Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Respondent Theodore Madrid was charged with one count of first degree murder and two counts of child abuse resulting in death. During jury selection, the prosecution excused prospective juror J.T., a Black man who indicated on his juror questionnaire that he was sixty-eight years old, married with children, and a retired customer-service specialist. The court gave each side a total of five minutes to question the prospective jurors, including J.T. The prosecution asked J.T. if he had any concerns about potentially having to look at autopsy pictures in the case, to which J.T. responded, "no." The prosecution then asked J.T., "Do you have a good joke?" J.T. responded, "I'm the joke." Thereafter, the prosecution used its ninth peremptory challenge to excuse J.T. Madrid raised a Batson challenge to this, arguing the excuse was race-neutral: "the real problem is we don’t know very much about him. He has a hearing issue it appears and he’s sort of completely nonresponsive. We have very little information on him from the questionnaire and no time to really have a very detailed conversation with him." The trial court accepted this reason and excused the juror. After a nine-day trial, the jury convicted Madrid on all counts. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review on whether a party could, on remand, raise a new race-neutral reason to justify a peremptory strike made at trial. The Supreme Court responded in the negative: when a party has been provided with an adequate opportunity to present its race-neutral justifications at trial, it is barred from introducing new race-neutral justifications on remand. The Court's application of that holding to the facts here prompted the Court to affirm the court of appeals' judgment, which meant that Madrid was entitled to a new trial. View "Colorado v. Madrid" on Justia Law

Police officers interrogated defendant-appellee Brent Willoughby at his home about domestic violence allegations. After the State charged Willoughby with several offenses, he moved to suppress the statements he made during this interrogation, arguing that the officers obtained them in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The trial court granted the motion, finding that Willoughby had been subjected to a custodial interrogation without first receiving Miranda warnings. The State filed an interlocutory appeal, challenging the trial court’s suppression order. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Willoughby was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he made the statements at issue. Therefore, it reversed the portion of the trial court’s order suppressing the statements and remand the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Willougby" on Justia Law

Defendant James Justice was charged with multiple offenses in four felony cases. The State extended him a global plea bargain offer, but he rejected it. Unhappy that the State would not sweeten the offer, Justice filed a motion asking the district court to compel mediation. The court granted the motion and ordered mediation over the State's objection. As part of its order, the court required good-faith participation and threatened to impose sanctions for lack of compliance. The State then brought petitions invoking the Colorado Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in two of the cases, and the Supreme Court issued rules to show cause. The Supreme Court determined the district court lacked the authority to require the parties to mediate in these criminal cases, and because the mediation order arguably involved the court in the plea bargaining process, the district court erred. View "Colorado v. Justice" on Justia Law

Sylvia Johnson was convicted by jury of unlawfully purchasing a firearm “for transfer to” a man she identified as her common law husband, Jaron Trujillo, who was legally prohibited from possessing a firearm. While deliberating, the jurors posed two questions to the court about the meaning of “transfer.” This became the issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court: what the term “transfer” meant under section 18-12-111(1) C.R.S. (2022), the so-called “straw-purchaser” statute. The Supreme Court held that it included temporary transfers and the shared use of a firearm. The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, albeit on slightly different grounds. View "Johnson v. Colorado" on Justia Law

At the time of his appeal, defendant John Hacke was out of custody. The issue his appeal presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether Hacke was entitled to a preliminary hearing on the charge of identity theft, a class 4 felony. After Hacke was arrested, he posted bond. During a subsequent court appearance, he asserted that he was entitled to a preliminary hearing because he was facing mandatory sentencing. Since the State did not initially take a definitive position on this contention, the court scheduled a preliminary hearing. However, the court afforded the State an opportunity to object to the preliminary hearing later if warranted. When the parties appeared again, the court ruled that Hacke was not entitled to a preliminary hearing because identity theft didn't require mandatory sentencing. The district court denied Hacke’s request for a preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court concurred: "The relevant inquiry isn’t whether Hacke’s criminal history subjects him to mandatory sentencing if he is convicted of identity theft. It’s whether identity theft, the class 4 felony he’s accused of committing, requires a mandatory sentence. Class 4 felony identity theft does not require a mandatory sentence. Therefore, Hacke is not entitled to a preliminary hearing." View "Colorado v. Hacke" on Justia Law

