Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In a combined opinion, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed whether sexual offenders had to bear the cost of their victims’ forensic medical examinations as criminal restitution. The General Assembly authorized recovery of “extraordinary direct public . . . investigative costs,” courts of appeals have disagreed as to whether the cost of a victim’s SANE (Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner) examination was “extraordinary.” As both a medical and investigative response to a sexual offense, a SANE exam necessarily performs dual roles: as a valuable tool for collecting sexual-assault evidence; and also as a patient-centered medical procedure sensitive to victims’ treatment needs, conducted by medical personnel, and limited to the scope of victims’ informed consent. The Supreme Court concluded the hybrid nature of these exams rendered them (and their resulting costs) extraordinary, and the state may recover those costs as restitution. The Court thus affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in Colorado v. Teague, No. 10CA2358 (Colo. App. Nov. 27, 2013) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)), and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in Colorado v. Rogers, 2014 COA 110, __ P.3d __. Accordingly, the Court reinstated the district court’s restitution award in Rogers. View "Teague v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review in this case was whether it was reversible error for a trial court in a criminal case to provide the deliberating jury with “unfettered and unsupervised access” to a crime scene video and a video of a police interview of defendant Ignacio Ray “Mike” Rael. A unanimous division of the court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in either regard. The Supreme Court agreed with the result reached by the appellate court, namely, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury unfettered access to the two videos during deliberations. In the Court’s view, the jury was entitled to access the non-testimonial crime scene video because that video did not present the same risk of undue emphasis as do videos documenting witnesses’ out-of-court, testimonial statements. The Court also concluded based on the longstanding rule that a defendant’s confession was not subject to the same limitations during deliberations as the out-of-court statements of other witnesses, that the jury was entitled to access the interview video. View "Rael v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State appealed the reversal of Kalani Opana’s conviction for second degree murder, in the shooting death of one of his housemates. The district court instructed the jury as to the use of deadly physical force in defense of one’s person. In consideration of the statutory definition of the term “deadly physical force,” which limited the applicability of the term to “force, the intended, natural, and probable consequence of which is to produce death,” the court of appeals determined that there was adequate evidence produced at trial for the jury to have found that Opana used physical force not rising to the level of “deadly” physical force, and it concluded that in this case the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the use of physical force generally amounted to plain error. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the court of appeals misconstrued the definition of “deadly physical force,” and when that statutory term is properly construed, the evidence at trial did not support an instruction on self-defense predicated on the use of other-than-“deadly” physical force. The court of appeals was accordingly reversed, and the case remanded for consideration of the defendant’s remaining assignments of error. View "Colorado v. Opana" on Justia Law

In 2006, Guy Lucero was convicted by jury for multiple offenses arising from a drive-by shooting. He was tried as an adult. The trial court sentenced Lucero to consecutive term-of-years prison sentences for each count, aggravated as crimes of violence, resulting in an aggregate sentence of eighty-four years. The court of appeals affirmed Lucero’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), that the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile non-homicide offender, concluding that states must “give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Subsequently, Lucero filed a motion pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure seeking reduction of his sentence. As relevant here, Lucero argued that his sentence must be reduced under Graham to meet constitutional standards, because an eighty-four-year sentence imposed on a juvenile carried the same implications as a sentence of life without parole. The trial court denied the motion; the court of appeals affirmed. The Colorado Supreme Court determined "Graham" and "Miller" did not apply here, and therefore, did not invalidate Lucero's aggregate term-of-years sentence. The Court also rejected Lucero’s argument that the court of appeals erred in treating his claim as one under Rule 35(c). View "Lucero v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In 2000, Atorrus Rainer was convicted by jury on two counts of attempted first-degree murder, two counts of first-degree assault, one count of first-degree burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, and crime of violence. He was seventeen at the time of the charged offenses, and he was charged as an adult. Rainer was sentenced to forty-eight years for each attempted murder charge, thirty-two years for each assault charge, and thirty-two years each for the charges of burglary and aggravated robbery. The sentences for the two counts of attempted murder were subsequently ordered to run concurrently, as were the sentences for the two counts of assault, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 112 years. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), which categorically banned sentences of life without parole for juveniles who were not convicted of homicide, Rainer moved the district court to vacate the sentence, arguing that his aggregate term-of-years sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole and therefore unconstitutional under "Graham." The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that, because Rainer would be eligible for parole at about age seventy-five, thus ineligible for parole within his expected lifetime, he had no meaningful opportunity to obtain release and was unconstitutional under "Graham" and the subsequent case of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). The Colorado Supreme Court determined "Graham" and "Miller" did not apply here, and therefore, did not invalidate Rainer's aggregate term-of-years sentence. View "Colorado v. Rainer" on Justia Law

