Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted of the murder of her minor son, E, and arson in the second degree. The case arose from an incident where the defendant sedated E with a substantial amount of diphenhydramine, set two fires in their home, and was found unconscious alongside E, who was later pronounced dead. The medical examiner determined E's cause of death to be homicidal asphyxia, with diphenhydramine intoxication as a contributing factor. The defendant's social media posts prior to the incident indicated distress and potential premeditation.The trial court, after a competency hearing, found the defendant competent to stand trial. The jury found the defendant guilty of both charges. The defendant appealed, claiming her amnesia deprived her of a fair trial, the trial court improperly admitted social media posts, and the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the defendant's claim of amnesia affecting her right to a fair trial failed under the first prong of State v. Golding because she did not request a posttrial determination regarding the fairness of the trial, making the record inadequate for review. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the social media posts, as they were properly authenticated through testimony.Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of murder. The jury could reasonably find that the defendant caused E's death with intent, based on the cumulative evidence, including the circumstances of the fire, the sedative found in E's system, and the defendant's behavior and social media posts. The evidence was also sufficient to support the arson conviction, as the jury could reasonably find that the defendant set the fires with the intent to damage the home and conceal the murder. The court affirmed the judgment. View "State v. Ziolkowski" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of possessing child pornography in the first degree, which requires proof of possessing fifty or more images of child pornography. The New Britain Police Department obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s cell phone, which revealed images of suspected child pornography. The state introduced fifty-seven images at trial, and the defendant was found guilty by a jury.The defendant appealed, arguing that thirteen of the images did not constitute child pornography as they depicted mere nudity, which is protected under the First Amendment. He also contended that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the Dost factors, which are used to determine whether an image depicts a lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area. The trial court had instructed the jury that it could consider these factors but was not obligated to do so.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that at least eleven of the thirteen challenged images depicted a lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area, thus constituting child pornography. The court also determined that the first five Dost factors are helpful in assessing whether a depiction is lascivious but should not be used to define the term. The sixth Dost factor, which considers whether the image is intended to elicit a sexual response in the viewer, should not be used in possession cases as it introduces a subjective element.The court found that the trial court’s instruction on the Dost factors, including the sixth factor, did not mislead the jury. The court also held that a specific unanimity instruction was not required, as the different images and categories of sexually explicit conduct are merely means of proving the elements of the offense. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit exhibits showing file names of deleted images associated with the defendant’s email address, as they were probative of the defendant’s knowledge and possession of child pornography. The judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Inzitari" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and one count of assault in the first degree, among other crimes, related to a shooting incident involving multiple victims. The defendant claimed self-defense and defense of others, arguing that he shot one of the victims, Wooten, because Wooten was an active shooter. The defendant also sought to admit evidence of another victim, Taylor's, prior arson conviction to demonstrate Taylor's violent character.At trial, the defendant testified that he shot Taylor and Wooten in self-defense and defense of others. The jury found the defendant guilty of all charges, rejecting his justification defenses. The trial court excluded evidence of Taylor's arson conviction, ruling that the defendant did not have a certified copy of the conviction.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to defeat the defendant's claims of self-defense and defense of others regarding Wooten's murder. The court noted that the shootings of Taylor, Smith, and Wooten were part of a single, continuous episode. The jury could reasonably have found that Wooten was acting defensively to protect Smith from the defendant's unprovoked attack. The court also held that any error in excluding evidence of Taylor's arson conviction was harmless. The arson conviction did not necessarily involve a risk of harm to a person or violent physical conduct, and there was no evidence that Taylor was armed or the aggressor in the shootings. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault in the first degree. He appealed, arguing that the second count in the state's February 2020 substitute information was time-barred by the five-year statute of limitations. This count alleged conduct from January 1, 2014, which was first included in the 2020 substitute information, more than five years after the alleged conduct occurred.The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, reasoning that the defendant had notice of the 2014 allegations from the arrest warrant affidavit filed in 2018. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the arrest warrant affidavit provided sufficient notice of the 2014 conduct, and thus, the 2020 substitute information did not substantially broaden or amend the timely charges.