Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The State brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge the District Court's suppression of Defendant Khaled Zadran's statements, which were obtained through a custodial interrogation. The police arrested and interrogated Zadran in the course of an investigation of a suspected drug dealer. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether the police officer who interrogated Zadran engaged in coercive conduct sufficient to render Zadran's inculpatory statements involuntary. The trial court found that the interrogating officer made improper implied promises and had a generally coercive demeanor. Thus, the trial court concluded that all of Zadran's statements were involuntary and inadmissible. The Court held that under the totality of the circumstances, that the interrogation was not coercive and the statements were voluntary. View "Colorado v. Zadran" on Justia Law

The State brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge the District Court's suppression of Jasim Ramadon's statements obtained from a custodial interrogation. Ramadon is a native of Iraq who the United States military brought to this country for his protection as a teenager. In 2012, the Colorado Springs police brought Ramadon to the police station as part of a sexual assault investigation. The police had information identifying Ramadon as one of the perpetrators in the sexual assault. The trial court found that under the totality of the circumstances, all of Ramadon's statements after minute forty-two of the interrogation tape were impermissibly coerced and involuntary. After viewing the videotape of the interrogation, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's suppression order, however disagreeing with the time of the coercive behavior. The Supreme Court held that starting at minute fifty-four, instead of minute forty-two, was when the interrogating officer told Ramadon that if he did not tell the truth, he would likely be deported to Iraq. The record supported the trial court's conclusion that coercive police conduct during the custodial interrogation played a significant role in inducing Ramadon's inculpatory statements. View "Colorado v. Ramadon" on Justia Law

Defendant sought the return of $11,200 that was forfeited, distributed and spent by the receiving agencies three-and-a-half years before his criminal conviction was dismissed. The trial court granted defendant's motion. The State appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's order. After its review, the Supreme Court held that section 16-13-307(1.6), C.R.S. (2013) of the public nuisance statute did not apply where the underlying criminal case was dismissed following a reversal of the related criminal conviction on appeal when forfeiture judgment already entered. Accordingly, the appellate court was reversed. View "Colorado v. $11,200.00 U.S. Currency" on Justia Law

The State brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge the trial court's suppression of evidence discovered in a vehicle search incident to the arrest of defendant Shaun Crum. Police officers observed Crum standing near the open rear driver-side door of a SUV late at night in a commercial area known for high levels of drug activity. The officers approached Crum to speak with him, ran a wants and warrants check, and discovered an outstanding warrant for Crum's arrest. As Crum was being placed under arrest, he dropped a fast food wrapper and stepped on it, attempting to crush it with his feet. The officers retrieved the wrapper, which was found to hold a baggie containing two Oxycodone pills packaged in a manner consistent with a possible intent to distribute. The officers then searched the vehicle, finding various items in the passenger compartment that led to additional drug charges. Crum moved to suppress, but the trial court ruled that although the officers had probable cause to arrest Crum for possession of a controlled substance, they lacked sufficient reason to believe that the vehicle contained further evidence of possession. Consequently, the court suppressed the evidence discovered in the search. Because the officers saw Crum reaching into the vehicle, apparently retrieving the pills that he later attempted to conceal, the Supreme Court concluded it was reasonable for them to suspect that additional pills might be found in the vehicle. Under these circumstances, the Court found sufficient connection between the contraband in Crum’s possession and the vehicle to give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that additional contraband might be located in the vehicle. Therefore the suppression order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Crum" on Justia Law

A.S. was sentenced as an aggravated juvenile offender to two years' commitment to the Department of Human Services, suspended on condition of successful completion of two years' probation. The district court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that 19-2-601 C.R.S. (2013) authorized only commitment to DHS, and did not grant a court discretion to grant probation. Upon review of the applicable statute, the Supreme Court concluded 19-2-601 does indeed grant a sentencing court discretion. View "A.S. v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Paul Voth was arrested after firing several gunshots in a rural subdivision where he lived. He was taken to Denver Health Medical Center. Denver Health reported that Voth was disoriented when he arrived at the hospital due to visual and auditory hallucinations. Voth's delirium began to subside around about a month later. Although Denver Health suspected that viral encephalitis was the source of Voth's psychotic episode, it did not reach a definitive diagnosis. Voth was ultimately charged with several crimes; he entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the trial court's oral order allowing Voth, to assert involuntary intoxication as an affirmative defense under section 18-1-804, C.R.S. (2013).The Court found the trial court abused its discretion when it found that a virus qualified as a "substance" that could result in intoxication under the statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Voth" on Justia Law

