Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of burglary in the third degree and larceny in the third degree. The Appellate Court reversed defendant's convictions, concluding that it was plain error for the trial court not to instruct the jury, as mandated by General Statutes 54-84 (b), that it may draw no unfavorable inferences from defendant's failure to testify. The court granted the state’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the issue of whether the Appellate Court properly reversed defendant’s conviction under the plain error doctrine. The court concluded that, even if a violation of section 54-84 (b) is subject to harmless error analysis, the state cannot establish that the violation in the present case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "State v. Ruocco" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of sexual assault and risk of injury. Petitioner failed to appeal from the judgment of conviction. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the trial court had conducted an inadequate canvass and erroneously concluded that Petitioner knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The habeas court granted the petition and ordered a new trial, concluding that the public defender’s office had erred in determining that Petitioner was ineligible for the assistance of counsel. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that Petitioner had advanced a claim of public defender error in the habeas court; and (2) the issue of whether Petitioner’s claims were procedurally defaulted was not properly before the Court. Remanded. View "Newland v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault in the first degree and one count of risk of injury to a child. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the trial court properly instructed the jury on the use of constancy of accusation evidence; (2) the constancy of accusation doctrine should be modified to address the potential prejudice to defendants caused by the testimony of multiple constancy witnesses; and (3) there is no reason to order a new trial when testimony, such as that presented in the instant case, has been properly admitted under the Court’s former articulation of the constancy of accusation doctrine. View "State v. Daniel W. E." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of sexual assault in the first degree. The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the trial court erred in excluding a prospective juror for cause on the ground that he was “not able to speak and understand the English language” within the meaning of Conn. Gen. Stat. 51-217(a)(3), but the error was not prejudicial. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court’s purportedly improper exclusion of the prospective juror should constitute per se reversible error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Appellate Court did not err in determining that the trial court’s excusal of the prospective juror for cause under Conn. Gen. Stat. 51-217(a)(3) was subject to reversal only upon a showing of prejudice; and (2) the improper removal of the prospective juror did not entitle Defendant to a new trial in the absence of a showing of prejudice. View "State v. Gould" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. After Petitioner was released from custody, federal authorities entered a final order of removal based on Petitioner’s felony conviction. Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition claiming that his trial counsel’s assistance was deficient because counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, as required by Padilla v. Kentucky. The habeas court granted the petition and ordered that Petitioner’s conviction be vacated, holding that counsel was required to inform Petitioner that his plea of guilty to an aggravated felony made him subject to mandatory deportation. The State appealed, arguing that Padilla requires only that counsel advise a client of a heightened risk of deportation, not that federal law mandates deportation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, because federal law called for deportation for Petitioner’s conviction, counsel was required to unequivocally convey to Petitioner that federal law mandated deportation as the consequence for pleading guilty. View "Budziszewski v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with several offenses after shooting Albert Weibel during an attempted robbery. Before trial, Defendant moved to preclude Weibel from making an in-court identification of Defendant, arguing that in-court identification procedures are unnecessarily suggestive. The trial court denied the motion pursuant to State v. Smith. During trial, Weibel identified Defendant as his assailant. The jury subsequently found Defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree and assault in the first degree. The Appellate Court affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the Supreme Court should overrule the holding in Smith and hold that inherently suggestive in-court identifications are inadmissible even in the absence of a suggestive pretrial identification procedure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) first time in-court identifications must be prescreened for admissibility by the trial court; (2) Weibel’s in-court identification was a first time in-court identification and should have been prescreened, and the failure to follow the procedures outlined in this opinion potentially violated Defendant’s due process rights; but (3) any due process violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Dickson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his right to present a defense by limiting his cross-examination of investigating police officers as to whether the murder investigation conformed to general police practices and/or standard police investigative procedures. The Appellate Court agreed with Defendant and reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was an absence of a sufficient offer of proof to such a line of inquiry, and therefore, the trial court did not improperly preclude Defendant’s inadequate investigation defense strategy. View "State v. Wright" on Justia Law

In 1992, Defendant was convicted of murder. In 2010, Defendant filed a third motion to correct an illegal sentence. The trial court denied the motion on the merits. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his right to counsel by denying his request for the assistance of counsel without adhering to the procedure set forth in Anders v. California. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s request for the appointment of counsel, holding that Anders applied to Defendant’s claim and that the requirements of Anders were not satisfied in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Anders procedure is not required to safeguard the statutory right to counsel in the context of a motion to correct an illegal sentence; but (2) the trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel to assist Defendant in determining whether a sound basis existed for him to file his motion, and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Francis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a registered sex offender when he was admitted to the state rental assistance program. Thereafter, the legislature promulgated section 17b-812-13(9) of the Regulations of Connecticut States Agencies, which makes sex offender registration a ground for termination or denial of rental program assistance. The Commissioner of Housing (Commissioner) subsequently terminated Plaintiff’s rental program benefits. Plaintiff took an administrative appeal of the Commissioner’s decision to the trial court, which concluded that the Commissioner’s application of section 17b-812-13(9) was not retroactive and therefore did not exceed the authority granted to the Commissioner by the legislature. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commissioner applied section 17b-812-13(9) of the regulations retroactively in this case by imposing a new obligation on Plaintiff’s sex offender status that terminated his rental program assistance; and (2) such retroactive application of the regulation was not statutorily authorized, and therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s administrative appeal. View "Shannon v. Comm’r of Housing" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of capital felony and other crimes. Petitioner was sentenced to death. Petitioner later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising several challenges to his death sentence. The habeas court denied the petition. After Petitioner filed his appeal, the Supreme Court granted Petitioner permission to file a supplemental brief on the question of whether the legislature’s enactment of P.A. 12-5 rendered the death penalty, as applied to him and other similarly situated defendants, unconstitutional. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided State v. Santiago, which held that the imposition of the death penalty on defendants sentenced to death for capital crimes committed before the effective date of the legislation was unconstitutional under the state constitution. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of Petitioner’s habeas petition, holding that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied to Petitioner. View "Webb v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law