Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Division of Motor Vehicles (a section of the Department of Revenue), revoked petitioner Tom Francen's driver's license following a hearing whereby it was determined petitioner had operated a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content in excess of the statutory minimum. The district court reversed, holding that the stop of petitioner's vehicle was not supported by a reasonable suspicion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the legality of the initial contact between petitioner and the police was not relevant in the civil administrative proceeding to revoke the driver's license. Petitioner appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. View "Francen v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Defendant Randy Kailey was charged with two counts of aggravated incest. After a jury trial, he was found guilty and ultimately sentenced to thirty-two years in jail. Kailey met with a psychologist employed by the Department of Corrections for a private therapy session. At the outset, Kailey reviewed a DOC form that provided that any statements Kailey made during therapy indicating that he intended to harm himself or others would not be considered confidential and would be disclosed to the DOC. During his session, Kailey allegedly made several statements about witnessed that testified against him at trial. The psychologist considered these statements to constitute serious threats of violence. Pursuant to his statutory "duty to warn," the psychologist submitted an "indicent report" to the DOC describing what Kailey said during therapy. The State subsequently charged Kailey with retaliation against a witness. Kailey moved to exclude the incident report. The trial court granted Kailey's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that once a provider's legal "duty to warn" is triggered, the patient's threatening statements are not protected by privilege. View "Colorado v. Kailey" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the results of a preliminary breath test ("PBT") for blood alcohol content were admissible for impeachment purposes. When the defendant is charged with driving either while under the influence of alcohol (DUI) or while ability impaired by alcohol (DWAI), the results of the PBT may not be used as evidence of guilt at trial. Whether the results of the PBT may nevertheless be used for impeachment purposes was an issue of first impression for the Colorado Court. In this case, the county court determined that although evidence that a PBT registered a positive result for the presence of alcohol was inadmissible to prove intoxication, that evidence could nevertheless be admitted for impeachment purposes if the defendant testified that he had not been drinking. The district court affirmed this decision. The Supreme Court concluded that ruling was erroneous: "[w]hile a police officer is authorized to conduct a PBT as part of the officer's investigation, we hold that based on the plain language of section 42-4-1301(6)(i)(III), the PBT results may not be used in any court action except as specifically provided in the statute itself." Thus, because the statute did not allow for using PBT results as impeachment evidence, the Court reversed the order of the district court and remanded the case to that court with instructions to return the case to the county court for further proceedings. View "Cain v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In October 2010, the prosecution charged Alan DeAtley, a Washington State resident, with twenty-five counts of white-collar criminal activity involving alleged fraudulent tax credits for land conservation easements in Colorado. In July 2011, the trial court allowed DeAtley's first retained counsel to withdraw based on irreconcilable conflicts. It granted DeAtley a continuance to retain his then-current defense counsel, Martin Stuart and Jolie Masterson. In November 2012, DeAtley informed the court of his intention to discharge defense counsel. They promptly filed a motion to withdraw. In November 2012, instead of granting the motion to withdraw, the trial court granted DeAtley a relatively short continuance to retain yet a third defense attorney. DeAtley did not retain another attorney. Instead, he commenced a lawsuit against defense counsel for malpractice and breach of contract, reinforcing the discharge of them and causing defense counsel to renew their motion to withdraw. The trial court unreasonably and unfairly determined that the attorneys in this case could effectively represent DeAtley despite his discharge of them and the trial court's previous finding that a conflict of interest existed between defense counsel and DeAtley due to the malpractice and breach of contract suit. The trial court concluded that DeAtley was engaging in trial-delaying conduct. The Supreme Court concluded that the court subsequently chose the wrong remedy and thereby abused its discretion. The trial court's finding that defense counsel could "balance their personal interests implicated by the Defendant's actions with their obligation to represent him such that they can effectively do so" was arbitrary, unreasonable, and unfair given the trial court's first finding that a conflict existed. The trial court "should have granted the motion to withdraw and proceeded in accordance with Crim.P. 44(a), advising DeAtley that he had the obligation to hire other counsel, request the appointment of counsel by the court, or elect to represent himself." Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to withdraw. View "In re Colorado v. DeAtley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision to vacate Carey Griffin's conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. After the Court granted certiorari review, Griffin died. Griffin's counsel filed a notice of death and moved to dismiss. The State appealed, arguing that the proceedings should have abated ab initio. The Supreme Court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss but later vacated that order to allow the State to respond to the motion. Griffin's counsel argued that the doctrine of abatement ab initio applied here because Griffin died while his case was pending on direct appellate review of his conviction. The State argued Griffin's appeal should have been resolved despite his death because the State had an interest in obtaining resolution of the court of appeals' interpretation of the sex offender registration laws and this issue was likely to evade future review. The State also noted that other courts have questioned the continuing validity of the abatement ab initio doctrine in light of other interests, including the rights of crime victims. Consistent with cases from the United States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions, the Colorado Court declined to apply the doctrine of abatement ab initio to matters pending on certiorari review. In light of Griffin's death, the Court vacated its order granting the writ of certiorari and dismissed the State's petition, but did not abate the proceedings ab initio. View "Colorado v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Storlie argued the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the district attorney's motion under Crim. P. 48(a) to dismiss the charges against him. In response, the respondent trial court, through a brief filed on its behalf by the Attorney General's office, argued that a criminal defendant such as Storlie had no standing to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss. Respondent further argued that even if Storlie had standing, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. First, the Supreme Court concluded that it need not decide whether Storlie had standing to challenge the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss because the district attorney, who joined in Storlie's request for relief before the Supreme Court, had standing to challenge such a denial. On the merits, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss because there was no evidence that the prosecution acted in bad faith in seeking the dismissal, nor did the trial court make any findings suggesting bad faith. Accordingly, the case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Storlie" on Justia Law

