Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree for stabbing the victim. The key facts of the case include the defendant and the victim having a history of domestic violence, with the defendant previously assaulting the victim. On the day of the incident, the victim was stabbed multiple times while entering her home. The victim identified the defendant as her attacker, and the police arrested him based on this identification and other circumstantial evidence.The trial court admitted evidence of two prior incidents where the defendant had physically assaulted the victim to establish his specific intent to cause serious bodily injury. The defendant objected, arguing that the evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. The trial court allowed the evidence, and the jury found the defendant guilty. The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the prior misconduct evidence.The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the prior misconduct evidence was relevant to the defendant's intent and that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. The court also found that any error in admitting the evidence was harmless given the strength of the state's case and the limiting instructions provided to the jury.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court's judgment, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the prior misconduct evidence. The court found that the probative value of the evidence did not outweigh its prejudicial effect, as the key issue at trial was the identity of the attacker, not the intent. The court also determined that the admission of the prior misconduct evidence was harmful because it presupposed the defendant's identity as the attacker and the remaining evidence was equivocal. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Marcello E." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim. The victim was shot while talking to her boyfriend outside her apartment building. The defendant, along with two other individuals, fired several shots toward the victim’s residence, and one bullet struck the victim in the head, causing her death. The initial investigation did not result in charges, but years later, new information from witnesses led to the defendant’s arrest.The Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford tried the case, and the jury found the defendant guilty of murder. The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his alleged gang affiliation and his actions after law enforcement attempted to arrest him. The trial court had allowed the gang affiliation evidence to establish a motive for the shooting and admitted evidence of the defendant’s evasive conduct as indicative of his consciousness of guilt.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the gang affiliation evidence, as it was relevant to establishing a motive for the shooting and its probative value outweighed any unfair prejudicial impact. The court also found that the trial court properly admitted evidence of the defendant’s evasive conduct after law enforcement attempted to arrest him, as it was probative of the defendant’s consciousness of guilt. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant, who was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child. The victims, D and T, were sexually abused by the defendant, who was in a relationship with their mother, Q, and lived with them for several years. The abuse began when the victims were five years old and continued until they were eleven. The victims disclosed the abuse to their mother years later, which led to the defendant's arrest and trial.In the trial court, the defendant was found guilty on five counts of sexual assault in the first degree and eight counts of risk of injury to a child. The trial court instructed the jury, based on the precedent set in State v. Daniel W. E., that the victims' delay in reporting the abuse should not be considered when evaluating their credibility. The defendant appealed, arguing that this instruction violated his due process rights and that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing certain testimony from D.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and overruled the portion of Daniel W. E. that modified the constancy of accusation doctrine. The court returned to the standard set in State v. Troupe, which allows constancy evidence to corroborate the victim's testimony but not for substantive purposes, and permits the jury to consider the victim's delay in reporting when evaluating credibility. The court concluded that the trial court's instruction was erroneous but harmless, as it was not reasonably probable that the instruction misled the jury.Additionally, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing D to testify that the defendant told her he played the same sexual "games" with his daughter, as this testimony was probative of the defendant's grooming behavior. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "State v. Adam P." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of the murder of her minor son, E, and arson in the second degree. The case arose from an incident where the defendant sedated E with a substantial amount of diphenhydramine, set two fires in their home, and was found unconscious alongside E, who was later pronounced dead. The medical examiner determined E's cause of death to be homicidal asphyxia, with diphenhydramine intoxication as a contributing factor. The defendant's social media posts prior to the incident indicated distress and potential premeditation.The trial court, after a competency hearing, found the defendant competent to stand trial. The jury found the defendant guilty of both charges. The defendant appealed, claiming her amnesia deprived her of a fair trial, the trial court improperly admitted social media posts, and the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the defendant's claim of amnesia affecting her right to a fair trial failed under the first prong of State v. Golding because she did not request a posttrial determination regarding the fairness of the trial, making the record inadequate for review. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the social media posts, as they were properly authenticated through testimony.Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of murder. The jury could reasonably find that the defendant caused E's death with intent, based on the cumulative evidence, including the circumstances of the fire, the sedative found in E's system, and the defendant's behavior and social media posts. The evidence was also sufficient to support the arson conviction, as the jury could reasonably find that the defendant set the fires with the intent to damage the home and conceal the murder. The court affirmed the judgment. View "State v. Ziolkowski" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of possessing child pornography in the first degree, which requires proof of possessing fifty or more images of child pornography. The New Britain Police Department obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s cell phone, which revealed images of suspected child pornography. The state introduced fifty-seven images at trial, and the defendant was found guilty by a jury.The defendant appealed, arguing that thirteen of the images did not constitute child pornography as they depicted mere nudity, which is protected under the First Amendment. He also contended that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the Dost factors, which are used to determine whether an image depicts a lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area. The trial court had instructed the jury that it could consider these factors but was not obligated to do so.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that at least eleven of the thirteen challenged images depicted a lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area, thus constituting child pornography. The court also determined that the first five Dost factors are helpful in assessing whether a depiction is lascivious but should not be used to define the term. The sixth Dost factor, which considers whether the image is intended to elicit a sexual response in the viewer, should not be used in possession cases as it introduces a subjective element.The court found that the trial court’s instruction on the Dost factors, including the sixth factor, did not mislead the jury. The court also held that a specific unanimity instruction was not required, as the different images and categories of sexually explicit conduct are merely means of proving the elements of the offense. