Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and other crimes. Defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the jury instructions on the issue of the accuracy of an identification were prejudicially erroneous and deprived him of a fair trial. Applying the waiver rule in State v. Kitchens, the Appellate Court ultimately concluded that the claim had been waived. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Appellate Court did not err in concluding that Defendant waived his unpreserved jury instruction under the rule established in Kitchens; and (2) the rule in Kitchens should not be overturned. View "State v. Bellamy" on Justia Law

In 2015, the legislature amended the juvenile transfer statute to increase the age of a child whose case was subject to an automatic transfer to the regular criminal docket by one year, to fifteen years old. Automatic transfer is required in cases involving children who have been charged with the commission of a class A or class B felony. At issue in this case was whether that amendment applied retroactively so that the case of a child, such as Defendant, who had been charged with committing a class A or class B felony prior to the amendment for crimes he committed when he was fourteen years old, and whose case had already been transferred to the regular criminal docket, should have his case transferred back to the juvenile docket. The trial court reserved this question of law for the advice of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the request and answered the question in the affirmative, concluding that the legislature intended that the amendment apply retroactively. View "State v. Nathaniel S." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with murder and other offenses. In 2010, the trial court found Defendant incompetent to stand trial. Thereafter, a judge found that Defendant had been restored to competency and granted his motion to represent himself. In 2015, the trial court again found Defendant incompetent to stand trial. After evidentiary hearings, the trial court granted the State’s motion for forcible medication of Defendant, finding that the State had established that forced medication would not violate Defendant’s federal due process rights under the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Sell v. United States. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly determined that forced medication was “substantially likely” to render Defendant competent to stand trial. View "State v. Wang" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to possession of narcotics with intent to sell and failure to appear in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress narcotics evidence. The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) the trial court correctly determined that Defendant was not seized until police officers performed a patdown search for weapons, and (2) the record was inadequate to review Defendant’s claim that he was unreasonably seized when two police cruisers descended upon him in a small parking lot and an officer verbally commanded him to stop. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the appellate court erred in concluding that Defendant was not seized until the officers patted him down for weapons and that certain of Defendant's claims in that regard were unreviewable; and (2) the evidence Defendant sought to suppress was seized in violation of the federal and state constitutions. View "State v. Edmonds" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of burglary in the third degree and larceny in the third degree. The Appellate Court reversed defendant's convictions, concluding that it was plain error for the trial court not to instruct the jury, as mandated by General Statutes 54-84 (b), that it may draw no unfavorable inferences from defendant's failure to testify. The court granted the state’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the issue of whether the Appellate Court properly reversed defendant’s conviction under the plain error doctrine. The court concluded that, even if a violation of section 54-84 (b) is subject to harmless error analysis, the state cannot establish that the violation in the present case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "State v. Ruocco" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of sexual assault and risk of injury. Petitioner failed to appeal from the judgment of conviction. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the trial court had conducted an inadequate canvass and erroneously concluded that Petitioner knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The habeas court granted the petition and ordered a new trial, concluding that the public defender’s office had erred in determining that Petitioner was ineligible for the assistance of counsel. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that Petitioner had advanced a claim of public defender error in the habeas court; and (2) the issue of whether Petitioner’s claims were procedurally defaulted was not properly before the Court. Remanded. View "Newland v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault in the first degree and one count of risk of injury to a child. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the trial court properly instructed the jury on the use of constancy of accusation evidence; (2) the constancy of accusation doctrine should be modified to address the potential prejudice to defendants caused by the testimony of multiple constancy witnesses; and (3) there is no reason to order a new trial when testimony, such as that presented in the instant case, has been properly admitted under the Court’s former articulation of the constancy of accusation doctrine. View "State v. Daniel W. E." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of sexual assault in the first degree. The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the trial court erred in excluding a prospective juror for cause on the ground that he was “not able to speak and understand the English language” within the meaning of Conn. Gen. Stat. 51-217(a)(3), but the error was not prejudicial. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court’s purportedly improper exclusion of the prospective juror should constitute per se reversible error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Appellate Court did not err in determining that the trial court’s excusal of the prospective juror for cause under Conn. Gen. Stat. 51-217(a)(3) was subject to reversal only upon a showing of prejudice; and (2) the improper removal of the prospective juror did not entitle Defendant to a new trial in the absence of a showing of prejudice. View "State v. Gould" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. After Petitioner was released from custody, federal authorities entered a final order of removal based on Petitioner’s felony conviction. Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition claiming that his trial counsel’s assistance was deficient because counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, as required by Padilla v. Kentucky. The habeas court granted the petition and ordered that Petitioner’s conviction be vacated, holding that counsel was required to inform Petitioner that his plea of guilty to an aggravated felony made him subject to mandatory deportation. The State appealed, arguing that Padilla requires only that counsel advise a client of a heightened risk of deportation, not that federal law mandates deportation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, because federal law called for deportation for Petitioner’s conviction, counsel was required to unequivocally convey to Petitioner that federal law mandated deportation as the consequence for pleading guilty. View "Budziszewski v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with several offenses after shooting Albert Weibel during an attempted robbery. Before trial, Defendant moved to preclude Weibel from making an in-court identification of Defendant, arguing that in-court identification procedures are unnecessarily suggestive. The trial court denied the motion pursuant to State v. Smith. During trial, Weibel identified Defendant as his assailant. The jury subsequently found Defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree and assault in the first degree. The Appellate Court affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the Supreme Court should overrule the holding in Smith and hold that inherently suggestive in-court identifications are inadmissible even in the absence of a suggestive pretrial identification procedure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) first time in-court identifications must be prescreened for admissibility by the trial court; (2) Weibel’s in-court identification was a first time in-court identification and should have been prescreened, and the failure to follow the procedures outlined in this opinion potentially violated Defendant’s due process rights; but (3) any due process violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Dickson" on Justia Law