Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Amber Torrez was confined in Denver County on two unrelated warrants: a Jefferson County warrant for assault and other charges (the case giving rise to this appeal) and a Denver County warrant for two murder charges. With regard to the Denver County charges, Torrez was held without bond until a jury eventually found her not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), at which time she was committed to Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo (CMHIP). While confined after the NGRI verdict, Torrez pled guilty to the Jefferson County assault. Torrez asked the trial court to award her presentence confinement credit (PSCC) toward her Jefferson County sentence for both the time that she spent confined during the pendency of the Denver proceedings, as well as the time she spent at CMHIP after the Denver NGRI verdict. The trial court gave her credit for neither period. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that because Torrez would have remained confined prior to and after the NGRI verdict even had the charges in Jefferson County not existed, her presentence confinement for those periods was not attributable to this case, and credit was therefore not warranted for either period. View "Colorado v. Torrez" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a trial court abuses its discretion when it denies a continuance that defense counsel requested seeking more time to prepare for trial. At the time defense counsel moved for the continuance, the trial court was confronted with (and considered): (1) that defense counsel would have three weeks to prepare for a two- or three-day trial involving eight witnesses and no physical evidence, but defense counsel refused to make specific arguments on why the additional time was needed; (2) that the trial court would have had to rearrange its docket and possibly hand off the case to a different judge; (3) priority was given to cases involving the sexual assault of a child; and (4) the victim’s family wanted to resolve the case promptly. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that, under these circumstances, the trial court’s decision to deny a continuance was not so manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair to constitute an abuse of discretion. The Court reversed the contrary holding of the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Ahuero" on Justia Law

In this case, the supreme court considers whether a prospective juror’s silence in response to rehabilitative questioning constitutes evidence sufficient to support a trial court’s conclusion that the juror has been rehabilitated. Defendant Bradley Clemens chased his girlfriend out of their home and attacked her with a golf club on the street. He also attacked a bystander who attempted to intervene and stop the assault. The State charged Clemens with second-degree assault, felony menacing, and third-degree assault. Clemens pleaded not guilty, and the matter was tried before a jury. During Clemens’s portion of voir dire, defense counsel questioned the venire members, asking for their thoughts on relevant legal principles. Juror 25 commented that there are “always two sides to the story” and that he would need to hear both sides before making a judgment call. Defense counsel followed up by asking, “if you don’t hear from [Clemens] you have some real concerns as to whether or not you can find him not guilty?” Juror 25 said that was correct. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that a juror has been rehabilitated when, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the context of the silence indicates that the juror will render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence submitted to the jury at the trial. Applying this test, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel’s challenges for cause. View "Colorado v. Clemens" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jamey Robert Page entered the home of an eighty-six-year-old woman late at night and sexually assaulted her. During the assault, the victim bit Page’s tongue, causing him to bleed on her clothing. A DNA analysis of the victim’s blood-stained clothing revealed that a mixture of DNA was present and that Page’s DNA was the source of a major component. The People charged Page with several crimes related to the assault. As relevant here, the jury found Page guilty of both sexual assault involving an at-risk adult and unlawful sexual contact involving an at-risk adult. The trial court sentenced Page to twenty-four years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections on the sexual assault charge and eighteen months concurrently on the unlawful sexual contact charge. The issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether a conviction for unlawful sexual contact involving an at-risk adult merged with a conviction for sexual assault involving an at-risk adult. The Court concluded that it did. Hence, it reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded this case to the court of appeals with instructions to return the case to the trial court to vacate the defendant’s conviction for unlawful sexual contact. View "Page v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Gilbert Naranjo was charged with two counts of felony menacing for pointing a handgun from his vehicle toward the two occupants of another vehicle during a road-rage incident. Naranjo admitted at trial that he handled the gun during the incident but testified that he merely moved the weapon from the front passenger seat to the glove compartment to prevent it from sliding onto the floor and accidentally discharging. At the close of evidence, Naranjo tendered a jury instruction for the lesser non-included offense of disorderly conduct, which, in relevant part, prohibited the intentional, knowing, or reckless display of a deadly weapon in a public place "in a manner calculated to alarm." The trial court refused, and the jury convicted Naranjo of both counts of felony menacing. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that Naranjo was entitled to the instruction, and reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The State appealed. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded there was no rational basis for the jury to simultaneously acquit Naranjo of felony menacing and convict him of disorderly conduct. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals. View "Colorado v. Naranjo" on Justia Law

