Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with violating a protective order and was sentenced to five years of incarceration, execution suspended, followed by five years of probation. Later, he was arrested for threatening and subsequently charged with violating his probation. Due to COVID-19 related delays, the violation of probation arrest warrant was not served until several months after it was issued. The defendant remained in custody for several months before being released on bond. The trial court found the defendant in violation of his probation, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to five years of incarceration, execution suspended after six months, followed by three years and 250 days of probation.The trial court declined the defendant's request to direct the commissioner of correction to apply specific presentence confinement credit to his sentence, stating that the determination of such credits was within the purview of the Department of Correction. The defendant appealed this decision to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment, relying on its decision in State v. Hurdle, which held that trial courts lack authority to award presentence confinement credit under General Statutes § 18-98d.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that trial courts do have the authority to direct the commissioner to apply specific presentence confinement credit to a sentence on a judgment mittimus, as established in the companion case of State v. Hurdle. The court disagreed with the state's argument that the defendant was not entitled to credit starting from the date the arrest warrant was signed, noting that the defendant was not serving another sentence during that time. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment in part and remanded the case to the trial court to exercise its discretion in accordance with this opinion. View "State v. Eric L." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree following a guilty plea. He appealed, claiming that the trial court incorrectly concluded it lacked authority to direct the commissioner of correction to apply presentence confinement credit to his sentence. The defendant also argued that his plea agreement included an understanding that he would receive such credit and that there was no meeting of the minds on this issue, rendering the plea agreement void.The trial court had denied the defendant’s request for presentence confinement credit, stating it had no discretion under the statute to grant it. The court also denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, finding no reason to believe he did not understand the terms of the plea agreement. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the trial court lacked authority to award presentence confinement credit and that the plea agreement did not include an agreement for such credit.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court does have discretionary authority under the statute to direct the commissioner to apply specific presentence confinement dates to a sentence. The court found that the legislative history and statutory text support the trial court’s inherent authority to issue such orders. The court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment regarding the trial court’s authority to order presentence confinement credit and remanded the case for the trial court to exercise its discretion on this issue.The Supreme Court also agreed with the Appellate Court that the plea agreement did not include an agreement for presentence confinement credit and that the defendant’s subjective belief that he would receive such credit was unreasonable. The court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment in all other respects. View "State v. Hurdle" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder, criminal possession of a pistol or revolver, and carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit. The case involved the shooting death of the victim, Eric Diaz, who was selling drugs when he was approached by a man, later identified as the defendant, and a fight ensued in a black car, resulting in the victim being shot in the abdomen. The victim died from the gunshot wound. The police identified the car as a Nissan Maxima with a broken rear vent window, registered to Frank Bridgeforth but driven by the defendant. Forensic evidence and eyewitness testimonies linked the defendant to the crime.The trial court asked questions to three witnesses, including a police officer and two defense experts, which the defendant claimed were biased and prejudicial. The trial court’s questions aimed to clarify the preparation of a photographic array and the presence of gunshot residue in the car. The defendant did not object to these questions during the trial. The jury was instructed that the court’s questions should not influence their judgment.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial court’s questioning did not violate the defendant’s due process rights. The court held that the questions were not extensive or adverse enough to impair the jury’s function or the judge’s impartiality. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s intent to kill, given the close-range shooting in a vital area and the defendant’s flight from the scene.The defendant’s claims of improper jury instructions were deemed waived because defense counsel had a meaningful opportunity to review and did not object to the instructions. The court concluded that the instructions, when viewed as a whole, were not clearly erroneous and did not constitute plain error. The judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Mebane" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault and risk of injury to a child based on allegations of sexual abuse involving his children, B, J, and D. The charges included sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, and risk of injury to a child. