Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

This case presented two issues for the Supreme Court’s review: (1) whether a double jeopardy claim can be raised for the first time on appeal; and (2) whether defendant William Costello Scott’s convictions for both aggravated robbery-menaced with a deadly weapon (“aggravated robbery-menaced victim”) and menacing amounted to plain error. In light of the Court’s opinion in “Reyna-Abarca v. Colorado,” (2017 CO 15, ___ P.3d ___),the Court concluded that unpreserved double jeopardy claims can be raised for the first time on appeal and that courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error. Furthermore, the Court concluded that in the circumstances presented here, any error that might have occurred when the trial court entered judgment on Scott’s convictions for both aggravated robbery-menaced victim and menacing was not obvious and thus, did not amount to plain error. Accordingly, although the Court concluded that the division erred in declining to review Scott’s unpreserved double jeopardy claim, the Court nonetheless affirmed the judgment. View "Scott v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Petitioner-defendant Farouk Nagi appealed the court of appeals’ judgment affirming his conviction and sentence for sexual assault on a child by one of a position of trust. He also argued the district court lacked sufficient grounds to justify ordering a competency evaluation, and that the period during which petitioner was under observation or examination was not properly excluded from the calculation of time within which trial was statutorily required. The court of appeals rejected petitioner’s assertion he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial. In the absence of any specific assertion or indication in the record that the district court’s order was entered in bad faith, for the purpose of circumventing the statutory speedy trial mandate or otherwise depriving the defendant of a protected interest, rather than from any concern for the defendant’s rights or the integrity of the judicial process, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. View "Nagi v. California" on Justia Law

In 2006, respondent Ruben Ramos was riding in the front passenger seat of a car driven by his girlfriend. His girlfriend’s three children were seated in the backseat along with R.L., his girlfriend’s friend. The girlfriend and Ramos began to argue when Ramos turned his attention to R.L., where he punched R.L. in the face several times. Blood from Ramos’ hand ended up on R.L.’s jacket and baseball cap. Ramos’ theory of defense was that he had not struck R.L. and the blood stains were from waiving his hand around. This case, as in “Venalonzo v. Colorado,” presented for the Supreme Court’s review an issue of lay and expert testimony. Specifically, this case required the Court to resolve one issue: whether an ordinary person would be able to differentiate reliably between blood cast-off and blood transfer. Applying the test announced in “Venalonzo,” the Court held that an ordinary person would not be able to testify reliably about the difference between blood cast-off and blood transfer. Therefore, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the trial court abused its discretion by not qualifying a police detective’s blood testimony as expert testimony. View "Colorado v. Ramos" on Justia Law

The defendant in this case, Daniela Molina, used the last name and social security number (SSN) of another person, D.K., to obtain an apartment lease and employment. A jury later convicted Molina of two counts of identity theft and three counts of forgery. Molina appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove all the elements of identity theft and forgery. The court of appeals held: (1) the State was required to prove that Molina knew she had stolen the information of a real person; (2) there was insufficient evidence that Molina knew the last name and SSN she used belonged to a real person; (3) vacated her identity theft convictions; and (4) affirmed her forgery convictions. The court of appeals declined to reach Molina’s argument that the term “thing of value” in the identity theft statute only pertained to items with pecuniary value and therefore neither employment nor an apartment lease were “thing[s]of value.” The Supreme Court concluded: (1) the State needed to show that Molina knew she stole another person’s information; (2) there was sufficient evidence to show Molina knew she stole a real person’s information; and (3) an apartment lease and employment qualified as “things of value.” View "Colorado v. Molina" on Justia Law

Trooper Joseph Ynostroza stopped John Cox for driving in the left lane. During the stop, the Trooper observed several factors that led him to suspect that there might be evidence of illegal activity in the trunk of the vehicle, including the fact that his canine alerted to the odor of drugs in the trunk. The Trooper opened the trunk where he found, among other things, two white trash bags with multiple sealed packages of marijuana. The trial court granted Cox’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that it is “unreasonable for an officer to rely on the alert from a canine trained to detect any amount of marijuana, including legal amounts.” The trial court concluded that, based on the remaining factors to be considered, the Trooper did not have probable cause to search the trunk. The State appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Trooper had probable cause under the totality of the circumstances. View "Colorado v. Cox" on Justia Law

