Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether Amendment 64 to the Colorado Constitution (legalizing possession of small amounts of marijuana) deprived the State the power to continue to prosecute cases where there was a nonfinal conviction for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, and where there was a pending right to appeal (exercised by filing a notice of appeal) at the time the Amendment became effective. "In case a statute is repealed or rendered inoperative, no further proceedings can be had to enforce it in pending prosecutions." The Colorado Supreme Court found that Amendment 64 rendered inoperative the pertinent language of the statute under which the defendant in this case had been arrested, because Amendment 64 legalized what the applicable statute had prohibited. As such, the Court concluded that Amendment 64 indeed deprived the State of its power to continue to prosecute cases where there was a nonfinal conviction for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana and where there was a pending right to appeal at the time the Amendment became effective. View "Colorado v. Boyd" on Justia Law

Alamosa County police officers applied for and received a warrant to search Lonnie Cooper’s residence and vehicles on his property for illegal drugs and other items associated with the sale of illegal drugs. The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed an interlocutory appeal to answer whether an officer could reasonable and in good faith rely on a warrant when the warrant affidavit was devoid of specific dates, but established a long, ongoing pattern of drug trafficking from a home. After review of the specifics of this case, the Supreme Court concluded there was enough evidence in the warrant affidavit of an ongoing drug trafficking operation that an officer could have a reasonable, good faith belief that the warrant was proper. The Court reversed the trial court’s suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Respondent Curtis Adams was found guilty by jury of assaulting a correctional officer. The presumptive sentencing range for that offense was two to six years, but because Adams committed the assault while serving a sentence for a prior felony, the trial court imposed an aggravated sentence of twelve years, to be served consecutively to Adams’ remaining sentence. This case arose out of the intersection between two sources of sentence enhancement: one requiring an aggravated term-of-years range; the other requiring consecutive sentencing. The appellate court concluded Adams was not subject to the term-of-years enhancement as applied by the trial court. The State appealed, arguing that the trial court was required to apply both enhancements. The Supreme Court, in its review of the plain language of the applicable statutes, concluded both enhancements applied. The Court reversed a portion of the appellate court’s judgment vacating respondent’s sentence. The case was then remanded for resentencing. View "Colorado v. Adams" on Justia Law

Police responded to a domestic disturbance involving then 16-year-old A.L.-C., who was feuding with he mother and stepfather on the first floor of the family home. B.O., his sister, told an aunt who was in the house, that A.L.-C. had sexually assaulted her. B.O. repeated her allegations to the police. A.L.-C. was briefly detained, but then returned to his parents. The following day, A.L.-C. and his parents went to the police station for questioning about the alleged sexual assaults. A detective and Spanish interpreter advised the three of A.L.-C.'s "Miranda" rights, then the detective and interpreter stepped out of the room to allow the family to discuss whether A.L.-C. would waive his rights. A videorecorder captured their exchange. Initially, the tape showed the parents individually asking A.L.-C. whether he understood his rights. A.L.-C. replied that he was "always the liar, or the one lying" and told his mother he would rather keep quiet. Whether A.L.-C. meant this as a refusal to speak with his mother or with the police was unclear. Minutes later, the detective and interpreter re-enetered the room and A.L.-C. and his mother both signed the Miranda waiver form. A.L.-C. indicated he understood his rights and agreed to discuss his sister's allegations. A.L.-C.'s stepfather left the room before more questioning began, but his mother remained for its entirety. At issue was A.L.-C.'s statement to his mother outside of police presence. The trial court suppressed A.L.-C.'s incriminating statements, concluding that although his mother was present, she could not protect his right to remain silent because she did not share his interests. The State sought the Colorado Supreme Court's review. Finding that the plain language of section 19-2-511(1) C.R.S. (2016) required only that a parent be present during the advisement and interrogation, the Supreme Court reversed the suppression order. View "People in the Interest of A.L.-C." on Justia Law

