questions presented in this case. (1) In October 2013, Michael Fransua was arrested after he unlawfully entered his former girlfriend’s house and assaulted her. Fransua was charged with second-degree burglary, third-degree assault, and harassment; two months later, he posted bond and was released from jail. (2) While out on bond, in March 2014, Fransua was arrested after he again entered his former girlfriend’s house and refused to leave. This time, Fransua was charged with first-degree trespass, violation of bail bond conditions, and violation of a protection order. Although Fransua posted bond in the first case, and thus was released from jail pending trial in that case, he was unable to post bond in the second case. As a result, Fransua was confined from the date he was arrested in the second case, to the date he was sentenced in the first case. During this 108-day period of confinement, however, Fransua’s bond in the first case was never revoked or modified. In exchange for a complete dismissal of the second case, as well as all original charges in the first case, Fransua pled guilty to a single count of attempted second-degree burglary in the first case. He was sentenced to a term of five years in community corrections as part of that plea agreement. Three months later, Fransua escaped from community corrections. Consequently, he was resentenced to a term of five years in the custody of the Department of Corrections. During Fransua’s resentencing hearing, he requested 245 days of PSCC. The district court, however, awarded him only 162 days. His case presented a question of whether he was entitled to presentence confinement credit ("PSCC") for time spent in jail because he was unable to post bond in his second case. Further, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed whether defendant was entitled to credit for both the first and last days of his presentence confinement. The Court concluded Fransua was not entitled to credit in his first case from his confinement in the second case. Fransua was entitled to credit for both the first and last days of his presentence confinement. View "Fransua v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In 2011, Douglas Baker was arrested on a then-outstanding 2009 warrant for sexual assault on a child, pattern of abuse, a class three felony. When Baker learned that he was facing arrest, he fled to Florida. He was extradited to Colorado, and booked into jail where he remained in custody for the duration of the case. Baker pled guilty to one count of sexual assault on a child, position of trust, a class three felony, and, in 2012, he was sentenced to a term of ten years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The court awarded Baker 364 days of credit for time served and designated him a Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”). At the sentencing hearing, Baker objected to the SVP finding and told the court that he would file a motion objecting to it. Baker, however, failed to file a motion objecting to his SVP status for over three years, and, in the interim, he never filed a direct appeal. The issue his case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether a defendant’s claim that he was entitled to more presentence confinement credit (“PSCC”) than he originally received was properly understood as a challenge to a sentence “not authorized by law” under Crim. P. 35(a). The Court concluded that it was not: "PSCC is not a component of a sentence; instead, it is time served before a sentence is imposed, which is later credited against the defendant’s sentence. This conclusion does not mean that defendants have no avenue to seek correction of an improper calculation of PSCC." Here, all parties agreed that both the parties and the court overlooked Baker’s eighteen missing days of PSCC. Rule 36 would have been the appropriate route to correct the calculation error. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case with directions to return it to the district court. View "Colorado v. Baker" on Justia Law

Alysha Walton pled guilty to driving under the influence (“DUI”), and the county court sentenced her to twelve months of unsupervised probation. Because Walton did not provide a medical professional to testify regarding her authorization to use medical marijuana, the court, as a condition of probation, prohibited Walton from using medical marijuana. Walton appealed, and the district court affirmed the county court’s decision. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the plain language of section 18-1.3-204(2)(a)(VIII), C.R.S. (2019) created a presumption that a defendant could use medical marijuana while serving a sentence to probation unless a statutory exception applied. The relevant exception here applied if the sentencing court found, based on material evidence, that prohibiting this defendant’s otherwise-authorized medical marijuana use was necessary and appropriate to promote statutory sentencing goals. Because the county court made no such findings here, the district court's judgment affirming the county court was reversed. Because defendant completed her sentence, reversing and remanding was deemed moot. View "Walton v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this case and two companion cases announced at the same time, Wells-Yates v. Colorado, 2019 CO 90, and Melton v. Colorado, 2019 CO 89, the Colorado Supreme Court considered issues “that lie at the intersection of habitual criminal punishment and proportionality review.” In July 2013, Clifton McRae sold methamphetamine for $350 to his girlfriend, who was working as a confidential informant. The prosecution later brought six drug-related charges against McRae, only two of which arose from the July 2013 transaction, and six habitual criminal charges. In August 2014, the jury found McRae guilty of selling or distributing a schedule II controlled substance, a class 3 felony, and possessing drug paraphernalia, a petty offense, in connection with the July 2013 transaction. During a subsequent bench trial, the court adjudicated McRae a habitual criminal based on six predicate offenses. Before sentencing, McRae advanced a preemptive proportionality challenge, arguing that the 64-year habitual criminal sentence required by law for the triggering offense of selling or distributing a schedule II controlled substance was grossly disproportionate. Despite finding that the triggering offense and five of the six predicate offenses (the drug-related predicate offenses) were per se grave or serious, the trial court concluded that the required prison sentence of 64 years raised an inference of gross disproportionality and sentenced McRae to 16 years in prison instead. The State appealed. The Supreme Court held that in determining the gravity or seriousness of triggering and predicate offenses during an abbreviated proportionality review, the court should consider any relevant legislative amendments enacted after the dates of those offenses, even if the amendments do not apply retroactively. Although the court of appeals reached a similar conclusion, it erred in failing to recognize that, rather than consider relevant prospective legislative amendments enacted after the dates of the triggering and predicate offenses, the trial court actually applied those amendments retroactively. Therefore, its judgment was reversed. And, because additional factual determinations are necessary to properly address the defendant’s proportionality challenge, the case was remanded with instructions to return it to the trial court for a new proportionality review in accordance with Wells-Yates and Melton. View "Colorado v. McRae" on Justia Law

Brooke Rojas received food stamp benefits to which she was not legally entitled. Colorado charged her with two counts of theft under the general theft statute, section 18-4-401(1)(a), C.R.S. (2019). Rojas moved to dismiss these charges, arguing that she could only be prosecuted under section 26-2-305(1)(a), C.R.S. (2019), because it created the specific crime of theft of food stamps. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Rojas of the two general theft counts. Rojas contended on appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court that the trial court erred by denying the motion to dismiss because section 26-2-305(1)(a) abrogated the general theft statute in food stamp benefit cases. A split division of the court of appeals agreed with her. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with Rojas and the division majority. Based on the statute’s plain language, the Court held that the legislature didn’t create a crime separate from general theft by enacting section 26-2-305(1)(a). View "Colorado v. Rojas" on Justia Law