Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, Petitioner Yanick Kazadi, a legal permanent resident born in the Congo, sought post-conviction review of his felony plea leading to a deferred judgment, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to notify him of possible deportation consequences for pleading guilty to obtain a deferred judgment and sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, concluding Petitioner could not seek review of his deferred judgment and sentence under Crim. P. 35(c) while in the deferred judgment period because, in a deferred judgment situation, there has not been a judgment of conviction that makes Crim. P. 35(c) review available. View "Kazadi v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In early 2012, two uniformed Colorado Springs police officers went to Defendant Jeffrey Marshall's residence to serve a summons for his alleged indecent exposure. Defendant wasn't home at the time; the officers waited in their squad car for him in a nearby parking lot. Defendant eventually came home, parking in the same lot as the officers. He was carrying a black backpack with him at the time. The officers approached Defendant to serve the summons. Despite his apparent cooperation, one officer was concerned that Defendant might run away. Defendant was then put under arrest on the indecent exposure charge. While one officer placed Defendant in the squad car, the other officer opened the backpack and found six individual bags of marijuana weighing 7.4 grams total, an assortment of prescription pills, and a digital scale. Based on the items found in the backpack, the State charged Defendant with possession with intent to manufacture or distribute marijuana, possession of a schedule-three controlled substance, and five habitual criminal counts. After two suppression hearings, the trial court found that Defendant's arrest was valid because the officers had a summons that required fingerprinting and processing Marshall at the Colorado Springs stationhouse. Nonetheless, the trial court concluded that the subsequent search of the backpack was illegal because Defendant was handcuffed and either in, or standing next to, the police car at the time of the search. The trial court reasoned that under "Arizona v. Gant," (556 U.S. 332 (2009)), the search incident to arrest exception did not apply because the exigencies discussed in that case that would justify a search were absent. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the State that the evidence in Defendant's backpack should not have been suppressed because the officer conducted a valid search incident to arrest. Therefore the Court reversed the trial court's order suppressing the evidence. View "Colorado v. Marshall" on Justia Law

In this postconviction appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a criminal defendant could plead guilty while reserving the right to appeal an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence. Adopting its reasoning in "Neuhaus v. Colorado," (2012 CO 65, released concurrently with this opinion), the Court held that such conditional pleas are not permitted under Colorado rules or statutes. Further, the Court declined to create an exception to allow conditional guilty pleas that reserve the right to appeal unsuccessful pretrial motions to suppress evidence because a reservation of that right is better created by statute or court rule, if at all. In this case, the Court affirmed the decision of the district court. View "Escobedo v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this postconviction appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a criminal defendant could plead guilty while reserving the right to appeal an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence. Adopting its reasoning in "Neuhaus v. Colorado," (2012 CO 65, released concurrently with this opinion), the Court held that such conditional pleas are not permitted under Colorado rules or statutes. Further, the Court declined to create an exception to allow conditional guilty pleas that reserve the right to appeal unsuccessful pretrial motions to suppress evidence because a reservation of that right is better created by statute or court rule, if at all. In this case, the Court reversed the decision of the appellate court. View "Colorado v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

In this postconviction appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a criminal defendant could plead guilty while reserving the right to appeal an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence. The Court held that such conditional pleas are not permitted under Colorado rules or statutes. Further, the Court declined to create an exception to allow conditional guilty pleas that reserve the right to appeal unsuccessful pretrial motions to suppress evidence because a reservation of that right is better created by statute or court rule, if at all. In this case, the Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court. View "Neuhaus v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case, along with "Hagos v. Colorado" (2012 CO 63), to address whether a determination on direct appeal that instructional error did not constitute plain error necessarily requires a determination in post conviction proceedings that trial counsel's failure to object to the erroneous instruction did not prejudice the defense. Upon review, the Court concluded that that a determination that an instructional error did not constitute plain error does not control a determination of prejudice under "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668 (1984)), because the plain error and Strickland standards are not the same. "The plain error standard requires that an error impair the reliability of the judgment of conviction to a greater degree than the Strickland prejudice standard." Defendant Villarreal's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, nonetheless, failed under the separate, fact-specific Strickland