Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Police arrested Levent Kutlak after he had a fight with his in-laws. A detective interviewed Kutlak at the police station. Kutlak was read his Miranda rights, after which he asked whether he could "get [his laywer] down here now, or…?" The detective responded that it might "be difficult" to get in touch with the attorney. Moments later, Kutlak stated that he was going to "take a dice roll" and talk with the detective. Kutlak signed a Miranda waiver and proceeded to make incriminating statements regarding the in-laws incident. Kutlak later moved to suppress the statements he gave the detective. The trial court denied the motion and a jury convicted Kutlak on charges of child abuse, first degree criminal trespass and two counts of third degree assault. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. The State appealed, and after review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. The Court concluded that Kutlak did not invoke his right to counsel and he otherwise validly waived his Miranda rights prior to making incriminating statements about himself. View "Colorado v. Kutlak" on Justia Law

Defendant Jarrod Rutter was convicted of multiple felonies relating to the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine. Rutter was adjudicated a habitual criminal, which quadrupled the maximum presumptive range for the class-2 convictions from twenty-four to ninety-six years. Subsequent to his sentencing, the Colorado Legislature prospectively reduced the classification of the offenses for use and possession of methamphetamine, and amended the habitual criminal statute so that certain offenses no longer qualified as underlying felonies in habitual crime adjudications. The Legislature did not, however, reduce the classification for the manufacture of methamphetamine. Based on these changes, Rutter challenged the proportionality of his sentence under the Eighth Amendment. The court of appeals determined the legislative changes were prospective in nature and thus should not be considered, that all of Rutter's predicate and triggering offenses were per se grave and serious, and concluded that Rutter's sentence was not grossly disproportionate. Finding no error with the appellate court's review of Rutter's sentence, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rutter v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the trial court violated respondent Michael Johnson's statutory and constitutional rights by increasing his sentence on the remaining conviction on remand following a successful appeal on his other convictions. The trial court initially accepted, then rejected at sentencing, a plea agreement in which Johnson would have pled guilty to an added count of possession of a controlled substance, then the original counts would have been dismissed. The trial court rejected the plea agreement, the case proceeded to trial, and the jury found Johnson guilty of first-degree kidnapping, sexual assault, and possession of a controlled substance. Johnson was then sentenced to an aggregate sentence of twenty years to life. The court of appeals reversed and vacated the sexual assault and kidnapping convictions on double jeopardy grounds. The case was remanded for the trial court to reinstate the original plea agreement, and to resentence Johnson on the remaining possession conviction. Johnson received a twelve-year sentence (twice the length of the original six-year sentence). Johnson appealed a second time, arguing that the increased sentence violated his statutory and due process rights. The court of appeals rejected Johnson's statutory claim, but applied a presumption of vindictiveness to the trial court's resentencing and held that the sentence indeed violated Johnson's due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the court of appeals correctly rejected Johnson's statutory argument, but erred in applying the presumption of vindictiveness to the new sentence on the possession of a controlled substance conviction. View "Colorado v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Respondent Louis Madden was convicted of attempting to patronize a prostituted child and attempted third degree sexual assault by force. He was originally sentenced to an indeterminate sentence and ordered to pay costs, fees and restitution. He appealed his conviction. The attempt to patronize a prostituted child was reversed, leaving only the attempted sexual assault charge. The case was returned to the trial court with instructions to impose a determinate sentence. Madden was thereafter sentenced to three years with credit for time served. Madden moved for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The motion was granted, and the prosecution elected not to appeal or retry the case. Madden applied to be refunded that portion of the fees, costs and restitution he had already paid, and the trial court agreed to a partial refund; the trial court reasoned that money paid to a counseling service the victim used could not be returned. Madden appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's "refund" order, finding that the trial court did not have statutory authority to order a refund from public funds. "Madden did not pursue a refund through the procedures defined in the Exoneration Act" which provides trial courts the proper authority pursuant to which to issue refunds. View "Colorado v. Madden" on Justia Law

