Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant David Uribe-Sanchez was charged with four felonies and two crimes-of-violence sentence enhancers for the sexual assault of a girl who referred to him as "dad." He would be sentenced to 34 years imprisonment and designated a sexually violent predator (SVP). To conclude that defendant satisfied the relationship criteria of the SVP statute, the trial court concluded defendant "promoted" his relationship with the victim primarily to victimize her. The appellate court affirmed. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts in this case erred by concluding defendant "promoted a relationship" with the victim when he assaulted her. The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court for a determination of whether the SVP designation was proper under the SVP statute. View "Uribe-Sanchez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant James Hunter was designated as a sexually violent predator (SVP) following his conviction of second-degree burglary, sexual assault, sexual assault on a child, and a crime of violence. The court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction, but reversed the SVP designation, and remanded the case back to the trial court for specific findings on whether either of defendant's victims were strangers to him, or whether he had established or promoted a relationship with either. On remand, defendant argued he was not a stranger. The trial court found that he was, and designated him an SVP. The issue before the Supreme Court turns on the interpretation of "stranger" in the SVP statute. Upon review, the Court held that "stranger" meant that the offender did not know the victim, or the victim did not know the offender at the time of the offense. On application of "stranger" in the SVP statute to this case, the Court held that the appellate court erred when it reversed the trial court's ruling designating defendant an SVP. View "Colorado v. Hunter" on Justia Law

Defendant Carlos Gallegos pled guilty to attempted sexual assault on a child after admitting to sexually assaulting his live-in-girlfriend's six-year-old daughter. The trial court found that defendant met the relationship criterion of the sexually violent predator (SVP) statute because he established a relationship with the victim primarily to sexually assaulting her. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was the interpretation of "established a relationship" and "promoted a relationship" in the SVP statute. Applying the definition of these phrases to defendant's case, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to reverse defendant's SVP designation because he had not "established a relationship" with the victim primarily for the purpose of assaulting her because he lived with her and treated her as a stepdaughter preceding the assault. View "Colorado v. Gallegos" on Justia Law

Defendant Rhoderick Flockhart was convicted of distribution of marijuana and possession of eight ounces or more. On appeal, the appellate court ruled on three issues: (1) the court reversed defendant's convictions because the trial court instructed the jury before deliberating; (2) the trial court erred by requiring defendant to raise and argue his challenges for cause in front of the prospective jurors; and (3) affirmed the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to disqualify the judge. The Supreme Court, after its review of the trial court proceedings, concluded: (1) that the trial court erred in giving pre-deliberation instructions, but that the error was harmless; (2) the trial court can, in its discretion, conduct venire challenges for cause in open court; and (3) the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to disqualify the trial judge. View "Colorado v. Flockhart" on Justia Law

The Arapahoe County Sheriff's Department received a call from R. Talent, who claimed to have spotted his stolen van in the driveway of a house that was later determined to be Defendant Lance Brunsting's residence. Talent told police that "Lance" was known to carry a gun and was associated with dangerous people who were involved in drugs and who were known to carry guns. Concerned with the report of guns at the residence, the Sheriff dispatched five deputies and a sergeant to the location. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the deputies' violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, or whether their claim of exigent circumstances at the time they were called to the property applied as an exception those rights. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that exigent circumstances existed when the deputies entered the curtilage of Defendant's residence, the issue of officer safety. With no violation of defendant's rights, the Court remanded the case back to the trial court for consideration of other issues defendant raised on appeal. View "Colorado v. Brunsting" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dina Marshall was charged with driving under the influence of drugs, careless driving, and possession of drug paraphernalia after lab urinalysis results revealed she had methamphetamine in her system when she caused a car accident. At trial, the State sought to admit the lab result showing that Marshall had methamphetamine in her urine; over Marshall's objection, the trial court admitted the lab report without the testimony of the lab technician who actually performed the test. Marshall appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling that the admission of the report did not violate Marshall's right to confront witnesses. The Court found that there was no evidence presented at trial that Marshall possessed drug paraphernalia. Therefore, the Court found that the trial court erroneously denied Marshall's motion for judgment of acquittal on this charge, and reversed the district court's judgment with respect to that charge. View "Marshall v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This case arose from Petitioner Brandon Allen's designation as a sexually violent predator (SVP). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's SVP designation and held that the trial court could designate an offender as an SVP even if the offender was deemed unlikely to recidivate based on his low score on the Sex Offender Management Board's risk assessment screening instrument. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court makes the ultimate SVP designation, but should give substantial deference to the scored Screening Instrument. A trial court that deviates from the results of the scored Screening Instrument must make specific findings on the record to demonstrate the necessity of the deviation. View "Allen v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Joshua Dooly sought certiorari to appeal the court of appeals' judgment that affirmed the dismissal of his application for postconviction relief. The trial court denied his request for new counsel, and instead, granted his existing counsel's motion to dismiss the application altogether. The appellate court upheld the district court, reasoning that Petitioner's counsel of record could file motions on Petitioner's behalf in clear contravention of his client's wishes. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss against Petitioner's wishes. The case was remanded back to the district court to reinstate Petitioner's application. View "Dooly v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State filed an interlocutory appeal to challenge the trial court's suppression of drugs discovered in defendant's truck. Although the district court upheld the initial traffic stop, it found that defendant was illegally detained at the time of a narcotics dog sniff of his vehicle because the purpose for the initial stop had already been accomplished, and no other reasonable suspicion existed to support further investigation. The court therefore suppressed the results of the subsequent search. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the prosecution failed to present evidence supporting the police's suspicions that defendant had committed, was committing or was about to commit a crime other than a traffic offense, they lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain him for further questioning or investigation. The contraband seized from his vehicle was therefore properly suppressed as the product of an illegal detention. View "Colorado v. Mason" on Justia Law

The State appealed the denial of a motion to quash subpoenas that Respondent John Brothers served on the parents of an alleged child-victim of sexual assault. The subpoenas ordered the parents to appear at Respondent's preliminary hearing and to bring their minor son, the alleged victim. The State argued in its motion that the victim's testimony was not necessary for the probable cause determination, and that he stood to suffer unnecessary psychological harm if required to appear. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the county court abused its discretion in refusing to consider the motion to quash at the preliminary hearing. The Court agreed with the State that there was a possibility of harm to the child even if he was not ultimately required to testify. View "Colorado v. Brothers" on Justia Law