Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The State brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge the district court's suppression of contraband seized from the defendant's vehicle on two separate occasions. In each case, after the defendant was arrested for driving under suspension, a police narcotics detection canine was brought to the scene and led around the defendant's truck, which had been parked and left at the location of her arrest. Also in each case, after the dog alerted to the presence of narcotics, a search of the truck's cab revealed drug paraphernalia and suspected methamphetamine. The district court found that under these circumstances, the state constitution barred the police from bringing a trained narcotics detection dog within detection range of the defendant's vehicle without first having reasonable suspicion to believe it contained contraband, which the court found to be lacking in both cases. The Colorado Supreme Court held after it's review that an interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed legitimate under the state constitution any more than under the federal constitution, and that official conduct failing to compromise any legitimate interest in privacy cannot be deemed a search under the state constitution any more than under the federal constitution. Because narcotics dogs could not communicate anything more than reason to believe the defendant's truck either contained or did not contain contraband, no reasonable privacy interest was infringed upon in permitting narcotics dogs to sniff around the vehicle. The Court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court reviewed the court of appeals' opinion in "People v. Laeke" (08CA79 (Colo. App. Feb. 4, 2010)). The court held that when the prosecution has conceded that defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime, he has a statutory right under Colorado's insanity statutes to a jury trial on both the merits and the affirmative defense of insanity. The court of appeals further held that a defendant's constitutional rights are violated when a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) is entered without a trial. After review of the applicable legal authority and court precedent, the Supreme Court held that a defendant does not have a statutory right to a jury trial on the merits and his affirmative defense of insanity when he enters a NGRI plea and the prosecution concedes defendant was insane. "The legislature articulated its intent when it amended the insanity statutes. The explicit legislative wording did not include an intent to create a substantive statutory right to a jury trial on the merits and the affirmative defense of insanity after it has been established that the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime." The Court held that the Constitution is not violated when NGRI is entered without a trial on the merits and an affirmative defense of insanity. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

In this case alleging sexual assault on a child, Defendant Yrineo Salazar sought to introduce evidence of an alternate suspect (the child's grandfather). Defendant asserted the alternate suspect had sexually assaulted his own daughter when she was a child and was present in the home when the incidents for which Defendant was charged allegedly occurred. Defendant thus argued the alternate had motive and opportunity to commit the charged offenses, and therefore, evidence of the alternate's prior sexual conduct was relevant and its probative value not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. The Supreme Court determined after its review of the case that under its precedent, evidence of the alternate's prior sexual conduct with someone other than the victim was of "questionable relevance" to the identity of the perpetrator of the charged offense. "Even assuming the relevance of the alternate's prior sexual conduct, [the Court] concluded that the evidence should be excluded under the Colorado Rules of Evidence because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger or confusing the issues and misleading the jury." Noting that the grandfather was never charged for the alleged abuse of his daughter, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that evidence was admissible in this case.

Defendant-Petitioner Thomas Lynn O'Hara, III was convicted of distribution of a schedule II controlled substance, adjudicated a habitual criminal, and sentenced to ninety-six years in the Department of Corrections. Prior to trial, Defendant moved unsuccessfully to suppress the State's wiretap evidence against him, contending, among other things, that the wiretaps were not properly authorized because the elected district attorney had not personally prepared or signed the applications to initiate or extend the wiretaps. On appeal, Defendant renewed his challenge to the wiretap evidence. The court of appeals held that the applicable law requires the attorney general or a district attorney to "specifically authorize a specific wiretap application," but the elected official "need not sign or personally submit the application." Because the court of appeals concluded that the record contained no finding by the trial court that the elected district attorney specifically authorized the wiretaps, it remanded the case for further proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed in substance with the court of appeals' statutory interpretation, and affirmed the court's decision to remand for further proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that while the lack of the elected official's signature on the application is not fatal, in the absence of the elected official's signature, the requisite personal authorization cannot be presumed. "Under such circumstances, the prosecution must show compliance with section 16-15-102(1)(a) by establishing that the application was personally authorized by the attorney general or elected district attorney. This compliance may be shown through the sworn testimony or affidavit of the elected official, or similar proof."

