Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A Colorado State Trooper stopped the vehicle in which Victor Zuniga was riding as a passenger. The vehicle was carrying over a pound of raw marijuana and marijuana concentrate. Zuniga was ultimately charged with two counts of possession with intent to manufacture or distribute marijuana or marijuana concentrate. Zuniga pled not guilty, and moved to suppress, arguing that the seized marijuana was the fruit of an illegal detention and search. In particular, Zuniga argued: (1) the Trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in the first place; (2) the prolonged detention was unlawful; and (3) the vehicle search was not supported by probable cause. The trial court found that because marijuana possession was legal in certain circumstances in Colorado, and drug-sniffing dogs were unable to differentiate between legal and illegal amounts of marijuana, the court concluded there was no probable cause to search the vehicle because the Trooper could only speculate about the amount of marijuana he smelled. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that after a review of the facts, noting the driver and Zuniga's divergent stories about their time in Colorado, their "extreme" nervousness, the strong odor of marijuana and the drug-dog's sniff test, there was probable cause. Therefore, the trial court erred in suppressing evidence of the marijuana. View "Colorado v. Zuniga" on Justia Law

Jeffery Freeman was convicted of third degree assault on an at-risk adult. Later, when he applied for a motor vehicle salesperson’s license, the Colorado Motor Vehicle Dealer Board (the Board) denied his application pursuant to the mandatory disqualification statute, section12-6-118(7)(a)(I), C.R.S.(2015). Under the statute, a person who has been convicted of a felony “in violation of article3, 4 or 5 of title 18, C.R.S., or any similar crime” must have his or her application for a license to sell cars denied. The question before the Supreme Court was whether Freeman’s conviction for the felony offense of third degree assault on an at-risk person was a “felony in violation of article 3” for the purpose of the mandatory disqualification statute, where the elements of the crime were contained in section 18-3-204, but the felony enhancement provision was contained in section 18-6.5-103(3)(c). Because the felony enhancement for third degree assault did not constitute a separate offense under "Colorado v. McKinney," (99 P.3d 1038, 1043 (Colo. 2004)), the Supreme Court concluded that Freeman was convicted of a felony “in violation of article 3. . . of title 18,”and therefore he was ineligible to receive a motor vehicle salesperson’s license under section 12-6-118(7)(a)(I). Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals holding to the contrary, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado Motor Vehicle Dealer Board v. Freeman" on Justia Law

Brian Penn was convicted by jury of unlawful sexual contact. On appeal, he argued that the county court erred in allowing an investigating officer to testify that he "had reason to arrest the defendant for a crime that had been committed." The district court agreed and reversed the conviction. The State moved for reconsideration which was denied, then appealed to the Supreme Court. Penn moved to dismiss the State's appeal, arguing it was outside the time limit set by Colorado Appellate Rule 52(a). The Supreme Court granted certiorari review and concluded that the State's petition was timely, and that the county court's admission of the officer's testimony was not reversible plain error. The Court reversed the district court and remanded for reinstatement of Penn's conviction. View "Colorado v. Penn" on Justia Law

In 2001 when he was twenty-eight years old, respondent David Corson had a sexual relationship with "K.B.," a seventeen-year-old client of the residential treatment facility where Corson worked. Two years later, he pled guilty to sexual assault on a child, position of trust. The prosecution agreed to recommend a sentence of probation and dismiss a separate charge. Approximately three years before this plea, the prosecutor in this case obtained a juvenile adjudication against K.B. for falsely reporting a sexual assault. That case had no connection except that it could have been used to impeach K.B.'s credibility at Corson's trial. This adjudication was not disclosed to Corson, and as a result, he sought to overturn his conviction. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the court of appeals reversed. The Attorney General petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Corson argued that the State's non-disclosure rendered his plea involuntary and his plea counsel ineffective. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding no due process violation, that Corson knew of K.B.'s adjudication prior to his plea, and that the adjudication was not part of K.B.'s criminal history and therefore not subject to automatic disclosure. View "Colorado v. Corson" on Justia Law

As a condition of probation, the trial court ordered Carl Ruch to complete a sex offender polygraph and participate in sex offense specific treatment intervention. Ruch refused such treatment, contending that participating would have violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Due to this refusal, the trial court revoked Ruch's probation and sentenced him to a prison term. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Ruch's Fifth Amendment rights would have been violated had he complied with the trial court's order. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine whether Ruch's probation officer would have sought to revoke probation based solely on the other probation violations, and if so, whether the trial court would have revoked on other grounds. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court found no Fifth Amendment violation, finding Ruch's purported invocation of the Fifth was premature and amounted to a "prohibited blanket assertion of the privilege." View "Colorado v. Ruch" on Justia Law

The State challenged a district court order denying the probation department's complaint to revoke Bryan Roberson's sex offender intensive supervision probation (SOISP). The State sought to revoke probation because Roberson (among other thins) allegedly failed to participate in a sex offender evaluation and treatment program, allegedly refusing to answer during a polygraph test. Roberson refused to answer on advice of counsel, fearing that the answers would be used against him in future criminal proceedings (he had a direct appeal of his conviction pending at the time of the polygraph test). The district court denied the State's revocation complaint, concluding that answering the questions would have violated Roberson's Fifth Amendment rights to self-incrimination. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court and affirmed. View "Colorado v. Roberson" on Justia Law

Defendant E.G. was convicted of two counts of sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of sexual abuse. Before trial, he filed a motion requesting court-ordered access to the scene of the crime, his grandmother’s basement. The trial court concluded that it had no authority to order such access and denied the motion. The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning, though not its result, holding that atrial court does indeed have authority to order defense access to a third-party residence. It nevertheless affirmed the denial of the motion for access because it concluded that E.G. had “failed to demonstrate” that inspection of the crime scene was “necessary to present his defense.” The Supreme Court held that the trial court lacked the authority to order access to a private residence, and therefore affirmed the court of appeals on alternate grounds. View "Colorado in the Interest of E.G." on Justia Law

Defendant Saul Chavez was charged with one count of sexual assault. The alleged victim lived in a home with other members of her family. The State alleged that Chavez, a family friend, had been allowed to stay the night at the victim’s house after drinking alcohol late into the evening. The State further alleged that Chavez entered a bedroom where the victim was asleep, where he engaged in sexual intercourse with her, without her consent, while she was physically helpless. Chavez filed a motion requesting court-ordered access to the home (the scene of the alleged crime). He argued that he needed access in order to “be able to investigate and photograph the property for his defense.” Chavez cited Crim. P. 16(I)(d) in support of his motion, arguing that, under that rule, the court had “discretionary power” to order the disclosure of “relevant material and information.” The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether a trial court had the authority to grant a defendant’s discovery motion seeking access to the private residence of a non-party. The Court held that the trial court lacked the authority to order such access, and abused its discretion by its order. View "In re Colorado v. Chavez" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee Amadeo Chavez-Barragan was charged with possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute. After the trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence, the State appealed. The Supreme Court concluded reasonable suspicion supported the initial stop, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Chavez-Barragan" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court granted the State's petition to review a district court's order that concluded that the "lewd fondling or caress" provision of the Colorado public indecency statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The Court found that the provision did not burden a substantial amount of protected speech or expressive conduct, so it was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Moreover, because defendant's conduct in this case met any reasonable definition of "lewd fondling or caress," the statute wasnot vague as applied to his actions. The Court reversed the trial court's order holding to the contrary. View "Colorado v. Graves" on Justia Law