Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a defendant, Raeaje Resshaud Johnson, who was charged with multiple counts related to a domestic violence incident. During jury selection, the prosecutor used a peremptory strike against a Black potential juror, Juror M, who had indicated in a questionnaire that law enforcement had been disrespectful to her or those close to her based on race. The defense challenged this strike under Batson v. Kentucky, alleging it violated equal protection.The trial court sustained the strike, finding that the prosecutor had provided a race-neutral reason for the strike and that the defense had not proven purposeful racial discrimination. Johnson was subsequently convicted on most counts. On appeal, Johnson argued that the trial court had erred in denying his Batson challenge. The appellate court agreed, concluding that the prosecutor's reliance on Juror M's past experiences with law enforcement was a race-based reason for the strike. The court reversed Johnson's convictions and remanded for a new trial.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed with the appellate court's conclusion. It held that the prosecutor's reliance on Juror M's past experiences with law enforcement was a race-neutral reason for the strike. However, the Supreme Court found that the trial court had not made sufficient findings to indicate that it had considered all the pertinent circumstances in concluding that the strike was not made with a discriminatory purpose. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The defendant, Harold Lloyd Honstein, was charged with third-degree assault following an incident with his roommate, V.S. Initially, V.S. reported that Honstein had punched her and thrown a soda can at her head. However, ten months later, V.S. partially recanted her accusation, stating that Honstein had not punched her but had thrown a soda can at her head. This recantation was made in a conversation with the prosecutor and a victim advocate. The prosecutor immediately informed the defense counsel and offered to stipulate via a jury instruction that V.S. had recanted. The defense counsel, however, subpoenaed the prosecutor to testify at trial, arguing that the prosecutor was the only witness to V.S.'s first recantation. The trial court denied the prosecution's motion to quash the subpoena, ruling that there was a "compelling and legitimate need" to call the prosecutor for impeachment purposes.The prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, arguing that the trial court had erred in ordering the prosecutor to testify. The Supreme Court agreed with the prosecution, holding that a defendant who wishes to call a participating prosecutor as a witness must demonstrate a compelling and legitimate reason to do so. The court found that the defense had not demonstrated such a reason, as the material substance of the prosecutor's testimony was available from an alternative source, namely, the investigator who had spoken with V.S. after her conversation with the prosecutor. The court concluded that the trial court had erred in ordering the prosecutor to testify and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "People v. Honstein" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant who was convicted for enticement of a child. The defendant had approached a ten-year-old girl, A.W., while she was walking her dog. He drove into the opposing lane of traffic to pull his truck up beside her, asked her personal questions, and made inappropriate comments. Based on these events and evidence of the defendant’s previous behavior with a five-year-old girl in Louisiana, a jury convicted the defendant of enticement of a child.The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove the offense of enticement. The court of appeals agreed with the defendant's argument, vacating his conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant had attempted to invite or persuade A.W. to enter his truck, or that he intended to commit unlawful sexual contact.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation of the term "attempt" in the child enticement statute. The Supreme Court held that the term "attempt" in the statute should be interpreted according to its plain meaning, not as referring to the inchoate crime of "attempt" defined in another statute. The Supreme Court found that the defendant's words and actions, taken together and viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, constituted sufficient evidence for a reasonable person to conclude that the defendant attempted to invite or persuade the victim to enter his vehicle with the intent to commit unlawful sexual contact upon her. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision vacating the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case to the court of appeals to address his remaining appellate arguments. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Khalil Jamandre Sanders, who was charged with first-degree assault, illegal discharge of a firearm, menacing, possession of a weapon by a previous offender, and two counts of violence after shooting and injuring Jamie Vasquez during a road-rage incident. Sanders requested the presiding judge to recuse herself from the case, arguing that she had experienced a similar incident of criminal conduct, which could potentially bias her judgment. The trial court denied Sanders's motions, and the case proceeded to trial, resulting in Sanders's conviction.The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, concluding that the trial judge's recusal was not required under the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions, section 16-6-201(1)(d), C.R.S. (2023), and Crim. P. 21(b), or the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct (“C.J.C.”) 2.11. The division determined that disqualification was not necessary because Sanders failed to demonstrate actual bias on the part of the judge.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the division's judgment but on somewhat different grounds. The court concluded that the division applied too strict a standard by requiring a showing of actual bias to support a disqualification motion. However, the court agreed that disqualification was not warranted on the facts of this case. The court also concluded that Sanders had not established an appearance of partiality that might have required the trial court to recuse itself under C.J.C. 2.11(A). View "Sanders v. The People of the State of Colorado" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Joseph Wayne Washington, who was charged with multiple crimes including murder, drug possession, witness tampering, violation of a protection order, and solicitation of murder. Washington argued that these charges should not have been tried together, citing a previous case, Norman v. People, which he believed established a rule of automatic reversal for improper joinder of charges.The case was first tried in a lower court where Washington's motion to sever the charges into four separate cases was denied. The court ruled that all seventeen charges were interconnected and part of the same incident. The case proceeded to trial, and Washington was found guilty of second degree murder, ten drug possession counts, violation of a protection order, and witness tampering. He was acquitted of first degree murder, one of the drug possession counts, and the murder solicitation charges.Washington appealed, arguing that his convictions should be reversed due to prejudicial misjoinder under Rule 8(a)(2). The court of appeals affirmed Washington’s conviction, concluding that misjoinder is not a structural error and requires the same harmless-error review that applies to other trial errors.