Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this interlocutory appeal, the Surpeme Court reviewed a trial court order that suppressed statements made by Petitioner Dianeth Pittman in response to police interrogation without a prior advisement pursuant to "Miranda v. Arizona," (384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)). Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in determining that Pittman was in custody for purposes of Miranda and therefore the trial court erred by suppressing the statements. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order.

The People brought an interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2011),and C.A.R. 4.1, challenging the district court's suppression of statements made by Defendant Erick Figueroa-Ortega to a police detective. Defendant was charged with burglary, criminal mischief, and theft, in connection with a break-in at the restaurant where he worked as a cook. The district court found that the statements in question were the product of custodial interrogation, without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Because the Supreme Court determined that the defendant was not in custody at the time he made the statements in question, the district court erred, and its suppression order was reversed.

Defendant Michael Pierson sought review of the court of appeals' judgment that affirmed his various convictions of felony sexual assault on a child and indecent exposure. The district court denied Defendant's pre-trial motion to admit evidence of the child's similar victimization by a teenage cousin, during substantially the same time period. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling, finding both that the proffered evidence of prior sexual contact did not fall within the rape shield exception for the source of semen, pregnancy, disease, or similar evidence of sexual intercourse, and that it was not relevant for any of the other purposes offered by the Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, finding that because the proffered evidence amounted to evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior sexual activity, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence.

The State brought an interlocutory appeal seeking the Supreme Court's review of a trial court order that suppressed evidence seized by police following an inventory search after a traffic stop. The trial court ruled that the traffic stop was pretextual and thus invalid. The court reasoned that, pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, contraband (heroin and drug paraphernalia) seized from the car during the inventory search had to be suppressed as evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that, irrespective of the officers' pretextual or subjective reason for stopping the vehicle, the officers possessed an independent and objective basis to make this traffic stop (the Defendant ran a red light). Having ruled that the stop was invalid, the trial court did not consider the State's argument that the search of the car was a valid inventory search and that the seizure of contraband from the car was therefore admissible. Hence, the Court reversed the trial court's order of suppression but remanded the case to the trial court with directions to make factual findings and conclusions of law concerning the validity of the inventory search consistent with our holding in "Pineda v. People," (230 P.3d 1181 (Colo. 2010)).

In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenged an order suppressing incriminating statements made by Defendant Michael Lynn while in custody. The trial court held that the statements came after Defendant's unambiguous request for counsel. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and held that Defendant's question, "When can I talk to a lawyer?" was an unambiguous request for counsel. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the trial court suppressing Defendant's statements.

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court concerned whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review a district court order dismissing a misdemeanor charge in a county court case that was improperly transferred to the district court in violation of a chief judge's order governing such transfers within the judicial district. "While it is questionable whether the district court had jurisdiction to dismiss the county court charge," the Court nevertheless held that the only forum for an initial appeal of such a dismissal is in the court of appeals because it is a final judgment of the district court. The Court noted that to hold otherwise would render this "important issue of the respect owed to a controlling chief judge's order" unreviewable. Accordingly, the Court held that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over this appeal. The case was remanded to the court of appeals to review the district court's dismissal on the merits.

The prosecution brought this interlocutory appeal seeking to reverse the trial court's ruling that suppressed evidence obtained from the search of the apartment of the Defendant Andrian Arapu. Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agents sought to contact Defendant, suspecting he was in the country illegally. In accordance with their standard protocol, ICE requested assistance from local law enforcement. When federal agents contacted Defendant, he refused to give them permission to enter his apartment, but he consented to the local detective entering the apartment to monitor a woman already inside. When the federal agents were arrested Defendant, he gave his consent to the local detective to gather his keys and phones, and to secure the apartment. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a suspect who consented to a law enforcement officer entering his dwelling to monitor another person inside permits the law enforcement officer to ask the monitored person for identifying information. Further, the Court held that a suspect who consents to a law enforcement officer remaining inside his dwelling to gather belongings and to secure the dwelling, permits the law enforcement officer to remain in the apartment until all law enforcement personnel have left the dwelling. Thus, the Court reversed the district court's suppression of the drug-related evidence, and reversed the district court's suppression of a firearm because it would have been discovered in a search pursuant to a warrant supported by a redacted affidavit that independently established probable cause to search the apartment for drug-related evidence. Accordingly, the case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings.

The State filed an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's suppression of evidence obtained following an investigatory stop of Defendant Adolph Funez-Paiagua. Defendant was standing on the property of a closed auto-body shop at 1:15 in the morning. One of two responding officers approached where Defendant had been standing. After hearing a loud crash and seeing Defendant fleeing the property with "some large bags," the officer ordered Defendant to stop. The trial court found the officer's testimony credible, but concluded that the evidence did not establish reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop. Specifically, the trial court determined that the seizure occurred "at the time the [first] officer contacted [Funez-Paiagua]." The trial court found that, at that time, the officer knew that Defendant was standing on private property late at night. The trial court concluded that these facts did not support reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop and therefore the trial court suppressed the evidence seized as a result of the stop. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the stop created reasonable suspicion. The investigatory stop was therefore not an unreasonable seizure, and the trial court incorrectly suppressed evidence resulting from the stop.

In its order, the trial court in this case ruled that the prosecutorial work product doctrine under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) was limited to work product prepared in anticipation of the case before the court, and did not extend to work product prepared in anticipation of a different but related criminal prosecution. Prior to disclosing the contested materials, the State petitioned the Supreme Court under C.A.R. 21 to reverse the trial court arguing the prosecutorial work product protection under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) extended to all work product and was not limited to materials prepared in anticipation of prosecuting the case immediately before the court. Resolving this issue in accordance with the intent of Crim.P. 16(I)(e)(1) to protect the professional judgment and mental impressions of prosecutors from disclosure so that they may candidly analyze the merits of a case and plan their litigation strategy, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and made the rule absolute: the Court held that the protection of prosecutorial work product, under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1),extends to opinion work product prepared by the prosecution in anticipation of any criminal prosecution. Because the trial court did not inspect the contested materials nor decide whether they constituted opinion work product prepared in anticipation of a criminal prosecution, the Court remanded the case matter to the trial court to make this determination through an ex parte, in camera review.

Defendant Tyler Wilburn announced his intent to introduce expert testimony of a learning disability to challenge whether he "knowingly" violated his bail bond condition, a mistake-of-fact defense (he missed his court date after he allegedly wrote down the wrong date). The prosecution maintained that Defendant had to plead not guilty by reason of insanity in order to introduce expert testimony of his mental condition, a plea which requires a "commitment" to a state mental health facility. The trial court agreed and ordered Defendant committed for forty-five days to a state facility to conduct a court-ordered mental examination. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and made the rule absolute: Defendant's proposed expert testimony of a learning disability was admissible under the procedures of section 16-8-107(3)(b), which requires notice and a court-ordered mental examination. Defendant was not required to plead insanity to challenge whether he possessed the mens rea for the offense with expert testimony concerning his learning disability. Under section 16-8-106, the trial court has discretion to consider the circumstances and the nature of Defendant's defense to set a reasonable time, place, and length for a court-ordered mental health examination.