analysis. Thus, the Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment but on different grounds. View "Villarreal v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this postconviction proceeding, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a determination on direct appeal that instructional error did not constitute plain error necessarily required a determination in postconviction proceedings that trial counsel's failure to object to the erroneous instruction did not prejudice the defense. The Court concluded that a determination that instructional error did not constitute plain error does not control a determination of prejudice under "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668 (1984)), because the two standards are not the same. The plain error standard requires that an error impair the reliability of the judgment of conviction to a greater degree than the Strickland prejudice standard. Defendant Hagos' ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed under the separate, fact-specific Strickland analysis. The Court affirmed the appellate court but on different grounds. View "Hagos v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the court of appeals' unpublished decision in "People v. Gross," (07CA2255, slip op. at 7 (Colo. App. Apr. 1, 2010) (not selected for official publication)), which reversed the defendant's convictions arising out of a shooting at a campground. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court committed cumulative error by instructing the jury on the initial aggressor doctrine, which was requested by defense counsel; by allowing the prosecutor to argue that the defendant did not satisfy the duty to retreat, a requirement of the initial aggressor jury instruction; and by failing to instruct the jury that it could consider self-defense with respect to the crime of extreme indifference murder. In its holding, the court reasoned that the attorney incompetence exception to the invited error doctrine permitted plain error review of a defense-tendered instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the invited error doctrine precludes plain error review of a defense-tendered instruction. The attorney incompetence exception does not apply to deliberate, strategic acts of defense counsel but rather to inadvertent errors or oversights. In this case, the invited error doctrine precluded the defendant from arguing that the trial court erred by giving the initial aggressor instruction because the defendant's trial counsel made a deliberate, strategic decision to request it. "Likewise, the prosecutor's statements during closing argument about the duty to retreat may not be raised on appeal." The Court held that the trial court should have instructed the jury on self-defense with respect to the crime of extreme indifference murder, but that this error did not amount to plain error. View "Colorado v. Gross" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the prosecution challenged a district court order that granted defendant Suzanne Guthrie's motion to suppress evidence of an illegal narcotic discovered during a routine inventory search of her personal effects after a judge at the El Paso County Court, in a prior proceeding, ordered a deputy sheriff to jail her for direct contempt of court. In the prosecution for Defendant's possession of illegal drugs, the district court suppressed evidence discovered during the inventory search as an ad hoc remedy for the due process violation it deemed the county court judge committed when conducting the contempt proceeding. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment: the inventory search resulted directly from the county court's order to the deputy sheriff, based on a finding of criminal contempt of court to jail Defendant. Appeal of the summary contempt conviction, which might or might not result in reversal, would be the proper recourse for the county court's alleged due process violation. Suppressing evidence of the illegal narcotic discovered as a result of the valid inventory search here would not have been an appropriate remedy even if the county court erred in convicting Defendant of direct contempt of court. View "Colorado v. Guthrie" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was the court of appeals' unpublished decision in "Colorado v. Gross," (07CA2255, slip op. at 7 (Colo. App. Apr. 1, 2010) (not selected for official publication)), which reversed the defendant's convictions that arose out of a shooting at a campground. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court committed cumulative error by instructing the jury on the initial aggressor doctrine, which was requested by defense counsel; by allowing the prosecutor to argue that the defendant did not satisfy the duty to retreat, a requirement of the initial aggressor jury instruction; and by failing to instruct the jury that it could consider self-defense to determine whether the defendant possessed the culpable mental state required for the crime of extreme indifference murder. In so holding, the court reasoned that the attorney incompetence exception to the invited error doctrine permits plain error review of a defense-tendered instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the invited error doctrine precludes plain error review of a defense-tendered instruction. The attorney incompetence exception does not apply to deliberate, strategic acts of defense counsel but rather to inadvertent errors or oversights. Here, the invited error doctrine precluded the defendant from arguing that the trial court erred by giving the initial aggressor instruction because the defendant's trial counsel made a deliberate, strategic decision to request it. Furthermore, the prosecutor's statements during closing argument about the duty to retreat also could not be raised on appeal. In addition, the trial court should have instructed the jury on self-defense with respect to the crime of extreme indifference murder, but this error did not amount to plain error. View "Gross v. Colorado" on Justia Law