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. The court clarified that the previous case, Norman v. People, did not create a rule of automatic reversal for improper joinder of charges. Instead, the court held that harmless-error review applies to misjoinder. The court concluded that if there was any error in joining the various charges in Washington’s case, that error was harmless. View "Washington v. People" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Taunia Marie Whiteaker, who was convicted of second degree burglary, first degree criminal trespass, third degree assault, and harassment following a physical altercation at her mother-in-law's house. Whiteaker appealed her conviction, arguing that the district court erred by failing to merge her conviction for first degree criminal trespass into her conviction for second degree burglary.The Colorado Court of Appeals rejected Whiteaker's argument, relying on a previous ruling that first degree criminal trespass is not a lesser included offense of second degree burglary. The court reasoned that even though subsequent opinions cast doubt on the previous ruling, it was the prerogative of the Supreme Court alone to overrule its cases. One judge disagreed, believing that a recent opinion had abrogated the previous ruling, but agreed that both convictions should survive because the district court's error in failing to merge the two offenses was not plain.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court agreed with Whiteaker that first degree criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of second degree burglary, and that her overlapping convictions violated the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The court held that double jeopardy sentencing errors require automatic reversal even when the error isn't obvious to the district court. Therefore, Whiteaker's convictions for trespass and burglary merge. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to instruct the district court to amend the mittimus to reflect the merger of Whiteaker's conviction for first degree criminal trespass into her conviction for second degree burglary. View "Whiteaker v. People" on Justia Law

The case involves Glen Gary Montoya, who was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI). After initially agreeing to a blood test, Montoya later refused. However, after the nurse left, he changed his mind and requested to take the test. The test was not conducted. At trial, the prosecution sought to use Montoya’s refusal as evidence of consciousness of guilt. Montoya was found guilty of DUI and careless driving.The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that if a criminal court determines that a driver refused testing, that determination must be based on the law of refusal that has developed in the administrative, license-revocation context. The court also concluded that if the prosecutor seeks to use as evidence a defendant’s refusal of a chemical test, but the defendant disputes refusal, the entire circumstances surrounding the defendant’s test-taking must be submitted for the jury’s consideration. The court reversed Montoya’s DUI conviction and remanded for a new trial.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the law of refusal. The Supreme Court held that criminal DUI trials are governed by the same evidentiary rules as any other criminal trial. Therefore, criminal courts are not bound by the law of refusal that governs administrative, license-revocation hearings. The court also concluded that the district court erred by admitting evidence of Montoya's refusal to submit to testing and excluding evidence of his subsequent request for testing. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the lower court, remanding the case for a new trial. View "People v. Montoya" on Justia Law

Brandon Mason Bohler was charged with first-degree murder after stabbing his roommate to death. He pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. During his arrest, Bohler made statements to the police which were later suppressed by the district court. The court ruled that Bohler was in custody for Miranda purposes when he made the statements, and thus, they should have been preceded by a Miranda warning.The People of the State of Colorado appealed the district court's decision to suppress Bohler's statements. They argued that Bohler was not in custody when he made the statements, and therefore, a Miranda warning was not required. The appeal was brought before the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the district court's decision. The court determined that Bohler was not in custody when he made the statements. The court reasoned that a reasonable person in Bohler's position would not have believed himself to be deprived of freedom of action to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in suppressing Bohler's statements, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "People v. Brandon Bohler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed a lower court's restitution order, ruling that the defendant was the proximate cause of the victim's pecuniary loss. The defendant, Arnold Roman Martinez, had stolen a bicycle and was pursued by the bicycle's owner in a car. The car was damaged when the owner cut off Martinez, causing him to crash into the car. The district court ordered Martinez to pay over $2,000 in restitution for the damage to the car.On appeal, Martinez challenged the order, asserting that he did not proximately cause the damage to the car. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado ruled that the standard for reviewing a district court's determination of proximate cause for criminal restitution is clear error, not the abuse-of-discretion standard used by the lower court. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not clearly err in determining that Martinez's theft was the proximate cause of the damage to the car. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the restitution order on different grounds. View "Martinez v. People" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Colorado examined the case of Carlos Ray Maes, who was charged with six felony counts. A magistrate presided over the preliminary hearing and found that probable cause existed for each of the eligible counts. The case was then bound over to the district court. Nearly three months later, Maes petitioned the district court for a review of the magistrate's probable-cause determination, but the district court declined, arguing that it did not have jurisdiction to review such a determination and that Maes's petition was not timely.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that a magistrate's finding of probable cause after a preliminary hearing is a "final order or judgment" under the Colorado Rules for Magistrates and is therefore reviewable by a district court. Further, the court held that the time limit for petitioning for district court review of a magistrate's final order or judgment begins when the magistrate memorializes that determination in writing. Consequently, the court concluded that Maes's petition was timely filed. The court made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "People v. Maes" on Justia Law