The issue presented in these cases was whether a trial court could bifurcate the elements of felony DUI during a jury trial. Specifically, the Court addressed whether a jury trial for felony DUI could be conducted piecemeal, with the element of prior convictions tried separately, only after the jury returns a guilty “verdict” on the other elements. Citing Colorado v. Fullerton, 525 P.2d 1166 (Colo. 1974), the Supreme Court held that a trial court could not bifurcate the elements of the offense of felony DUI (or of any offense) during a jury trial. View "Colorado v. Kembel" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether: (1) an objection to an allegedly sleeping juror was preserved when the parties note that the juror was sleeping but requested no action from the court; (2) there was a distinction between the waiver of the right to a jury trial and the waiver of the right to a jury of twelve, which could possibly implicate whether counsel could waive the number of jurors on behalf of her client; and (3) the right to a jury of twelve was waived when counsel notes that a juror was asleep but did not object or request action from the court. The Supreme Court found defendant Elliott Forgette was tried by a jury of twelve, and this case did not implicate the second and third issues on which the Court granted certiorari, and it therefore did not decide those questions. The Court concluded, however, that defense counsel does not properly preserve an objection to an allegedly sleeping juror merely by noting that a juror was asleep without objecting or otherwise requesting any action from the court: "when counsel is aware of all of the pertinent facts and does not preserve an objection to an allegedly sleeping juror, that objection is waived, thereby precluding appellate review." View "Elliott v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In February 2022, Matthew D. Barrett presided over a hearing in a case captioned Colorado v. Knisley, No. 21CR1312 (Dist. Ct., Mesa Cnty.). At one point during this hearing, which concerned the return on certain subpoenas duces tecum issued by the defendant in that case, Belinda Knisley, District Attorney Daniel Rubinstein asked to approach the bench. At the bench, he informed Judge Barrett that his paralegal had alerted him to the fact that Tina Peters, who was present in the courtroom and who was a defendant in a separate case over which Judge Barrett was presiding, appeared to be recording the hearing. Rubinstein then confirmed that he had “seen the screen, and indeed it’s recording.” Though Peters denied recording the Knisley hearing, the State moved for an order directing the issuance of a citation to hold Peters in contempt for dishonesty to the court. The State referenced attached affidavits from the paralegal seated near Peters as she was allegedly recording. "Out of an abundance of caution," Judge Barrett issued an order in which he recommended the State's motion be heard by a different judicial officer because he did not witness or find on the record Peters was recording the Knisley hearing. Several months later, Peters served on Judge Barrett a subpoena to appear for a deposition in her contempt action. Judge Barrett responded by filing a motion to quash the subpoena, arguing that: (1) his testimony was unnecessary because the transcript of the February hearing demonstrated that he did not observe Peters’s alleged conduct, while other witnesses who did observe her conduct could testify to the relevant facts; and (2) any deposition would impermissibly intrude on his mental processes. The district court denied Judge Barrett's motion to quash; the Colorado Supreme Court determined Judge Barrett's testimony was not necessary to the proceeding for which it was sought, and the district court abused its discretion in compelling Judge Barrett to appear for a deposition in this case. View "In re Colorado v. Knisley" on Justia Law

Following his conviction and sentence for first degree murder, James Woo brought a civil replevin action seeking the return of certain property that was lawfully seized by the government as part of his criminal case. The trial court ruled, and the court of appeals agreed (on different grounds), that the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”) barred Woo’s claim. Woo argued on appeal that, if the CGIA precluded his replevin action, he was rendered remediless and the CGIA, as applied to him, violated his rights under the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Because the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that Woo had a remedy in his criminal case to recover any property lawfully seized, and because the Court further concluded that the remedy was constitutionally adequate, the CGIA’s bar of this replevin action did not violate his federal and state constitutional rights to procedural due process. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment, but on slightly different grounds. View "Woo v. El Paso County Sheriff" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the State challenged a trial court order that granted defendant Jorge Solis’ motion to disqualify the entire Seventh Judicial District Attorney’s Office because his public defender, began working for the DA’s office prosecuting his case. The issue presented here was whether, as Solis argued before the trial court, his attorney’s former representation of Solis constituted “special circumstances” under section20-1-107(2), C.R.S. (2022), requiring not just the attorney’s disqualification, but also disqualification of the entire DA’s Office. Following a half-day hearing, the trial court found that the DA’s Office had a screening policy in place and that it had taken additional precautions to wall the attorney off from Solis’s prosecution. The court thus concluded Solis had failed to establish that special circumstances existed such that “it [was] unlikely that [he] would receive a fair trial.” The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in granting Solis’s motion. The trial court’s determination that the attorney could potentially deviate from the screening policy in the future was based on his appearance in Mr. Flores-Molina’s case; it was not a determination that the attorney would violate the screening policy in this case or that confidential information from the attorney’s prior representation had not been or could not continue to be adequately screened from the attorneys prosecuting Solis’s case. Because there was no evidence in the record that Solis is unlikely to receive a fair trial, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order disqualifying the entire DA’s Office. View "Colorado v. Solis" on Justia Law