In 1995, Cheryl Armstrong was convicted by jury on two counts of second-degree murder under a complicity theory. She was sixteen at the time of the charged offenses, and was tried as an adult. Armstrong was sentenced to forty-eight years in prison on each count, to be served consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of ninety-six years. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), which categorically banned sentences of life without parole for juveniles who were not convicted of homicide, Armstrong moved the district court to vacate the sentence, arguing that her aggregate term-of-years sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole and therefore unconstitutional under "Graham." The district court denied Armstrong’s motion. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that, because Armstrong will be eligible for parole at about age sixty, she has a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, and her sentence thereby complied with "Graham" and the subsequent case of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). The Colorado Supreme Court determined "Graham" and "Miller" did not apply here, and therefore, did not invalidate Armstrong's aggregate term-of-years sentence. View "Armstrong v. Colorado" on Justia Law

When a defendant knowingly and intelligently waives his Miranda rights, knew he was free to leave an interview, and confessed to committing a crime during the course of a conversational, friendly interview devoid of coercive promises or threats, he gave his statements voluntarily. This interlocutory appeal required the Colorado Supreme Court to determine whether an defendant's confession to an Army investigator during basic training was the product of coercion. A thirteen-year-old victim told a sheriff's office that seven years prior, defendant Z.T. forced her to give him oral sex. At the time of the alleged assaults, Z.T. was thirteen, and the victim was six. At the time the victim made the allegations in 2015, Z.T. was in Army basic training in Georgia. A sheriff's deputy formally asked an Army investigator to interview Z.T. about the allegations. Z.T. would ultimately be charged with sexual assault on a child. He was extradited to Colorado to stand trial. He moved to suppress the confession, and the trial court granted the motion, finding the Army investigator engaged in coercive conduct that played a significant role in inducing the confession. Finding no such coercive behavior and that the confessions were given voluntarily, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado in the Interest of Z.T.T." on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury convicted Alejandro Estrada-Huerta of second-degree kidnapping and sexual assault. Estrada-Huerta was seventeen at the time he was charged, and he was tried as an adult. The trial court sentenced Estrada-Huerta to twenty-four years for the kidnapping conviction and sixteen years to life for each count of sexual assault. The sexual assault sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to the kidnapping sentence, resulting in an aggregate sentence of forty years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Estrada-Huerta moved to vacate his sentences, arguing his aggregate term-of-years sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole and was therefore unconstitutional under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that, because Estrada-Huerta would be eligible for parole at age fifty-eight, he had a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, therefore his sentence complied with “Graham” and the subsequent case of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s result, though on different grounds. The Court found that “Graham” and “Miller” did not apply in this matter; Estrada-Huerta was not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole: he received consecutive terms for three separate convictions. View "Estrada-Huerta v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Just after midnight on September 6, 2015, Officer Luke Bishard responded to a report of a vehicle driving erratically. Officer Bishard observed defendant Melissa King’s eyes were glassy and her speech was slurred. King admitted to having stopped for a drink on her way home from work. She attempted but failed to successfully perform voluntary roadside maneuvers. Officer Bishard arrested King for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). After the arrest, he read her an advisement consistent with Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute, section 42-4-1301.1, C.R.S. (2016). King refused to submit to a either a blood or breath test. Before trial, King filed a motion to declare section 42-4-1301(6)(d) unconstitutional as applied. The Colorado Supreme Court held that per Fitzgerald v. Colorado, 2017 CO 26 (2017), the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s refusal to consent to a blood or breath test as evidence of guilt does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Given the holding in “Fitzgerald,” King’s as-applied challenge to the statute failed, and the trial court’s order reversed. View "Colorado v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant Alan Sewick was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). The arresting officer began to read Sewick an advisement consistent with Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute, section 42-4-1301.1, C.R.S. (2016), but the officer could not complete the advisement because Sewick became belligerent, yelling at the officer and telling him to stop reading. The officer asked Sewick whether he would consent to a blood test or a breath test, and Sewick refused to do so. Before trial, Sewick filed a motion asking the trial court to declare section 42-4-1301(6)(d) unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The trial court rejected Sewick’s facial challenge, but it granted Sewick’s motion with respect to the as-applied challenge. The Colorado Supreme Court held that per Fitzgerald v. Colorado, 2017 CO 26 (2017), the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s refusal to consent to a blood or breath test as evidence of guilt does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Given the holding in “Fitzgerald,” Sewick’s as-applied challenge to the statute failed, and the trial court’s order reversed. View "Colorado v. Sewick" on Justia Law