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit exhibits showing file names of deleted images associated with the defendant’s email address, as they were probative of the defendant’s knowledge and possession of child pornography. The judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Inzitari" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and one count of assault in the first degree, among other crimes, related to a shooting incident involving multiple victims. The defendant claimed self-defense and defense of others, arguing that he shot one of the victims, Wooten, because Wooten was an active shooter. The defendant also sought to admit evidence of another victim, Taylor's, prior arson conviction to demonstrate Taylor's violent character.At trial, the defendant testified that he shot Taylor and Wooten in self-defense and defense of others. The jury found the defendant guilty of all charges, rejecting his justification defenses. The trial court excluded evidence of Taylor's arson conviction, ruling that the defendant did not have a certified copy of the conviction.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to defeat the defendant's claims of self-defense and defense of others regarding Wooten's murder. The court noted that the shootings of Taylor, Smith, and Wooten were part of a single, continuous episode. The jury could reasonably have found that Wooten was acting defensively to protect Smith from the defendant's unprovoked attack. The court also held that any error in excluding evidence of Taylor's arson conviction was harmless. The arson conviction did not necessarily involve a risk of harm to a person or violent physical conduct, and there was no evidence that Taylor was armed or the aggressor in the shootings. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault in the first degree. He appealed, arguing that the second count in the state's February 2020 substitute information was time-barred by the five-year statute of limitations. This count alleged conduct from January 1, 2014, which was first included in the 2020 substitute information, more than five years after the alleged conduct occurred.The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, reasoning that the defendant had notice of the 2014 allegations from the arrest warrant affidavit filed in 2018. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the arrest warrant affidavit provided sufficient notice of the 2014 conduct, and thus, the 2020 substitute information did not substantially broaden or amend the timely charges.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the arrest warrant affidavit does not toll the statute of limitations for uncharged conduct. The court held that the timely filed 2018 informations did not mention the 2014 conduct, and the defendant did not receive notice within the limitation period that he would be called to defend against the 2014 conduct. Therefore, count two of the 2020 substitute information substantially broadened or amended the timely charges and was time-barred under the statute of limitations.The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment regarding count two, directing the trial court to render a judgment of acquittal on that count and to resentence the defendant on the remaining counts. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "State v. Orane C." on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple offenses related to a series of robberies and burglaries in 2020. He was incarcerated following his arrest in October 2020. During pretrial proceedings, the defendant reached a plea agreement with the state, which included a total effective sentence of ten years of imprisonment followed by five years of special parole. The sentences were to run concurrently and be stayed until April 1, 2022, to ensure that the defendant's pretrial credit was not affected.The defendant pleaded guilty in multiple judicial districts, and the courts issued sentences in accordance with the plea agreement. However, the defendant later filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that he was promised 521 days of presentence confinement credit, but the commissioner of correction applied fewer days, resulting in a longer effective sentence.The trial court in the judicial district of New Britain dismissed the defendant's motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Appellate Court's decision in State v. Hurdle, which held that trial courts lacked authority under General Statutes § 18-98d to award presentence confinement credit.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that trial courts do have the authority to direct the commissioner to apply specific presentence confinement credit to a sentence on a judgment mittimus, as established in the companion case of State v. Hurdle. The court also determined that the defendant's motion raised a colorable claim that the plea agreement required the application of 521 days of presentence confinement credit and that there was no indication the defendant waived his statutory right to this credit.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider the merits of the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence. View "State v. Nixon" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with violating a protective order and was sentenced to five years of incarceration, execution suspended, followed by five years of probation. Later, he was arrested for threatening and subsequently charged with violating his probation. Due to COVID-19 related delays, the violation of probation arrest warrant was not served until several months after it was issued. The defendant remained in custody for several months before being released on bond. The trial court found the defendant in violation of his probation, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to five years of incarceration, execution suspended after six months, followed by three years and 250 days of probation.The trial court declined the defendant's request to direct the commissioner of correction to apply specific presentence confinement credit to his sentence, stating that the determination of such credits was within the purview of the Department of Correction. The defendant appealed this decision to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment, relying on its decision in State v. Hurdle, which held that trial courts lack authority to award presentence confinement credit under General Statutes § 18-98d.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that trial courts do have the authority to direct the commissioner to apply specific presentence confinement credit to a sentence on a judgment mittimus, as established in the companion case of State v. Hurdle. The court disagreed with the state's argument that the defendant was not entitled to credit starting from the date the arrest warrant was signed, noting that the defendant was not serving another sentence during that time. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment in part and remanded the case to the trial court to exercise its discretion in accordance with this opinion. View "State v. Eric L." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree following a guilty plea. He appealed, claiming that the trial court incorrectly concluded it lacked authority to direct the commissioner of correction to apply presentence confinement credit to his sentence. The defendant also argued that his plea agreement included an understanding that he would receive such credit and that there was no meeting of the minds on this issue, rendering the plea agreement void.The trial court had denied the defendant’s request for presentence confinement credit, stating it had no discretion under the statute to grant it. The court also denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, finding no reason to believe he did not understand the terms of the plea agreement. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the trial court lacked authority to award presentence confinement credit and that the plea agreement did not include an agreement for such credit.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court does have discretionary authority under the statute to direct the commissioner to apply specific presentence confinement dates to a sentence. The court found that the legislative history and statutory text support the trial court’s inherent authority to issue such orders. The court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment regarding the trial court’s authority to order presentence confinement credit and remanded the case for the trial court to exercise its discretion on this issue.The Supreme Court also agreed with the Appellate Court that the plea agreement did not include an agreement for presentence confinement credit and that the defendant’s subjective belief that he would receive such credit was unreasonable. The court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment in all other respects. View "State v. Hurdle" on Justia Law