In 2006, respondent Ruben Ramos was riding in the front passenger seat of a car driven by his girlfriend. His girlfriend’s three children were seated in the backseat along with R.L., his girlfriend’s friend. The girlfriend and Ramos began to argue when Ramos turned his attention to R.L., where he punched R.L. in the face several times. Blood from Ramos’ hand ended up on R.L.’s jacket and baseball cap. Ramos’ theory of defense was that he had not struck R.L. and the blood stains were from waiving his hand around. This case, as in “Venalonzo v. Colorado,” presented for the Supreme Court’s review an issue of lay and expert testimony. Specifically, this case required the Court to resolve one issue: whether an ordinary person would be able to differentiate reliably between blood cast-off and blood transfer. Applying the test announced in “Venalonzo,” the Court held that an ordinary person would not be able to testify reliably about the difference between blood cast-off and blood transfer. Therefore, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the trial court abused its discretion by not qualifying a police detective’s blood testimony as expert testimony. View "Venalonzo v. Colorado" on Justia Law

A jury convicted petitioner Anthony Edwin Marsh of sexually assaulting three of his granddaughters and possessing more than twenty images depicting child pornography. Marsh appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the presence of temporary internet cache files stored on a person’s hard drive can constitute evidence of “knowing possession” as used in Colorado’s child pornography statute, section 18-6-403, C.R.S. (2016). First, the Court held that when a computer user seeks out and views child pornography on the internet, he possesses the images he views. The evidence presented at trial established that Marsh’s cache contained images that a computer user had previously viewed on the web browser. The Court therefore concluded that the internet cache images qualified as relevant evidence that Marsh had previously viewed, and thus possessed, those images. Even if the trial court improperly admitted the forensic interviewers’ testimony as lay opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that error was harmless. Therefore, the Court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment in its entirety. View "Marsh v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Colorado medical marijuana constitutional amendment required law enforcement officers to return medical marijuana seized from individuals later acquitted of state drug charges. The federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) prohibited the distribution of marijuana, with limited exceptions. The question in this case was whether the return provision of the Colorado Constitution was preempted by the federal CSA. In a split decision, the court of appeals held the return provision was not preempted. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, finding that the CSA did not preempt state law on the same subject matter unless there was a positive conflict between the state and federal laws such that the two could not consistently stand together. The Colorado Court reasoned that because state law enforcement officers were returning marijuana, they were indeed “distributing” it. This constituted a “positive conflict” between the laws. The Court found that the Colorado provision was thus preempted and rendered void. View "Colorado v. Crouse" on Justia Law

In 2012, police arrested respondent Alexander Wolf after a search of his car netted various narcotics, including less than one ounce of marijuana. Respondent was ultimately charged with possession, and pertinent to this appeal, possession of less than two ounces of marijuana. Before respondent’s case was submitted to a jury, Colorado passed Amendment 64, legalizing possession of up to one ounce of marijuana for personal use. The jury found respondent guilty of possessing the marijuana, and he was sentenced to twenty-one days in jail and two years of probation. Respondent appealed, arguing that his conviction for possessing what ultimately was less than one ounce of marijuana should be vacated because Amendment 64 legalized possession of less than one ounce of marijuana before he has been convicted. A divided court of appeals vacated the marijuana possession conviction and sentence. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that Amendment 64 deprived the State of the power to continue to prosecute individuals for possession of one ounce of marijuana after the Amendment became effective. View "Colorado v. Wolf" on Justia Law

In 2010, defendant Brandi Russell and her husband brought their infant to a hospital with a broken leg. Worried that the child may have been abused, a doctor contacted a social worker, who then contacted the Department of Social Services. The social worker interviewed defendant, and worried she was on drugs. A court order was obtained requiring defendant to submit to a drug test. The results revealed defendant has used amphetamine, marijuana and methamphetamine. Police obtained a warrant, searched defendant's home, and found drug paraphernalia. The State charged defendant with child abuse resulting in serious injury, and possession of controlled substances. A jury acquitted defendant of the child abuse charge, but convicted her on possession charges. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court found that defendant would have been convicted on the methamphetamine charge with or without a police officer's testimony, so any error in admitting that testimony as lay testimony was harmless. With respect to defendant's possession of marijuana conviction, the Supreme Court found that Amendment 64 to the Colorado Constitution deprived the State of the power to continue to prosecute cases where there was a nonfinal conviction for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana pending on direct appeal when the Amendment became effective. The Court affirmed the court of appeals as to both issues. View "Russell v. Colorado" on Justia Law