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence, statute of limitations issues, improper admission of sexual misconduct evidence, and violations of his confrontation rights.The trial court joined the cases for trial, and the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. The trial court vacated some convictions as lesser included offenses and sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of twenty-five years, suspended after fifteen years, followed by twenty years of probation.On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court found insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction of sexual assault in the first degree and the vacated conviction of sexual assault in the fourth degree involving J. The court noted that the state failed to prove that the defendant touched J’s genitals with his mouth, lips, or tongue, a necessary element for these charges.The court also agreed with the defendant that his convictions of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child involving B should be reversed under the plain error doctrine. The trial court failed to obtain the defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of the statute of limitations, which had expired before the charges were filed.The court rejected the defendant’s claims regarding the improper admission of sexual misconduct evidence and found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. The court also found no error in the trial court’s decision not to conduct an in camera review of J’s and B’s psychiatric records and in declining to release D’s psychiatric records.The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the convictions related to B and the conviction of sexual assault in the first degree related to J, remanding the case for resentencing on the remaining convictions. The judgments were affirmed in all other respects. View "State v. Daren Y." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder and criminal possession of a firearm. The case involved the shooting of the victim, Derrick Nichols, who was found dead near the defendant's vehicle. An eyewitness, Sheleese Lockhart, testified that she saw the victim being shot from inside the defendant's car. The police recovered several items belonging to the victim and shell casings from the crime scene. Gunshot residue tests on the defendant's hands, clothing, and car revealed particles consistent with gunshot residue.The trial court admitted the gunshot residue evidence and allowed expert testimony on the matter. However, it precluded the defendant's expert from testifying about surveillance footage that the defense argued showed the victim walking outside the car before being shot, contradicting the eyewitness testimony. The trial court applied the standard for nonpercipient witness identification rather than the standard for expert testimony.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, as the physical evidence did not render the state's theory of the case a physical impossibility. The court found that the trial court improperly applied the wrong standard in precluding the defendant's expert testimony about the surveillance footage. This error was not harmless because the expert's testimony could have challenged the credibility of the state's key eyewitness. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.The court also addressed the admissibility of the gunshot residue evidence, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony that one and two element particles consistent with gunshot residue were found on the defendant and in his vehicle. The probative value of this evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder as an accessory and conspiracy to commit murder. She waived her right to a jury trial and opted for a trial by a three-judge panel. The defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and that her waiver of a jury trial was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the canvassing court failed to explain that the three-judge panel did not need to be unanimous to convict. Additionally, she claimed that the panel improperly began deliberations before the close of evidence.The trial court found the defendant guilty based on evidence including her tumultuous relationship with the victim, her presence near the crime scene, and her inconsistent statements to the police. The defendant had initially claimed she was at home during the shooting but later admitted to being picked up by her cousin near the scene. Phone records also showed she contacted her cousin multiple times shortly before the murder.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. The court noted that the defendant’s presence at the scene, her actions during the crime, and her inconsistent statements provided a reasonable basis for the panel’s verdict.However, the court invoked its supervisory authority to require that trial courts must specifically advise defendants who waive their right to a jury trial in favor of a three-judge panel that only two of the three judges need to agree to convict, unlike a jury which must be unanimous. The court concluded that this new rule should apply to the defendant’s case, reversed her conviction, and ordered a new trial.The court also addressed the defendant’s claim regarding premature deliberations by the panel, concluding that unlike juries, three-judge panels are not constitutionally prohibited from discussing the case before the close of evidence. View "State v. King" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder, carrying a pistol without a permit, and criminal possession of a firearm. The case involved the shooting of the victim, Giovanni Rodriguez, in a hotel parking lot. The defendant, Trevor Monroe Outlaw, was identified as the shooter by his girlfriend, Cheenisa Rivera, who testified against him under a cooperation agreement. Rivera and another witness, Loretta Martin, were both in witness protection and testified that the defendant was in the car from which the shots were fired.The trial court denied the defendant's motion to preclude evidence of Rivera's plea agreement, which included her guilty plea to conspiracy to commit murder. The jury found the defendant guilty of murder and carrying a pistol without a permit, and the court found him guilty of criminal possession of a firearm. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not questioning or dismissing a juror who appeared to be sleeping, improperly admitted evidence related to witness protection, allowed Rivera to testify about her guilty plea, and that the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments violated his right to a jury trial.