Jack Schaufele was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in injuries to himself and others. While he lay unresponsive at the hospital, a police officer asked a nurse to draw Schaufele's blood for an alcohol analysis. The State later sought to use evidence from that blood draw to prosecute Schaufele for vehicular assault, driving under the influence, driving under the influence per se, and careless driving. In an interlocutory appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court applied the proper legal test when it suppressed evidence stemming from the blood draw. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's analysis in suppressing the evidence. The Court declined the State's invitation to disregard the majority opinion in "Missouri v. McNeely" (which instructed a trial court to consider the totality of the circumstances and adopt Chief Justice Roberts' concurring and dissenting opinion that a "warrantless blood draw may ensue" if an officer could reasonably conclude that there was not sufficient time to seek and receive a warrant"). View "Colorado v. Schaufele" on Justia Law

Defendant Jay McIntyre's then ten-year-old niece accused him of sexually assaulting her on two separate occasions. In an interlocutory appeal, the State sought review of a trial court's order suppressing defendant's inculpatory statements. The trial court found defendant did not make the statements voluntarily. Upon review of the State's petition, the Supreme Court held that when considering the totality of the circumstances, police did not improperly coerce defendant into making his statements, but that he instead spoke voluntarily. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. McIntyre" on Justia Law

A man called "Rabbit" tried to strangle two people in a Boulder park. Witnesses identified the man to police. Plainclothes officers located "Rabbit," identified themselves as police, and asked him questions regarding the incident in the park. Petitioner Bradley Begay (a/k/a "Rabbit") was never told he was under arrest, nor was he handcuffed. Begay never tried to leave during the encounter with police, but police did not say specifically defendant was free to leave. Approximately twenty minutes into their conversation, an officer who had interviewed one of the alleged victims identified petitioner as the assailant. Officers then read defendant his Miranda rights and arrested him for assault. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the statements he made before his arrest as the product of a custodial interrogation without a Miranda warning. The trial court granted the motion; the State appealed. Finding that the trial court conflated the standards governing seizure under the Fourth Amendment and custody under the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Colorado v. Begay" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dallas Jeffrey Finney was charged with two counts of sexual assault-helpless victim and two counts of sexual assault-victim incapable. He entered into a series of plea agreements before a final agreement was accepted by the trial court. Five different trial court judges reviewed the agreements, and at several junctures, petitioner was advised of the potential penalties he faced. The prosecution filed a complaint to revoke petitioner's final plea agreement, alleging petitioner violated the terms of the agreement because he had been terminated from a sex offender treatment program. At the hearing on the revocation complaint, defense counsel informed the court that petitioner would admit to violating the conditions of the plea agreement and that the prosecutor would agree to a sentence of community corrections if petitioner were accepted into such a facility. The court accepted petitioner's admission and set the case for sentencing. Petitioner was not advised of the potential sentence he faced if not accepted into community corrections. Petitioner later learned he was not eligible for community corrections because he had been terminated from the sex offender program. Petitioner was ultimately sentenced to two years to file in the Department of Corrections. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief arguing, among other things, that the failure to advise him of the potential penalties prior to admitting violating the terms of the plea agreement violated his due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that petitioner had been advised multiple times of potential penalties, particularly with respect to negotiating the five plea agreements. With regard to his statutory right to an advisement under 16-11-206, the Court concluded the requirements were met in this case. View "Finney v. Colorado " on Justia Law