Respondent Shannon Nelson was convicted of five charges relating to sexual assaults allegedly committed against her children. She was sentenced to 20 years in prison, and ordered to pay court costs, fees and restitution. The court of appeals reversed the judgment against Nelson and remanded for a new trial based on the improper use of an unendorsed expert witness. In the second trial, a new jury acquitted Nelson of all charges. At issue for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether Nelson could get a refund of all the costs, fees and restitution she paid following her conviction after the first trial. The Supreme Court found that a trial court could not authorize a refund absent statutory authority. Because none of the statutes governing the fines, fees and restitution empowered the trial court in this case to issue a refund, it could not do so. Exonerated defendants could seek a refund of costs, fees and restitution through a separate civil proceeding (which Nelson did not pursue). View "Colroado v. Nelson" on Justia Law

In 2014, a detective from the Douglas County Sheriff's Office (DCSO) responded to a middle school's report that twelve-year-old female student J.M. had posted a picture of herself drinking what appeared to be alcohol. Officials became worried that there was more to the posting, contacted police, and spoke to the student. DCSO was contacted by J.M.'s mother, stating that J.M. wanted to talk to them. J.M. and her mother separately participated in a series of video-recorded interviews. The interviews would reveal that the mother's then-fiancee, defendant-appellee John Swietlicki allegedly had regular sexual encounters, since the child was eight. J.M. J.M. told the detective that Swietlicki sometimes showed her pornography on his computer during these encounters. The mother corroborated various details pertinent to J.M.'s allegations. Swietlicki would ultimately be extradited back to Colorado to stand charges based on J.M.'s allegations. Police seized Swietlicki's laptop without a warrant until a search warrant issued. Once issued, police found that the laptop contained child pornography. Swietlicki moved to suppress all evidence found on the laptop, and the trial court granted the motion, finding that police lacked probable cause to seize the laptop. The State appealed the suppression motion. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's suppression order, finding that the search was justified under the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement. View "Colorado v. Swietlicki" on Justia Law

The State appealed an appellate court's judgment that vacated respondent Kenneth Childress' conviction of vehicular assault while operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. It was undisputed that Childress was not driving the vehicle in question, but the jury was instructed that he could be found guilty as a complicitor. The court of appeals concluded that because vehicular assault while under the influence was a strict liability offense, and required no culpable mental state on the part of the driver. Furthermore, the appellate court found that the Colorado Supreme Court had held previously that complicitor liability was inapplicable to crimes lacking a culpable mental state requirement. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, clarifying its holding that the appellate court relied on in vacating Childress' conviction. View "Colorado v. Childress" on Justia Law

Petitioner Anthony Chavez was convicted of a sex offense, and the trial court imposed an indeterminate, fifteen-year-to-life sentence. Chavez challenged that sentence on appeal, arguing that the trial court did not understand the range of its sentencing options. The Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s calculation of petitioner’s sentence and affirmed it. View "Chavez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the State of Colorado argued that evidence of text messages between defendant Matthew Herrera and a juvenile girl (“Faith”) was admissible under a warrant authorizing a search of his cellphone for indicia of ownership, or in the alternative, under the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement. Faith’s mother told police she believed defendant was involved in a sexual relationship with her daughter. A police detective started texting defendant posing as a fourteen-year-old girl. These texts eventually led to defendant’s arrest, at which time police seized the cell phone in question. After review of the evidence in the record to the point of this appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the State’s argument that the texts were obtained under the warrant’s authorization to search for “indicia of ownership” of the cellphone. Further, the Court concluded the texts did not fall within the plain view exception. As such, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to suppress the evidence. View "Colorado v. Herrera" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the State challenged an order suppressing at retrial the testimony given by defendant Ivan Quintero-Amador at his first trial. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in suppressing this evidence because: (1) defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights when he testified at the first trial; and (2) his trial counsel's ineffective assistance did not directly affect his prior testimony, thus precluding a finding that the admission of this testimony violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The trial court's suppression order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Quintero-Amador" on Justia Law