Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners Conley Hoskins and Jane Medicals, LLC, sought to vacate a trial court's order disqualifying the Peters Mair Wilcox (PMW) law firm as their counsel. The trial court disqualified the firm on the grounds that the firm previously represented another party, All Care Wellness, LLC, in the same matter for which PWM represented petitioners. Furthermore, the trial court concluded that All Care and petitioners had materially adverse interests. Petitioners argued on appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court that the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying petitioners' retained counsel of choice. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court record was insufficient to support the finding that the interests of petitioners and All Care were materially adverse to one another. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court indeed abused its discretion in disqualifying petitioners' counsel. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Colorado v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

Defendants Sir Mario Owens and Robert Ray petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for relief from a series of discovery rulings by the district court relative to post-conviction proceedings in their respective death-penalty cases. Each had moved to discover the prosecution’s investigation of the claims raised by Owens’s motion for post-conviction review, on the grounds that such disclosure was required either by Crim. P. 16 or by the federal or state constitution. The district court ruled that Crim. P. 16 did not impose obligations on the prosecution with respect to its preparation to meet the defendants’ post-conviction claims, but that the prosecution continued to have obligations to disclose information that was both exculpatory and constitutionally material, without regard for the time of or impetus for its discovery. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the district court did not err in finding Crim. P. 16 inapplicable to information acquired in response to the defendants’ post-conviction claims. Because, however, the Court has previously held not only that a prosecutor’s constitutional obligation to disclose information favorable to an accused extended through the appeal of a death sentence, but that district courts should order the disclosure of some possibly exculpatory material, despite being unable to find a reasonable probability that nondisclosure would change the result of the proceeding. The cases were remanded for the district court to apply the due process standard the Court announced in "Colorado v. Rodriguez," (786 P.2d 1079 (Colo. 1989)). View "In re Colorado v. Owens" on Justia Law

Defendant Lori Martin shot her husband in the back of the head, killing him, following a dispute about her moving to another state with the couple's daughter. Martin was charged with first-degree murder and two crimes of violence. Martin claimed self-defense. The jury had trouble reaching a unanimous verdict. The court did not respond. The parties "preferred" that the trial court not intervene, but the court expressed concern that it should consider a modified-Allen jury instruction. The trial court ultimately gave the instruction; the jury returned, finding Martin guilty of second-degree murder (heat of passion). Although the foreperson signed the verdict form when polled, she said the verdict was not hers. The trial court then provided another supplemental instruction that tracked the pattern instruction directing the jury to continue deliberations after polling indicated it did not reach a unanimous verdict. Defense counsel expressed concern that the foreperson would be "beaten down by the rest of the jurors" and suggested "further instruction," but did not elaborate or provide specific language. The jury returned the same verdict it returned previously. On appeal, Martin argued the trial court erred by giving the deadlocked jury the two instructions to continue deliberations. As pertinent here, Martin contended that the trial court erred by failing to give a mistrial advisement with the modified-Allen instruction per "Colorado v. Raglin," (21 P.3d 419 (Colo. App. 2000)). The Supreme Court overruled "Raglin" and held that the trial court was not required to provide a mistrial advisement when giving a modified-Allen instruction. "The trial court has discretion to instruct a deadlocked jury about the possibility of a mistrial when, considering the content of the instruction and the context in which it is given, the instruction will not have a coercive effect on the jury." View "Martin v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Terrence Gibbons was charged with theft by receiving and perjury for claiming ownership over a stolen jet ski and trailer, and having signed temporary permits. At trial, his defense was that he did not know the jet ski and trailer were stolen. The trial court received a question from the jury, asking what would happen if all jurors did not reach a unanimous decision. Both parties agreed that the trial court should give the jury a modified-Allen instruction. After giving the instruction, the jury returned, finding Gibbons guilty on both counts. On appeal, Gibbons argued the trial court erred by not including along with the modified-Allen instruction, an explanation of what would happen if the jury was deadlocked. Gibbons cited "Colorado v. Raglin," (21 P.3d 419 (Colo. App. 2000)). The Supreme Court overruled "Raglin" and held that the trial court was not required to provide a mistrial advisement when giving a modified-Allen instruction. "The trial court has discretion to instruct a deadlocked jury about the possibility of a mistrial when, considering the content of the instruction and the context in which it is given, the instruction will not have a coercive effect on the jury." View "Gibbons v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Aaron Fain was charged with six counts of attempted murder, attempted first degree murder after deliberation and attempted first degree extreme indifference murder. He was also charged with drunk driving, criminal mischief and various weapons charges. At trial, Fain conceded to the mischief, DUI and weapons offenses, but contested the murder charges. After Fain presented his case, the jury began deliberations. The next morning, the court told the parties that the jury was having trouble reaching a unanimous verdict. The court told the parties it was inclined to give a modified-Allen instruction; neither party objected to this suggestion. The instruction the trial court gage the jury tracked the pattern instruction, and concluded by telling the jury that if it could not reach a unanimous verdict on any count, to then "let [the court] know." Soon after, the jury found Fain guilty of all three counts of attempted second degree murder, three counts of attempted first degree extreme indifference murder, and the conceded counts. On appeal, Fain argued the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury about a mistrial if it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. For support, Fain cited "Colorado v. Raglin," (21 P.3d 419 (Colo. App. 2000)). The Supreme Court overruled "Raglin" and held that the trial court was not required to provide a mistrial advisement when giving a modified-Allen instruction. "The trial court has discretion to instruct a deadlocked jury about the possibility of a mistrial when, considering the content of the instruction and the context in which it is given, the instruction will not have a coercive effect on the jury. Applying this holding, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury about a possibility of a mistrial. View "Fain v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant-petitioner Ricardo Sanchez appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing, inter alia, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to New Mexico police shortly after his arrest, in violation of his Miranda rights. Specifically, he objected that he was not advised of those rights, and did not understand he would not ultimately be obligated to pay for an appointed attorney. The court of appeals rejected petitioner's argument, concluding that the advisement he received concerning his right to appointed counsel was sufficient to convey that if he could not afford an attorney, one would be provided free of charge. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the court of appeals. View "Sanchez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the State appealed a trial court order that suppressed statements defendant-appellee N.A.S. made to police. The trial court found that N.A.S. was in custody when he made the statements, he did not waive his Miranda rights "knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently," and that the statements were involuntary. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that in the totality of the circumstances of this case, N.A.S. was not in custody when he made his statements, and that he spoke voluntarily. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. N.A.S." on Justia Law