The State sought review of the court of appeals’ judgment reversing defendant Priscilla Rock’s convictions for second degree burglary and theft. The trial court denied Rock’s request for an additional, lesser-included-offense instruction on second degree criminal trespass, on the ground that second degree criminal trespass was not an included offense of second degree burglary. The court of appeals reversed, concluding both that the trial court erred in denying Rock’s requested instruction and that the error was not harmless with regard to either of Rock’s convictions. The Colorado Supreme Court determined the district court erred in denying the defendant her requested instruction on second degree criminal trespass on the ground that it was not a lesser included offense of the charged offense of second degree burglary, and because erroneously denying Rock’s requested instruction was not harmless with regard to either of her convictions, the judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "Colorado v. Rock" on Justia Law

Parish Carter was convicted of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The district court denied his motion to suppress statements made in a videotaped interrogation, including his assertion he had not been adequately advised of his Miranda rights. In a “fractured” opinion, the court of appeals affirmed with regard to both of these assignments of error. The Colorado Supreme Court found the Miranda advisement of defendant reasonably conveyed that he had a right to consult with counsel, both before and during any interrogation by the police, and because the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the jury unrestricted access to both a video recording and transcript of the defendant’s custodial interrogation, the judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "Carter v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the district court misinterpreted the “special circumstances” prong of section 20-1-107(2), C.R.S (2016), in finding that the circumstances at issue satisfied the high burden required to bar an entire district attorney’s office from prosecuting a defendant. Prosecutors from the District Attorney’s Office for the Fourth Judicial District (the “District Attorney”) twice brought the defendant, Maurice Kendrick, to trial on numerous charges related to allegations that he threatened several women with a gun and then fired the gun at two occupied houses. Each trial ended in a mistrial, and after ordering the second mistrial, the district court found “special circumstances” rendered it unlikely that Kendrick would receive a fair trial if he were again tried by the District Attorney. Accordingly, the court disqualified the District Attorney from re-prosecuting the case and ordered that a special prosecutor be appointed to try Kendrick a third time. The Supreme Court found the district court ordered the disqualification of the District Attorney based on the court’s “lingering concern that because the People have [the defense memorandum] in hand, . . . there clearly is at least an appearance that the defendant would not receive a fair trial, if not an actual problem of him not receiving a fair trial.” Insofar as the district court based its ruling on a perceived “appearance” of impropriety, we conclude that the court applied an incorrect legal standard because, as noted above, the appearance of impropriety is no longer a valid basis for disqualifying a district attorney. View "Colorado v. Kendrick" on Justia Law

In 2011, a jury convicted Susan Stock of third degree burglary and theft for stealing money from vending machines at the hotel where she worked. The court of appeals reversed Stock’s convictions, concluding that the trial court erroneously denied Stock’s motion to suppress statements she made to a police officer who had entered the hotel room where she lived. Stock’s father, who was Stock’s invited guest in the room, had opened the door on Stock’s behalf in response to the officer’s knock, and moved aside to allow the officer to step a few feet inside the hotel-room door. The officer then requested and obtained Stock’s express permission to come further into the room to speak with her. The court of appeals reasoned that the police officer’s entry into the hotel room was unlawful because Stock’s father lacked authority to consent to the officer’s entry into the hotel room. In reviewing the court of appeals’ decision, the issue presented to the Colorado Supreme Court was whether the officer’s entry into Stock’s hotel room violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. Importantly, this case did not require the Court to decide whether Stock’s father had authority to consent to a full-blown search of the room; rather, the narrower question was whether Stock’s father could consent to the officer’s limited entry a few feet inside the door. On the facts of this case, the Colorado Court concluded Stock conferred authority on her father to consent to the officer’s limited entry. The trial court therefore properly denied Stock’s motion to suppress, and her statements to the officer were admissible at trial. View "Colorado v. Stock" on Justia Law

The department of corrections petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment reversing a district court order denying Raymond Fetzer’s petition pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2). Fetzer’s petition sought an order compelling the recalculation of his parole eligibility date, asserting that the department’s “governing sentence” method, which calculated his parole eligibility date solely on the basis of the longest of his concurrent sentences, violated the statutory requirement that his multiple sentences be treated as one continuous sentence. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for recalculation, reasoning both that, contrary to the department’s understanding, the statutory continuous sentence requirement applies to concurrent as well as consecutive sentences and that the department’s “governing sentence” method of calculation could not apply to Fetzer’s sentences because they were all subject to the same statutory parole provisions. Because Fetzer’s multiple sentences were not all subject to the same statutory parole provisions, as indicated in the court of appeals’ opinion, reference to a governing sentence, or some comparable means of determining the applicable incidents of his parole, may have remained necessary to the calculation of Fetzer’s parole eligibility date. The judgment of the court of appeals reversing the district court’s order was therefore affirmed. Its remand order, directing the department to recalculate Fetzer’s parole eligibility date in accordance with its opinion, however, was reversed, and the case remanded with directions that it be returned to the district court. View "Exec. Dir. of the Colo. Dept. of Corr. v. Fetzer" on Justia Law