Petitioner Fritz Schneider appealed when the court of appeals affirmed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault: one for sexual assault of a physically helpless victim and another for "sexual assault by causing submission of a victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim's will" These charges were based on evidence of a single, continuous penetration of the same victim. The court of appeals upheld the convictions against challenges of jeopardy and merger on grounds petitioner had been convicted of two separate crimes. The appellate court upheld the consecutive sentences on grounds that the sentences were mandated by statute. Petitioner again appealed, arguing the court of appeals erred in its judgment. The Supreme Court concurred in the outcome, if on slightly different grounds. View "Schneider v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Similar to "Colorado v. Johnson," (2016 CO 69 (2016)), at issue in this case were questions involving what a trial court could order when a juvenile seeks a reverse-transfer of her criminal case from trial court to juvenile court. Defendant Brooke Higgins was a juvenile respondent before a magistrate judge. The district attorney requested, and Higgins' then-defense-counsel agreed to, a state administered mental health assessment of Higgins. Because the parties agreed, the magistrate judge ordered the assessment. Later, in front of a trial court, the DA dismissed the juvenile charges against Higgins and charged her as an adult with two counts of conspiracy to commit murder. Higgins sought, and the trial court granted, a reverse-transfer hearing to determine whether she should remain in adult court. Before that hearing, Higgins, now represented by different counsel, filed a motion to suppress the mental health assessment and disqualify the trial court judge. The trial court denied both requests, holding that the parties stipulated to the assessment, and there was independent statutory authority for the magistrate judge to order the assessment. Higgins appealed, arguing the trial court lacked authority to order a juvenile-charged-as-an-adult to undergo a mental health assessment for a reverse-transfer hearing. The Supreme Court found that based on the facts of this case, Higgins' arguments, while loosely related to those in "Johnson," were hypothetical and premature. The Court therefore vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Higgins v. Colorado" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were questions involving what a trial court could order when a juvenile seeks a reverse-transfer of her criminal case from trial court to juvenile court. The district attorney directly filed a criminal complaint against defendant Sienna Johnson in trial court, treating her as an adult and charging her with two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Defendant requested a reverse-transfer hearing, and the trial court granted her request. The State appealed, arguing that C.R.S. 19-2-517(3)(b)(VI) (the reverse-transfer statute) required a trial court to evaluate the petitioner's mental health. The DA requested access to defendant's mental health and psychological records and requested a court-ordered mental health assessment. Defendant responded that she should not have to produce the records because she had not waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege in her request for a reverse-transfer, and the statute did not give the trial court authority to order an assessment. The trial court ruled in favor of the DA on both counts. The Supreme Court concluded after review: (1) nothing in the reverse-transfer statute stated that a juvenile waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege by requesting a reverse-transfer hearing, so the trial court could not order her to produce her mental records; and (2) nothing in the statute gave the trial court explicit authority to order the mental health assessment. The case was therefore remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this case's first appeal, the Supreme Court reversed a suppression order by the trial court, concluding that the police lawfully stopped defendant Amadeo Chavez-Barragan for failing to drive within a single lane (weaving). Methamphetamine was discovered following the stop, and evidence of the methamphetamine was suppressed. The trial court had not ruled on other issues raised in the suppression motion, so the case was remanded. The trial court found different grounds upon which to base its suppression and again suppressed the evidence. This time, the trial court determined that the seizure that followed the initial stop was unreasonable, and defendant's consent to the search was not voluntary. After review, the Supreme Court again reversed the suppression order. Concluding that the initial stop and detention was reasonable and the consent to search was voluntary. The drugs found should not have been suppressed. View "Colorado v. Chavez-Barragan" on Justia Law

The Colorado State Patrol gave petitioner Gregory Hoskin a speeding ticket. Hoskin pled not guilty, and the matter went to a bench trial, which ultimately ended against Hoskin. He appealed, and the district court reversed, concluding that the county court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Hoskin when it required him to prove that his speed was reasonable and prudent, thereby violating his due process rights. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the speeding statute (C.R.S. 42-2-1101) created a mandatory rebuttable presumption that did not violate due process. Furthermore, the Court found sufficient evidence in the record to support the county court's judgment that Hoskin was speeding. The Court therefore reversed the district court and remanded the case for reinstatement of the county court's judgment. View "Colorado v. Hoskin" on Justia Law

Upon obtaining information that Steven Bleck was suicidal and possibly armed, officers with the Alamosa Police Department, including petitioner Jeffrey Martinez, entered Bleck’s hotel room. Bleck did not respond to the officers’ command to show his hands and lie down on the floor. Martinez approached him, and, without holstering his weapon, attempted to subdue him. In the process, the firearm discharged, injuring Bleck. As relevant here, Bleck brought suit against Martinez in federal court, alleging excessive force and a state law battery claim. The federal court granted summary judgment and dismissed Bleck’s federal claim, concluding that there was no evidence that the shooting was intentional. After the federal district court declined to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the state law battery claim, Bleck refiled the claim in state district court. Martinez then moved to dismiss the state law claims against him, arguing he was immune from suit and that his actions were not "willful and wanton." The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that Martinez should have known the situation would have been dangerous by not holstering his weapon prior to subduing Bleck. The court of appeals determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and did not consider Martinez' claim that the trial court applied the wrong "willful and wanton" standard before deciding his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court applied the wrong standard, and that the court of appeals erred in not hearing the appeal. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found the trial court erred by not determining all issues relating to Martinez' immunity claim. View "Martinez v. Estate of Bleck" on Justia Law