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court's limited inquiry into the allegedly sleeping juror was adequate and did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. The court also found that although the trial court improperly admitted evidence related to witness protection, the defendant did not demonstrate that this resulted in a manifest injustice. The admission of Rivera's guilty plea was deemed harmless, as it did not substantially impact the jury's verdict. Finally, the court concluded that the prosecutor's remarks during closing arguments did not violate the defendant's right to a jury trial, as they were intended to bolster Rivera's credibility rather than criticize the defendant's decision to go to trial. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "State v. Outlaw" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree after an altercation with a friend, during which he stabbed the friend multiple times. Following the incident, the defendant sought medical treatment at a hospital for injuries sustained during the fight. While at the hospital, he was questioned by several police officers without being advised of his Miranda rights. The defendant moved to suppress the statements made during these interactions, arguing that he was in custody and subject to interrogation without proper Miranda warnings.The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the defendant was not in custody during the hospital questioning. The court noted that the defendant was not handcuffed, was coherent despite his intoxication, and was not subjected to prolonged or aggressive questioning. The defendant was subsequently found guilty of assault in the first degree and sentenced to ten years of incarceration, suspended after seven years, with five years of probation.The Appellate Court reversed the conviction, concluding that the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes when questioned by the police at the hospital. The court reasoned that the presence of multiple officers, the defendant's physical condition, and the nature of the questioning created a custodial environment. The Appellate Court held that the trial court should have suppressed the statements and remanded the case for a new trial.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not in custody during the hospital interactions. The court emphasized that the defendant was not physically restrained by the police, the questioning was not aggressive or prolonged, and the defendant was informed that he was free to leave for police purposes. The court concluded that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have felt a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Therefore, the police were not required to administer Miranda warnings, and the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress was affirmed. View "State v. Garrison" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of assaulting public safety personnel and interfering with an officer after injuring a police officer during the execution of an arrest warrant. The warrant included charges of assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a firearm. The officers, part of a multi-agency task force, used significant force to enter the defendant's residence, where the defendant resisted arrest, leading to the officer's injuries.The trial court admitted testimony about the felony charges in the arrest warrant and identified the task force as the "Violent Fugitive Task Force." The defendant objected, arguing that this evidence was unduly prejudicial. The trial court overruled the objections, finding the evidence relevant to explain the officers' conduct and the reasonableness of their use of force. The jury found the defendant guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years of incarceration followed by two years of special parole.The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the evidence was relevant to show the officers were acting in the performance of their duties and that any prejudice was mitigated by limiting instructions. The defendant appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, arguing that the evidence was unduly prejudicial.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the names of the felony charges, as they were relevant to the officers' use of force and the performance of their duties. However, the Court found that the name "Violent Fugitive Task Force" had no probative value and was unfairly prejudicial. Despite this, the Court concluded that the error was harmless given the strength of the state's case and the defense's focus on causation rather than the officers' conduct. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed. View "State v. Delacruz-Gomez" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of home invasion and first-degree burglary after breaking into an apartment while armed with a Crosman Vigilante air gun. The air gun was loaded with pellets but lacked a CO2 cartridge, and the chamber for the cartridge was sealed with duct tape. The defendant was identified by one of the residents after a physical altercation and was later arrested. The state needed to prove that the defendant was armed with a "deadly weapon or dangerous instrument" to secure a conviction.The Superior Court in the judicial district of Danbury denied the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal, which argued that the air gun was not operable and thus not a deadly weapon. The jury was instructed that a deadly weapon is any weapon from which a shot may be discharged, whether loaded or unloaded, and found the defendant guilty of home invasion and first-degree burglary. The trial court rendered judgment consistent with the verdict and sentenced the defendant to sixteen years of incarceration, suspended after twelve years, and five years of probation.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the question of whether the air gun was a deadly weapon was subject to plenary review. The court concluded that the air gun, which required significant effort to be made operable due to the duct tape sealing the CO2 chamber, was not a weapon from which a shot could be readily discharged. The court held that the trial court's instruction to the jury was legally erroneous, as it did not convey the immediacy requirement implied by the statute defining a deadly weapon. Consequently, the defendant's conviction could not stand, and the judgment was reversed, with the case remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law