Respondent Abel Laeke was charged with one count of criminal attempt to commit unlawful sexual contact and one count of indecent exposure as a result of events that the State alleged occurred while he was a patient at the psychiatric ward at Denver Health Medical Center in 2004. At a preliminary hearing, the county court found probable cause to believe that Respondent committed the crimes and bound the charges over for proceedings in the district court. A trial court is required to hold a preliminary hearing if there has been no grand jury indictment or preliminary hearing prior to the entry of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). At arraignment, Respondent's attorney sought to enter a plea of NGRI over Respondent's objection. A doctor at the Colorado Mental Health Institute opined that Respondent was then legally incompetent. After Respondent was restored to competency, the prosecution stated that it would stipulate to the plea of NGRI, thereby agreeing that Respondent was insane on the date of the commission of the offense. Respondent's counsel again asked the court to accept the NGRI plea over Respondent's objection. The court asked Respondent if he had anything he'd like to say, and he responded "I think [my attorney] summed it up for me but I'm hoping to prove that I didn't do this in trial." Based on the prosecution's stipulation and the mental health evaluations before it, the district court accepted the NGRI plea and then found Respondent NGRI. The court then committed Respondent to the Department of Human Services. Respondent appealed, and the court of appeals held that Respondent was deprived of his right to a jury trial. The court of appeals held that Respondent had both a statutory and a constitutional right to a jury trial on the merits and his affirmative defense of insanity. After its review of the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court held that when a defendant has entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and the prosecution concedes that the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the offense, the defendant has neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to a jury trial on the affirmative defense of insanity or the merits of the charged offense. Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Geri David was attacked in the parking lot of a grocery store in 2004 by a man she later identified as Defendant Michael O'Shaughnessy. She was approached from behind by Defendant who was brandishing a six-inch hunting knife with a serrated blade. He held the knife to her face and ordered her into her car. She sat in the driver's seat with her feet outside of the car and kicked at her assailant to ward off the attack. As she lashed out at him, he stabbed her with the knife, causing injury to the right and left sides of her neck and throat, to her left thigh, and to her hand. Defendant demanded her money. David told him she did not have any money and turned toward the floor of the passenger seat to look for her purse. When she turned back, Defendant was gone. He did not reach for or take the purse. A jury convicted Defendant of attempted first degree murder with a deadly weapon, attempted aggravated robbery, second degree assault, false imprisonment, reckless endangerment, and a violent crime sentence enhancer. During the course of the trial, Defendant requested a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of abandonment. The trial court denied the request. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment and held that to present an affirmative defense of abandonment of an attempt crime for jury consideration, the defendant must present "some credible evidence" on the issue, and in this case, Defendant did not present such "credible evidence." Furthermore, the Court held that having injured the victim does not necessarily foreclose the affirmative defense of abandonment.

In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the General Assembly had not classified firearms as per se deadly weapons for the purposes of the first degree burglary statute. The legislature did not intend theft of a firearm from a building to constitute first degree burglary regardless of the manner the burglar used or intended to use the firearm. The General Assembly superseded earlier decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court which held that firearms were per se deadly weapons. In 2005, Defendant Mark Montez broke through a window of a home in Lakewood, Colorado, entered and ransacked the home, took about $150 and a gun case containing two unloaded shotguns before leaving left. A jury convicted Defendant on two counts of first degree burglary (one for each shotgun), as well as two counts of possession of a weapon by a previous offender, one theft count, and six habitual criminal counts based on prior convictions. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, but merged the two convictions for first degree burglary into one. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the statutory construction at issue in this case. Upon review, the Court held that the term "intended to be used" in the deadly weapon definition of section 18-1-901(3)(e) refers to the defendant's, not the manufacturer’s intent. The statute does not classify a firearm as a deadly weapon per se. In this case, the prosecution conceded that, if its argument that a firearm is per se a deadly weapon did not prevail, Defendant's could not stand. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction.

M.T. was charged in 2004 with sexual assault on a child. He pled guilty under terms of a deferred judgment to attempted sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. Four years later, M.T. successfully completed the terms of the deferred judgment and withdrew his guilty plea. Pursuant to the deferred judgment, prosecutors dismissed the charge of attempted sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. Thereafter, M.T. filed a civil petition to seal the criminal records associated with his case, pursuant to section 24-72-308(1), C.R.S. (2011). Over the prosecution’s objection, the district court granted the petition. That court reasoned that the exception contained in section 24-72-308(3)(c), which prohibits the sealing of "records pertaining to a conviction of an offense for which the factual basis involved unlawful sexual behavior," does not apply to a successfully-completed and dismissed deferred judgment. The court of appeals reversed. The majority held that files in a case dismissed after a deferred judgment contain records pertaining to a conviction and therefore the statutory exception precluded the sealing of M.T.'s records. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the court of appeals.

Defendant Joseph Lucero was convicted of crimes connected to several break-ins in August and September 2000, including three counts of theft and one count of first degree burglary. In review of this case, the Supreme Court applied several of its earlier decisions, and merged the three theft convictions into one, and vacated the first degree burglary conviction. As the Court held in "Roberts v. People," the General Assembly required all thefts committed by the same person within a six-month period prior to 2009 to be joined and prosecuted as a single theft. The court therefore corrected Defendant's sentence. Furthermore, the Court applied its holding in "Montez v. Colorado," holding that the General Assembly has provided that a firearm is not a deadly weapon per se for the purposes of the first degree burglary statute. As in "Montez," the prosecution in this case conceded that if firearms are not per se deadly weapons, Defendant's conviction could not stand. Accordingly, the Court vacated Defendant's first degree burglary conviction.

Defendant Anthony Revoal was charged with one count of possession with intent to manufacture or distribute marijuana in an amount less than five pounds after an investigatory stop and "Terry" frisk revealed marijuana and a scale containing marijuana residue. At the time of the stop, the police were aware that: (1) it was 11:30 p.m.; (2) robberies had recently occurred in the area; (3) Defendant was standing on the side of a closed sandwich shop; (4) Defendant walked to the side of an open liquor store, then walked toward the back of the liquor store, where it was dark; and (5) Defendant turned and walked away from the investigating officer when he saw the patrol vehicle. The trial court suppressed the marijuana evidence on the basis that these facts did not give the investigating officer reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding that the facts and circumstances the officer knew at the time of the intrusion, viewed either individually or in conjunction with each other, did not amount under the "totality of the circumstances" to a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the officer's investigatory stop.