Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The State appealed the court of appeals' judgments reversing convictions of the defendants in this case and "Colorado v. Vigil." In both cases, the appellate court applied a rule requiring automatic reversal for any erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause that adversely impacted defendant's ability to shale the jury through exercise of peremptory challenges. The Court overruled prior holdings to the contrary and concluded in this consolidated opinion that reversal of a criminal conviction for other that structural error, or an appropriate case-specific, outcome-determinative analysis, will not longer be sustained. Allowing a defendant fewer peremptory challenges that authorized does not in and of itself amount to structural error. View "Colorado v. Novotny" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, the issue before the Supreme Court in this case called for an evaluation of the relationship between C.R.S. sections 17-22.5-101 and 17-22.5-403(1) (2013) of article 22.5, governing "Inmate and Parole Time Computation." Petitioner Jeffrey Nowak was convicted on two counts of aggravated motor theft and sentenced to eight years. He began serving the sentence on May 13, 2003 - the effective date of the sentence for parole eligibility purposes. The Department of Corrections calculated petitioner's parole eligibility date (PED) as July 3, 2006. Several months after reaching his PED, petitioner absconded from a halfway house while on a temporary leave. Petitioner would later be convicted of felony escape and sentenced to twelve years in prison to run consecutively to the eight-year sentence. Petitioner began serving the new sentence on July 13, 2007. Because he had already reached his PED on the original sentence when he started serving the new sentence, the DOC used the July 2007 date (rather than the May 2003 date) to calculate petitioner's new PED. Petitioner sought habeas relief, arguing the DOC should have used the PED from May 2003. The Supreme Court concluded that for the purpose of computing an inmate's PED, section 17-22.5-101 required the DOC to construe all sentences as one continuous sentence when the inmate has been committed under several convictions with separate sentences, even when doing so results in the inmate becoming parole eligible before serving at least 50% of the second sentence. View "Nowak v. Suthers" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether the appellate court applied the presumption of regularity when the it determined the jury did not receive correct jury forms. The trial court record reflected that the trial judge read the correct instructions and verdict forms. But when the record was certified on appeal, it was discovered that one of the verdict forms was stapled to a refused jury instruction that was not given to the jury, raising the question that the jury may not have received the correct forms. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that when the trial court reads the correct elemental instructions and verdict form to the jury, the party asserting error must overcome the presumption of regularity. In this case, the party did not overcome the presumption by pointing out that a verdict form was stapled to a refused instruction, and in relation by pointing to ambiguous statements in the trial transcript. View "LePage v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ronald Grassi was involved in a single-car accident early one September morning. He suffered serious injuries, and his passenger was killed. Paramedics transported petitioner to a local hospital for treatment, where he remained unconscious for several hours. At the hospital, a trooper (part of the investigation but who had not been at the scene of the accident) detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from petitioner's mouth though he remained unconscious. The trooper ordered a blood draw. Prior to the blood draw, police knew that petitioner had been driving when it crashed, that no road conditions or other external factors appeared to have caused the crash, that petitioner's driving was consistent with that of an intoxicated driver, and that his breath smelled of alcohol. The blood draw revealed that petitioner's blood alcohol content (BAC) was well over the legal limit for driving under the influence. Petitioner was later charged with vehicular homicide, manslaughter and driving with an excessive BAC. Petitioner moved to suppress evidence of his BAC, arguing that the officer at the hospital who ordered the blood draw lacked probable cause to order blood from him while he lay unconscious in the hospital. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Colorado's express consent statute did not require police to possess probable cause in order to draw blood from an unconscious driver. After its review, the Supreme Court found that the fellow-officer rule imputed information that the police possess as a whole to individual officers who conduct searches if: (1) that officer acts pursuant to a coordinated investigation; and (2) police possess the information at the time of the search or arrest. Because the record of this case reflected those conditions, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Grassi v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Mark Steen was convicted on misdemeanor offenses. He challenged ordered issued by the county and district courts denying his motions to stay execution of his sentence pending appeal of those convictions. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the county court in this case was required to enter a stay upon petitioner's request to remain in effect through the final disposition of the appeal unless modified by the district court. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "In re Colorado v. Steen" on Justia Law

The court of appeals rejected defendant Lessell Moore's challenge to the validity of his waiver of his right to testify, and upheld his conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals erred in reviewing defendant's claim that his waiver was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent, and whether contemporaneous objection at trial was required to preserve the issue. The Court concluded the appellate court erred in considering defendant's challenge of his waiver. The Court reaffirmed that a defendant's challenge to his waiver to the right to testify is not subject to review on direct appeal, but only in post-conviction proceedings. Defendant need not make a contemporaneous objection to the trial court's advisement. The Court therefore vacated the court f appeals' decision regarding the validity of the waiver, but upheld the judgment of conviction. View "Moore v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the trial court was not required to award presentence confinement credit against a jail term imposed as a condition of probation, if the trial court chose to award credit, it had to do so equal to the full amount of time served. The Supreme Court disagreed with that holding. The Supreme Court concluded that the statutory provision governing presentence confinement credit does not apply to probation, and therefore does not apply to the jail component of a probation sentence. View "Colorado v. Smith" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the defendant in this case validly waived his right to a jury trial following the trial court's advisement that failed to substantially comply with Crim. P. 23(a)(5)(II). Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that a defendant may not litigate the validity of such a waiver on direct appeal, but must do so in a post-conviction proceeding. Furthermore, the Court held that when evaluating a defendant's waiver to a jury trial, the post-conviction court must determine whether the defendant personally waived the right knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. View "Colorado v. Walker" on Justia Law

The State challenged the trial court's suppression of evidence taken from defendant Jesse Lee Cunningham's home pursuant to warrant. The trial court ruled that pursuant to Crim. P. 41(e), defendant's motion to suppress required the State to initially go forward with evidence that the seizure was performed pursuant to a facially valid warrant, and that the warrant was legally executed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in that analysis. "Whether a search or seizure is performed pursuant to a warrant or is warrantless, defendant under Crim. P. 41(e) bears the burden of going forward to show that the search or seizure violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights." View "Colorado v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Neil Roggow of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, based on his unlawful sexual contact with an eight-year-old girl. The court of appeals reversed his conviction, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Roggow was in a position of trust with respect to the victim because he was not charged with her care or supervision when the unlawful acts occurred. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that, for purposes of section 18-3-405.3, a defendant need not be expressly charged with a particular duty or responsibility over the child at the time of the unlawful act in order to occupy a position of trust. The Court concluded that the evidence in this case was sufficient for a jury to conclude that Roggow was in a position of trust with respect to the victim at the time of the unlawful acts. View "Colorado v. Roggow" on Justia Law