Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to harassment in the second degree and criminal trespass in the first degree and was sentenced to one year incarceration, execution suspended, and two years of probation. Defendant was later charged with violating the conditions of his probation. After a hearing, the trial court found that Defendant violated the conditions of his probation, continued Defendant’s probation, and added new conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly admitted evidence that Defendant argued should have been suppressed; (2) the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that Defendant violated the terms of his probation; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting certain hearsay evidence; and (4) Defendant waived his Second Amendment right to possess firearms when he agreed to the condition of his probation barring him from possessing firearms. View "State v. Maietta" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of illegal possession of an explosive and manufacturing a bomb. The Appellate Court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court, concluding that the trial court committed plain error by not providing an accomplice credibility instruction, sua sponte, to the jury. The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Court, holding (1) the trial court’s failure to give an accomplice credibility instruction did not constitute plain error; and (2) it is unnecessary to reach the merits of Defendant’s alternative ground for affirmance, namely, that the trial court violated Defendant's constitutional rights by compelling him to provide a handwriting exemplar, as any alleged error was harmless. View "State v. Jamison" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted in two consolidated cases of attempted murder, two counts of risk of injury to a child, and murder. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the trial court improperly granted the State’s motion to disqualify his chosen attorney, Gary Mastronardi, and that the improper disqualification was structural error requiring a new trial. On remand, Defendant filed a motion asking the State to fund Mastronardi’s private fee or, alternatively, to dismiss the charges against him on the grounds that he was now indigent and tat Mastronardi would not represent him at the new trial at the rate paid to assigned counsel by the Division of Public Defender Services. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that the Supreme Court’s decision Peeler I did not require it. After a second jury trial, Defendant was found guilty on all counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not violate Defendant’s right to counsel of choice at his new trial by denying his funding motion. View "State v. Peeler" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of crimes committing during a string of armed robberies in the cities of Stamford and Norwalk and the town of Greenwich. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) his constitutional right to counsel was violated when the trial court admitted incriminating statements he made regarding the Norwalk and Greenwich robberies while he was represented by counsel in the case involving the Stamford robbery; and (2) the trial court violated his constitutional right to confrontation by restricting defense counsel’s cross-examination of a key prosecution witness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court’s admission of the incriminating statements and its restrictions on counsel’s cross-examination of the witness did not violate Defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights or constitute an abuse of discretion. View "State v. Leconte" on Justia Law

Defendant filed an application to be exempted from continued registration as a sex offender pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-251(b). Following contested hearings, the trial court exempted Defendant from the continued obligation to register as a sex offender, finding that Defendant was under nineteen years of age at the time of the offense and that registration was not required for public safety. The State appealed, and the Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court had the authority to grant Defendant’s application for an exemption from registration approximately seven years after he had commenced registration, notwithstanding his agreement to register as a sex offender for ten years in his plea agreement with the State. View "State v. Obas" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder, assault in the first degree, criminal possession of a pistol, and risk of injury to a child. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to conduct an inquiry into his claim of juror misconduct. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to conduct an inquiry into Defendant’s claim. After approximately a decade, the trial court held the required inquiry and found no evidence of juror misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in concluding that there was no evidence of juror misconduct; and (2) the delay on remand did not violate Defendant’s due process rights. View "State v. Roman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree. Defendant appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial on the ground that his mother had tampered with the jury by approaching a juror outside the courthouse and speaking to him about the evidence in the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the presumption of prejudice in jury tampering cases set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Remmer v. United States remains good law in cases of external interference with the jury’s deliberative process via private communication, contact, or tampering with jurors about the pending matter; and (2) the State carried its burden of proving that the actions of Defendant’s mother did not lead to the reasonable possibility that any juror’s ability to decide this case fairly and impartially was affected. View "State v. Berrios" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree, among other crimes. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment followed by probation. Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his sentence for first degree sexual assault was illegal because section 53a-70(b)(3) requires that persons convicted of that offense be sentenced to a term of imprisonment followed by a period of special parole. The trial court agreed with Defendant and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment and special parole for his conviction of first degree sexual assault. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 53a-70(b)(3) requires only that any period of special parole that may be imposed shall, along with the accompanying term of imprisonment, constitute a total sentence of not less than ten years. View "State v. Jason B." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree, among other crimes. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment of twelve years for his conviction of sexual assault in the first degree, followed by probation. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence, claiming that his sentence was illegal under Conn. Gen. Laws 53a-70(b)(3) because the sentence did not include a period of special parole. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s sentence was proper because section 53a-70(b)(3) does not require that persons convicted of first degree sexual assault be sentenced to a period of imprisonment and special parole; rather, it provides that if the court elects to impose such a sentence, then the total combined period of imprisonment and special parole must constitute a total sentence of not less than ten years. View "State v. Victor O." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that Defendant’s statements to her husband were not protected by the marital communications privilege pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-84b. Specifically, the court determined that Defendant’s statements were not “induced by the affection” of the marital relationship, and therefore, the trial court did not err by admitting the statements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant’s statements were not “induced by the affection, confidence, loyalty, and integrity of the marital relationship,” as required by section 54-84b(a), Defendant’s communications fell outside the marital communications privilege. View "State v. Davaloo" on Justia Law