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the arrest warrant affidavit does not toll the statute of limitations for uncharged conduct. The court held that the timely filed 2018 informations did not mention the 2014 conduct, and the defendant did not receive notice within the limitation period that he would be called to defend against the 2014 conduct. Therefore, count two of the 2020 substitute information substantially broadened or amended the timely charges and was time-barred under the statute of limitations.The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment regarding count two, directing the trial court to render a judgment of acquittal on that count and to resentence the defendant on the remaining counts. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "State v. Orane C." on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple offenses related to a series of robberies and burglaries in 2020. He was incarcerated following his arrest in October 2020. During pretrial proceedings, the defendant reached a plea agreement with the state, which included a total effective sentence of ten years of imprisonment followed by five years of special parole. The sentences were to run concurrently and be stayed until April 1, 2022, to ensure that the defendant's pretrial credit was not affected.The defendant pleaded guilty in multiple judicial districts, and the courts issued sentences in accordance with the plea agreement. However, the defendant later filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that he was promised 521 days of presentence confinement credit, but the commissioner of correction applied fewer days, resulting in a longer effective sentence.The trial court in the judicial district of New Britain dismissed the defendant's motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Appellate Court's decision in State v. Hurdle, which held that trial courts lacked authority under General Statutes § 18-98d to award presentence confinement credit.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that trial courts do have the authority to direct the commissioner to apply specific presentence confinement credit to a sentence on a judgment mittimus, as established in the companion case of State v. Hurdle. The court also determined that the defendant's motion raised a colorable claim that the plea agreement required the application of 521 days of presentence confinement credit and that there was no indication the defendant waived his statutory right to this credit.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider the merits of the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence. View "State v. Nixon" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with violating a protective order and was sentenced to five years of incarceration, execution suspended, followed by five years of probation. Later, he was arrested for threatening and subsequently charged with violating his probation. Due to COVID-19 related delays, the violation of probation arrest warrant was not served until several months after it was issued. The defendant remained in custody for several months before being released on bond. The trial court found the defendant in violation of his probation, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to five years of incarceration, execution suspended after six months, followed by three years and 250 days of probation.The trial court declined the defendant's request to direct the commissioner of correction to apply specific presentence confinement credit to his sentence, stating that the determination of such credits was within the purview of the Department of Correction. The defendant appealed this decision to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment, relying on its decision in State v. Hurdle, which held that trial courts lack authority to award presentence confinement credit under General Statutes § 18-98d.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that trial courts do have the authority to direct the commissioner to apply specific presentence confinement credit to a sentence on a judgment mittimus, as established in the companion case of State v. Hurdle. The court disagreed with the state's argument that the defendant was not entitled to credit starting from the date the arrest warrant was signed, noting that the defendant was not serving another sentence during that time. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment in part and remanded the case to the trial court to exercise its discretion in accordance with this opinion. View "State v. Eric L." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree following a guilty plea. He appealed, claiming that the trial court incorrectly concluded it lacked authority to direct the commissioner of correction to apply presentence confinement credit to his sentence. The defendant also argued that his plea agreement included an understanding that he would receive such credit and that there was no meeting of the minds on this issue, rendering the plea agreement void.The trial court had denied the defendant’s request for presentence confinement credit, stating it had no discretion under the statute to grant it. The court also denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, finding no reason to believe he did not understand the terms of the plea agreement. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the trial court lacked authority to award presentence confinement credit and that the plea agreement did not include an agreement for such credit.