Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Police arrived at Respondent Kim Fuerst's residence in response to a possible protection order violation. Fuerst's wife cooperated with the police's request to answer the door, eventually giving the police consent to search the residence. Officers found a bedroom door locked. The record indicated that Respondent was in the bedroom at the time; police managed to unlock the door, and there was no express objection to that entry. Officers found Respondent sitting on the floor "and in the company of numerous firearms." The officers detained Respondent and removed him from the residence. Officers later learned Respondent was a convicted felon. Respondent was later charged with four counts of possession of a weapon by a previous offender, and three counts of violation of the protection order. Respondent moved to suppress evidence of the firearms possession, arguing that his decision to silently remain behind the locked door inside the residence was not a valid consent to the police search. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the wife's free and voluntary consent to search was valid as to Respondent. View "Colorado v. Fuerst" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in these cases was whether a trial court could refer to prospective jurors by number instead of name in open court as a matter of routine policy. Defendant Rene Perez argued that the trial court's practice created an "anonymous jury" and as such, the jury should have been assessed under the anonymous jury framework devised by the federal courts. Defendants argued that because the trial court failed to follow that framework in this case, failing to demonstrate "good cause" for the practice, defendant's right to a fair trial was violated. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment that referring to prospective jurors by number did not invalidate defendant's conviction nor violate his constitutional rights. View "Perez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court seeking relief from a district court order that suppressed statements of Defendant Jesus Luna-Solis as well as certain DNA evidence. Although the court found that the statements in question were voluntary and made after an effective waiver of Miranda rights, it nevertheless suppressed them on the grounds that the Sixth Amendment barred the police from questioning defendant without counsel present. The court suppressed the DNA evidence on grounds that police in the execution of a Crim. P. 41.1 order of a County Court, sought the order for the benefit of the prosecution in this case, and that after filing a motion to admit evidence of an uncharged assault, the prosecution was permitted to acquire non-testimonial identification evidence from defendant, even to verify his identity as a perpetrator in the assault, only according to Crim. P. 16 II (a)(2), governing discovery in this case. Because defendant's Miranda waiver effectively waived his right to counsel as guaranteed by not only the Fifth but also the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in suppressing statements as a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Because Crim. P. 16 II imposes disclosure obligations on criminal defendants without simultaneously barring the use of evidence acquired through otherwise lawful investigation, the Court also found that the district court erred in finding a discovery violation and excluding DNA evidence. The district court's suppression order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Luna-Solis" on Justia Law

The State brought an interlocutory appeal before the Supreme Court to challenge a district court's order to suppress Defendant Carlos Barraza's incriminating statements made prior to his first police interview at his home, and at a second interview at the police station after having been given his Miranda rights. Defendant was charged with retaliation against a witness or victim when he confronted residents of an apartment who called police on his friend, leading to the friend's arrest. The district court concluded that Defendant's initial statements were given while in custody, and subsequent statements were tainted by the failure to initially advise Defendant of his rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that, considering the totality of the circumstances, Defendant was not subjected to a custodial interrogation at the time he made the initial statements, and because statements made at the police station were not therefore fruit of the poisonous tree, the district court erred in suppressing both statements. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the suppression order. View "Colorado v. Barraza" on Justia Law

In an original proceeding, petitioner Bruce Nozolino sought to vacate a trial court's order that disqualified the Office of the State Public Defender as his counsel. The trial court made the disqualification after it found that a conflict existed and was not waivable. On appeal to the Supreme Court, petitioner argued the trial court abused its discretion in its disqualification order. "Contrary to the trial court's ruling, our analysis of the factors critical to the determination of whether Nozolino must be allowed to waive conflict-free representation convince[d] us that the balance weigh[ed] in favor of Nozolino's preference for continued representation by [the Office of the Public Defender]." Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case for an advisement on record so that Nozolino could decide whether to waive conflict-free representation. View "In re Colorado v. Nozolino" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the prosecution challenged a district court order that granted defendant Dimitry Pleshakov's motions to suppress evidence and certain statements made to police. The district court concluded that defendant's incriminating statements were the product of an illegal interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings. The court suppressed these statements and evidence later obtained from defendant's apartment as fruit of the poisonous tree. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant was not subjected to a custodial interrogation at the time he made the statements at issue, and accordingly reversed the district court's order. View "Colorado v. Pleshakov" on Justia Law

Police suspected that Defendant Stephanie Theander was involved in the death of her ex-husband Gregg Theander. While confined to a hospital bed, she made a series of statements during two separate interviews with police. The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress these statements, finding that police violated her Miranda rights and that the statements were involuntary. The State appealed the trial court's rulings. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court agreed with the State and reversed the trial court. View "Colorado v. Theander" on Justia Law

In an original proceeding, the issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether an indigent alleged juvenile offender was entitled as of right to a second competency evaluation at the State's expense. Upon receiving an competency evaluation report, the trial court made a preliminary finding that "W.P." was competent to proceed. However, citing ongoing concerns about her client's mental health, W.P.'s public defender objected, requesting a hearing and filing a motion for a second competency evaluation at the State's expense. At the motion hearing, the public defender stated that because the juvenile code was silent, the statutory authority relied upon referred to the adult code which entitled the second evaluation at the State's expense. Concluding that the Children's Code was "specifically silent on that issue," the district court determined that the adult provisions did not apply and denied the request for a second evaluation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the public defender's request for a second evaluation. View "In re People in the Interest of W.P." on Justia Law

Defendant Jason LaRosa confessed to his wife, mother, pastor, a police dispatcher and an investigating police officer that he had sexually assaulted his two year old daughter. He was charged with multiple crimes, and a jury convicted him on all charges. On appeal, an appellate panel reversed Defendant's convictions under the corpus delicti rule, reasoning that the prosecution had presented only opportunity evidence (other than the confessions) establishing that Defendant had an opportunity to commit crime, but not that the crimes in fact, occurred. The State appealed that decision. The issue before the Supreme Court required the Court to decide whether to abandon the judicially created "corroboration requirement," the corpus delicti rule, and all of the attendant precedent. After review the Court decided to abandon the corpus delicti rule because "sound reasons exist[ed] for doing so." In its place, the Court articulated "the trustworthiness standard," requiring the prosecution to present evidence that proves a confession is trustworthy or reliable. The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to reverse Defendant's convictions because having consistently applied the corpus delicti rule as substantive law for over one hundred years, Defendant did not have fair warning of the Court's decision to abandon it. Therefore the Court was constitutionally prohibited from applying the new trustworthiness standard in this case. View "Colorado v. LaRosa" on Justia Law

Defendant Walter Tate appealed a district court order that reversed a suppression of evidence order. In a prosecution of Defendant for Driving Under the Influence, the trial court found that he had been stopped without reasonable articulable suspicion the moment a patrol car parked behind him, hemming in his car, even though he was asleep and unaware of the officer at the time. On interlocutory appeal by the State, the district court concluded that the earliest moment at which the defendant could have been seized occurred when he awoke and became aware of his circumstances, and by that point in time the officer had acquired at least reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a person cannot be seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even if his freedom of movement is actually restricted, without perceiving a show of authority as directed at him or his car. The Court affirmed the district court and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Tate v. Colorado" on Justia Law