J.R. was sexually assaulted by a man who offered her a ride as she was walking home at 2:00 A.M. one winter morning in 2005. J.R. was taken to the hospital for examination; she complained of neck and jaw pain stemming from when her assailant held her mouth shut. A presence of semen later implicated Respondent Michael Jones as J.R.'s assailant. The State charged respondent with numerous offenses. Prior to trial, he moved the trial court to bar the State from introducing evidence that he allegedly sexually assaulted two other women in two other states. The trial court denied the motion, finding the evidence of the two other alleged assaults under the four-part "Spoto" admissibility test allowed the evidence's admissibility to show respondent's "common plan, scheme, or design" and to rebut respondent's defense of consent (Colorado v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (1990)). A jury ultimately convicted respondent, but the appellate court reversed, finding that evidence of the two out-of-state assaults were not sufficiently similar to the Colorado assault. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The Supreme Court held that trial courts have no obligation to determine that evidence of other acts offered under the Colorado Rules of Evidence satisfy the doctrine of chances, and to also satisfy the second and third prongs of the Spoto admissibility test. Though the doctrine of chances provides one theory pursuant to which other-act evidence may satisfy components of the Spoto analysis, trial courts have discretion to assess the relevance of other-act evidence under Spoto apart from the doctrine. The court of appeals therefore erred when it effectively held that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the other-act evidence without conducting a doctrine of chances analysis. View "Colorado v. Jones" on Justia Law

Petitioner Christopher Marquez was convicted at a single trial of attempted aggravated robbery (a statutorily designated crime of violence); second degree assault (found by the jury to have been committed as a crime of violence under the circumstances of this case); and two counts of felony menacing. Petitioner was also found to be an habitual criminal requiring sentences to triple the maximum of the presumptive range for each of his crimes. The district court sentenced petitioner to concurrent terms of imprisonment for his felony menacing convictions, which it also ordered to be served concurrently with his crime-of-violence sentences, but it ordered petitioner's two crime-of-violence sentences to be served consecutively. After concluding that both crimes of violence were committed as part of a single "crime spree," the district court felt compelled to impose consecutive 48-year sentences. Petitioner sought review of the court of appeals' judgment that affirmed the district court's imposition of consecutive sentences for two crime-of-violence convictions. Because the phrase "arising out of the same incident," as appearing in section 18-1.3-406, C.R.S. (2013), is a reference to, and has the same meaning as, the phrase "arising from the same criminal episode," in section 18-1-408(2), C.R.S. (2013), and because the record in this case established that the crimes of violence of which petitioner was convicted were not "based on the same act or series of acts arising from the same criminal episode," as previously construed in the latter statute, the Supreme Court concluded the district court was not required to impose consecutive sentences. Rather, it was not only permitted, but in fact, required to exercise its discretion concerning the imposition of consecutive or concurrent sentences. The judgment of the court of appeals was therefore reversed, and the case was remanded for resentencing. View "Marquez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cameron Davis was driving his girlfriend's car while a man in the passenger seat shot and killed a bystander. At trial, the prosecution relied heavily on testimony from three witnesses: Davis' girlfriend, his mother, and one of his friends. The appeal concerned the testimony of two detectives who testified about their interviews with these three witnesses. The record in this case indicated that the testimony from law enforcement officials regarding a witness' credibility was offered to provide context for the detectives' interrogation tactics and investigative decisions. The Supreme Court concluded that this kind of evidence was properly admitted. View "Davis v. Colorado " on Justia Law

Defendant met his victim "ML" while standing in line at a store. A few days later, he and ML went out for dinner and drinks. Instead of driving ML to her car at the end of the date, defendant drove ML to a secluded location and sexually assaulted her. A jury would convict defendant of felonious sexual assault for which he was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight years to life, and designated as an SVP. Defendant appealed his conviction, sentence, and SVP designation to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the sexual assault conviction, but held that the trial court erred when it designated defendant as an SVP without making the factual findings required by the SVP statute. The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to make the factual findings of whether defendant was an SVP. Defendant took issue with the trial court's finding that he "established a relationship" with the victim with the intent of assaulting her to satisfy that criterion of the SVP statute. After applying its interpretation of the relationship criterion to the record in this case, the Court held that the trial court made the appropriate specific findings and correctly designated defendant as a SVP. View "Candelaria v. Colorado" on Justia Law