A search of respondent Joddy Carbajal's home led to the discovery of three firearms. Respondent had been previously convicted of a felony, and was charged with three counts of possession of a weapon by a previous offender (POWPO). At trial, respondent raised as an affirmative defense that he possessed the weapons to defend his home, person and property. Over respondent's objection, the trial court modified the stock jury instruction regarding that affirmative defense, and instructed the jury that respondent must have possessed the weapons to defend against what he "reasonably believed to be a threat of imminent harm." Respondent was convicted by the jury on two of the three counts. The court of appeals reversed, finding the defense did not require a "reasonable belief." The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding the trial court did not err in its jury instruction. View "Colorado v. Carbajal" on Justia Law

Sir Mario Owens and Robert Ray petitioned the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction for relief from a series of discovery rulings of the district court in their respective death-penalty cases relating to post-conviction proceedings. Each moved to discover the prosecution's investigation of claims raised by Owens' motion for post-conviction review, on grounds that disclosure was required by the state rules of criminal procedure or the federal and state constitutions. The district court held that Crim. P. 16 did not impose obligations on the prosecution with respect to its preparation to meet defendants' post-conviction claims, but that the prosecution did have obligations to disclose information that was both exculpatory and constitutionally material. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in finding it inapplicable to information acquired in response to defendants' post-conviction claims. However, because the Court had not previously held that only a prosecutor's constitutional obligation to disclose extended through the appeal of a death sentence, the district court should order disclosure of some possibly exculpatory material despite being unable to find a reasonable probability that nondisclosure would change the result of the proceedings. The cases were remanded for the district court to review defendants' constitutional claims. View "In re Colorado v. Owens " on Justia Law

The Division of Motor Vehicles (a section of the Department of Revenue), revoked petitioner Andrew Hanson's driver's license following a hearing whereby it was determined petitioner refused a blood alcohol test in violation of state law. At the revocation hearing, the arresting officer failed to appear, and petitioner moved for dismissal of the administrative action to revoke his license. The hearing officer denied the request and submitted the officer's report into evidence. Both the district court and the court of appeals affirmed the Department. Petitioner appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. "When [petitioner] refused, he violated section 42-2-126(3)(c), C.R.S. (2011). The hearing officer was not required to consider the legality of the legality of the first police officer's contact … because any evidence regarding the legality of the initial contact … is irrelevant for the purpose of revoking his license for refusing to take the blood or breath test." View "Hanson v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law