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court does have discretionary authority under the statute to direct the commissioner to apply specific presentence confinement dates to a sentence. The court found that the legislative history and statutory text support the trial court’s inherent authority to issue such orders. The court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment regarding the trial court’s authority to order presentence confinement credit and remanded the case for the trial court to exercise its discretion on this issue.The Supreme Court also agreed with the Appellate Court that the plea agreement did not include an agreement for presentence confinement credit and that the defendant’s subjective belief that he would receive such credit was unreasonable. The court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment in all other respects. View "State v. Hurdle" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder, criminal possession of a pistol or revolver, and carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit. The case involved the shooting death of the victim, Eric Diaz, who was selling drugs when he was approached by a man, later identified as the defendant, and a fight ensued in a black car, resulting in the victim being shot in the abdomen. The victim died from the gunshot wound. The police identified the car as a Nissan Maxima with a broken rear vent window, registered to Frank Bridgeforth but driven by the defendant. Forensic evidence and eyewitness testimonies linked the defendant to the crime.The trial court asked questions to three witnesses, including a police officer and two defense experts, which the defendant claimed were biased and prejudicial. The trial court’s questions aimed to clarify the preparation of a photographic array and the presence of gunshot residue in the car. The defendant did not object to these questions during the trial. The jury was instructed that the court’s questions should not influence their judgment.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial court’s questioning did not violate the defendant’s due process rights. The court held that the questions were not extensive or adverse enough to impair the jury’s function or the judge’s impartiality. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s intent to kill, given the close-range shooting in a vital area and the defendant’s flight from the scene.The defendant’s claims of improper jury instructions were deemed waived because defense counsel had a meaningful opportunity to review and did not object to the instructions. The court concluded that the instructions, when viewed as a whole, were not clearly erroneous and did not constitute plain error. The judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Mebane" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault and risk of injury to a child based on allegations of sexual abuse involving his children, B, J, and D. The charges included sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, and risk of injury to a child. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence, statute of limitations issues, improper admission of sexual misconduct evidence, and violations of his confrontation rights.The trial court joined the cases for trial, and the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. The trial court vacated some convictions as lesser included offenses and sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of twenty-five years, suspended after fifteen years, followed by twenty years of probation.On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court found insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction of sexual assault in the first degree and the vacated conviction of sexual assault in the fourth degree involving J. The court noted that the state failed to prove that the defendant touched J’s genitals with his mouth, lips, or tongue, a necessary element for these charges.The court also agreed with the defendant that his convictions of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child involving B should be reversed under the plain error doctrine. The trial court failed to obtain the defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of the statute of limitations, which had expired before the charges were filed.The court rejected the defendant’s claims regarding the improper admission of sexual misconduct evidence and found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. The court also found no error in the trial court’s decision not to conduct an in camera review of J’s and B’s psychiatric records and in declining to release D’s psychiatric records.The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the convictions related to B and the conviction of sexual assault in the first degree related to J, remanding the case for resentencing on the remaining convictions. The judgments were affirmed in all other respects. View "State v. Daren Y." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder and criminal possession of a firearm. The case involved the shooting of the victim, Derrick Nichols, who was found dead near the defendant's vehicle. An eyewitness, Sheleese Lockhart, testified that she saw the victim being shot from inside the defendant's car. The police recovered several items belonging to the victim and shell casings from the crime scene. Gunshot residue tests on the defendant's hands, clothing, and car revealed particles consistent with gunshot residue.The trial court admitted the gunshot residue evidence and allowed expert testimony on the matter. However, it precluded the defendant's expert from testifying about surveillance footage that the defense argued showed the victim walking outside the car before being shot, contradicting the eyewitness testimony. The trial court applied the standard for nonpercipient witness identification rather than the standard for expert testimony.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, as the physical evidence did not render the state's theory of the case a physical impossibility. The court found that the trial court improperly applied the wrong standard in precluding the defendant's expert testimony about the surveillance footage. This error was not harmless because the expert's testimony could have challenged the credibility of the state's key eyewitness. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.The court also addressed the admissibility of the gunshot residue evidence, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony that one and two element particles consistent with gunshot residue were found on the defendant and in his vehicle. The probative value of this evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law