Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two drug-related offenses following a police investigation that culminated in the seizure of heroin from defendant’s home pursuant to a search warrant. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress certain statements because the statements had been obtained when a police officer interrogated her during the execution of the search warrant without first advising her in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, determining that, at the time of the police questioning, Defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda, and therefore, Miranda warnings were not required. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was in custody when she was questioned by the police officer, and, as a result, the police were required to advise her of her rights under Miranda; and (2) the Miranda violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Mangual" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly allowed the victim’s attorney to testify about an immunity agreement the attorney had negotiated with the State on behalf of the victim. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that, even if the trial court erred in permitting the victim’s attorney to testify, the admission of the testimony was harmless, and therefore, Defendant could not prevail on his claim that he was entitled to a new trial. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to sell narcotics by a person who is not drug-dependent and interfering with an officer. The appellate court affirmed. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the appellate court abused its discretion by refusing to adopt the buyer-seller exception applied by federal courts in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence of conspiracy to sell narcotics. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the considerations embodied in the buyer-seller exception are already reflected in the laws of the state; and (2) the evidence demonstrated more than a mere buyer-seller relationship with Defendant’s coconspirator on a single occasion, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conspiracy conviction. View "State v. Allan" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested without a warrant and charged with several crimes. Defendant filed a motion to be released without bond because a probable cause finding had not been made within forty-eight hours of his arrest. The trial court denied Defendant's motion. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the specific facts of this case, any violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights was de minimis where (1) Defendant was present in the courthouse awaiting arraignment, at which point probable cause findings are typically made, prior to the expiration of the forty-eight hour period; and (2) the trial court found probable case for Defendant's arrest less than two hours after expiration of the forty-eight hour time period. View "State v. Heredia" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of multiple offenses and sentenced to a term of incarceration followed by sixteen years of special parole. Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the trial court illegally sentenced him to a sixteen year term of special parole when, in light of the crimes at issue, the maximum terms of special parole was ten years. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the two consecutive sentences of special parole at issue - neither of which exceeded ten years individually but together imposed a total effective sentence of sixteen years of special parole - violated Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-125e(c), which operates as an aggregate limitation on the total effective sentence of special parole when a defendant is sentenced for multiple offenses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ten year limitation on a period of special parole provided for in section 54-125e(c) applies per offense, rather than to the total effective sentence of special parole. Remanded. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in a spousal relationship in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-70b. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court should interpret section 53a-70b to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant acted with the specific intent to commit the crime of sexual assault in a spousal relationship. The appellate court rejected the claim and affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly concluded that section 53a-70b requires that Defendant had only a general intent to commit the act that constituted a violation of the statute. View "State v. Ferdinand R." on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with various criminal offenses in two informations. After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of sexual assault in the second degree, assault in the second and third degrees, and risk of injury to a child. After the convictions were affirmed on appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The habeas court found Petitioner's pretrial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to provide Petitioner with adequate advice regarding a pretrial plea offer and ordered the trial court to resentence Petitioner in accordance with the sentence proposed in the plea offer. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the habeas court improperly circumvented the trial court's discretion to impose an appropriate sentence. Remanded. View "H.P.T. v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of risk of injury to a child and sexual assault in the fourth degree. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding (1) the prosecutor made improper statements during closing arguments and in connection with defense counsel's cross-examination of key state's witnesses, and the prosecutorial impropriety deprived Defendant of his due process right to a fair trial; and (2) the trial court improperly admitted into evidence a video recording and transcript of a forensic interview of the victim under the tender years exception to the hearsay rule without first conducting a hearing. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Maguire" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he had been punished twice for the same offense and, thus, his convictions violated the proscription against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the two offenses of which Petitioner was charged and convicted were separate and distinct pursuant to the test set forth under Blockburger v. United States because (1) intent to kill is an element of second degree murder but is not an element of the offense of death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian; and (2) the offense of death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian by child abuse contains elements of proof not required to establish second degree murder. View "State v. Freeman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree and harassment in the second degree for allegedly threatening a coworker during a telephone call. The appellate court reversed, concluding (1) the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury that it could find Defendant guilty of the breach of the peace charge only if it found Defendant's offending speech was a real or true threat not entitled to protection under the First Amendment; and (2) where the telephone harassment statute bars conduct only, the evidence was insufficient to convict Defendant of the harassment charge because the the case was predicated entirely on Defendant's speech. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury instructions on the breach of the peace charge were inadequate to ensure Defendant was not convicted on the basis of constitutionally protected speech; and (2) the telephone harassment statute applied to speech as well as conduct, but because Defendant did not have fair notice that she could be subjected to punishment for the verbal content of the telephone call, the harassment charge must be dismissed. View "State v. Moulton" on Justia Law