Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The State charged Defendant Christopher Strimple with possession of an explosive or incendiary device and other crimes after a police search of the home he shared with his common law wife. Police responded to the home when Gabriele Thompson complained of domestic abuse. When police arrived, Defendant refused to let them in, threatened to kill officers if they entered, and engaged officers in a tense stand-off for nearly forty-five minutes. He ultimately surrendered peacefully, and police took him into custody. Thompson consented to an additional search during which the police discovered knives, a pipe bomb and drug paraphernalia. The trial court suppressed this evidence on the basis that, during the stand-off, Defendant had refused consent for entry into the home. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Thompson validly gave her consent to the second warrantless search because Defendant was no longer physically present and the police did not remove him from the scene in order to avoid his objection to the search.

Defendant Andrew Mumford challenged his conviction for possession of one gram or less of cocaine, arguing, among other things, that an incriminating statement he made to a law enforcement officer should have been suppressed because it was obtained without proper warnings under "Miranda v. Arizona" (384 U.S. 436 (1966)). The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that Defendant was not in custody for purposes of "Miranda" at the time he made the statements. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that under the totality of the circumstances at the time he made the incriminating statement, a reasonable person in Defendant's position would not have felt deprived of his freedom of action to a degree associated with a formal arrest.

The State appealed the reversal of Respondent Jerad Pickering's conviction for reckless manslaughter. The court of appeals held that the trial court's self-defense jury instructions impermissibly shifted the burden of the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Respondent acted recklessly. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's instruction did not shift the State's burden, and accordingly reversed the court of appeals' judgment and overruled contrary rules announced in "People v. Lara" and "People v. Taylor."

Defendant Gerald Lewis appealed his convictions and sentences for a number of offenses including three counts each of kidnapping and sexually assaulting his kidnap victims. The trial court sentenced Defendant for sexual assault and separately sentenced him for the second degree kidnapping of each victim, elevated to the level of a class two felony. Among its other holdings, the court of appeals rejected Defendant's contention that "People v. Henderson" should be overruled because of subsequent United States Supreme Court case law, and it affirmed each of his separate convictions and sentences. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether "Henderson" was still good law. Upon review, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, holding that the federal Court's case law "neither undermine [the Colorado Court's] prior assessment of legislative intent in 'Henderson' nor in any way diminish[es] the dispositive impact of legislative intent on Lewis's double jeopardy and merger claims."

In 2006, a jury convicted David Wood of manslaughter for fatally shooting someone in his apartment during a drug transaction. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial request for immunity from prosecution under Colorado's "Make My Day" statute. Following its review of the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court found that Defendant could have sought immediate review of the trial court's order by invoking the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction before the verdict was handed down, but "Make My Day" immunity may not be reviewed on appeal after trial. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision.

In 2009, the Court of Appeals reversed Defendant Gonzalo Santana's conviction for distribution of a controlled substance, concluding that the prosecution had violated his constitutional rights by shifting the burden of proof to him at trial. According to the appellate court, the prosecutor shifted the burden by cross-examining the defense expert about his ability to perform conclusive tests which established that the expert could have run such tests. The prosecution then emphasized that testimony in its closing argument. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court concluded that the prosecutor did not shift the burden of proof to the defendant. The Court found that defense counsel "opened the door" by questioning the expert about his ability to conduct conclusive tests. In light of the whole record, the Court reasoned that the prosecutor's questions and comments were "likely not meant to shift the burden of proof, but to highlight the strength of the prosecution's case."

Both Defendant Tremaine Speer and the State challenged the Court of Appeals' judgment that reversed Defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated robbery. The State contended that the district court erred by denying Defendant's requested jury instruction on the affirmative defense of "duress" which resulted in the reversal of his conviction. Defendant cross-petitioned, asserting that even if the Supreme Court disagreed that the omission of the instruction was "reversible error," he would nevertheless be entitled to a new trial because the district court erred in rejecting his challenges for cause on two prospective jurors who worked in âsecurity.â Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's "duress" jury instruction. It was undisputed that Defendant had a gun and drove himself to the scene of the crime. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could consider that Defendant acted under duress. Furthermore, the Court found that technically neither of the prospective jurors worked in "security," despite their employers being the Department of Homeland Security. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and reinstated the district court's judgment.

Plaintiff-Appellant The State of Colorado appealed a district court order that suppressed test results performed on blood drawn from Defendant-Appellee Joshua Smith following a car accident. Police suspected Defendant was intoxicated. A passenger extracted from the car told police that Defendant had been driving. Paramedics took Defendant to the hospital, and police asked for blood samples. Police did not have a search warrant or ask for Defendant's consent prior to taking the samples. The nurse drew one sample, after which another officer advised Defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant waived his rights and did not object to, resist, complain about, or otherwise question any of the blood draws. The trial court concluded that police had probable cause to arrest Defendant for vehicular assault at the time of the draws. Nevertheless, the court suppressed the results of the tests performed because the State's "prior consent" statute required that the police ask Defendant for his consent prior to drawing the blood. Upon consideration of the arguments and the "prior consent" statute, the Supreme Court held that officers do not have to request a driver's consent to conduct a constitutional involuntary blood draw. Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower court's decision that suppressed Defendant's test results. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.

Colorado state law makes it a felony for a person to have unlawful sexual contact with a child while occupying a "position of trust." Petitioner Mark Pellman appealed an order of the Court of Appeals that found that he was in a position of trust at the time of the unlawful contact between himself and his child victim. Petitioner was a friend of the victim's family, and from 2000-2005, visited with the family, attended the same church, and babysat the victim. In 2005, Petitioner chaperoned a trip to an amusement park when the alleged contact took place. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that he was only in a position of trust at specific times, the last of which was when he chaperoned the amusement park trip. The appellate court rejected this argument, and after review, the Supreme Court rejected it as well. The Supreme Court found that under the language of the applicable statute, a defendant might be in a position of trust through an ongoing a continuous supervisory relationship with the victim, regardless of whether or not the defendant was performing a specific supervisory task at the time of the unlawful contact. The Court found sufficient evidence to support the appellate court and affirmed its decision.

The State appealed a trial court order that suppressed statements made by Defendant Wayne Klinck during his initial interview by police. Responding to a domestic disturbance report, police arrived at Defendant's girlfriend's house. They asked Defendant to remain on the porch while the officers interviewed the girlfriend. Shortly thereafter, an officer spoke with Defendant, and when the officer determined he had probable cause, he placed Defendant under arrest. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and he invoked his right to counsel. Detectives re-contacted and interviewed Defendant in jail, and at that time Defendant waived his Miranda rights and provided additional information. The trial court suppressed the statements Defendant made on the porch prior to being placed under arrest. Upon consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Court found that Defendant was not in custody during his initial interview on the porch. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.