Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of multiple offenses and sentenced to a term of incarceration followed by sixteen years of special parole. Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the trial court illegally sentenced him to a sixteen year term of special parole when, in light of the crimes at issue, the maximum terms of special parole was ten years. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the two consecutive sentences of special parole at issue - neither of which exceeded ten years individually but together imposed a total effective sentence of sixteen years of special parole - violated Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-125e(c), which operates as an aggregate limitation on the total effective sentence of special parole when a defendant is sentenced for multiple offenses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ten year limitation on a period of special parole provided for in section 54-125e(c) applies per offense, rather than to the total effective sentence of special parole. Remanded. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in a spousal relationship in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-70b. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court should interpret section 53a-70b to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant acted with the specific intent to commit the crime of sexual assault in a spousal relationship. The appellate court rejected the claim and affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly concluded that section 53a-70b requires that Defendant had only a general intent to commit the act that constituted a violation of the statute. View "State v. Ferdinand R." on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with various criminal offenses in two informations. After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of sexual assault in the second degree, assault in the second and third degrees, and risk of injury to a child. After the convictions were affirmed on appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The habeas court found Petitioner's pretrial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to provide Petitioner with adequate advice regarding a pretrial plea offer and ordered the trial court to resentence Petitioner in accordance with the sentence proposed in the plea offer. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the habeas court improperly circumvented the trial court's discretion to impose an appropriate sentence. Remanded. View "H.P.T. v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of risk of injury to a child and sexual assault in the fourth degree. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding (1) the prosecutor made improper statements during closing arguments and in connection with defense counsel's cross-examination of key state's witnesses, and the prosecutorial impropriety deprived Defendant of his due process right to a fair trial; and (2) the trial court improperly admitted into evidence a video recording and transcript of a forensic interview of the victim under the tender years exception to the hearsay rule without first conducting a hearing. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Maguire" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he had been punished twice for the same offense and, thus, his convictions violated the proscription against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the two offenses of which Petitioner was charged and convicted were separate and distinct pursuant to the test set forth under Blockburger v. United States because (1) intent to kill is an element of second degree murder but is not an element of the offense of death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian; and (2) the offense of death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian by child abuse contains elements of proof not required to establish second degree murder. View "State v. Freeman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree and harassment in the second degree for allegedly threatening a coworker during a telephone call. The appellate court reversed, concluding (1) the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury that it could find Defendant guilty of the breach of the peace charge only if it found Defendant's offending speech was a real or true threat not entitled to protection under the First Amendment; and (2) where the telephone harassment statute bars conduct only, the evidence was insufficient to convict Defendant of the harassment charge because the the case was predicated entirely on Defendant's speech. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury instructions on the breach of the peace charge were inadequate to ensure Defendant was not convicted on the basis of constitutionally protected speech; and (2) the telephone harassment statute applied to speech as well as conduct, but because Defendant did not have fair notice that she could be subjected to punishment for the verbal content of the telephone call, the harassment charge must be dismissed. View "State v. Moulton" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that statements he made to the court during a pretrial hearing and at sentencing indicating dissatisfaction with the performance of his appointed counsel resulted in a clear and unequivocal request invoking the right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment. The appellate court affirmed Defendant's conviction, concluding that Defendant's statements to the court did not develop into a clear and unequivocal request for self-representation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not violate Defendant's right to self-representation during the criminal proceedings. View "State v. Pires" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered conditional pleas of nolo contendere to several felony offenses. The appellate court affirmed. Petitioner filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Petitioner's appellate counsel, who also served as his trial counsel, failed to file a petition for certification with the Supreme Court challenging the propriety of the appellate court's judgment. The habeas court granted the petition in part and ordered that Petitioner's right to file a petition for certification to appeal to the Supreme Court be restored. The appellate court reversed, concluding that Petitioner failed to introduce evidence that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficiency. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner's habeas action was not justiciable because it was not ripe for adjudication. Remanded with direction to dismiss the habeas petition. View "Janulawicz v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree. After Defendant was released from prison he was found to have violated the terms and conditions of his probation by engaging in criminal conduct. Accordingly, the trial court revoked Defendant's probation. Defendant appealed, claiming there was insufficient evidence to support the finding he had violated his probation. Before oral argument, however, Defendant pleaded guilty to the criminal charges upon which the finding rested. The appellate court subsequently dismissed as moot Defendant's appeal. Defendant appealed, arguing that his habeas corpus action collaterally attacking his criminal conviction revived the controversy such that mootness was averted. During the pendency of Defendant's appeal, the habeas court dismissed Defendant's habeas corpus action. The Supreme Court dismissed as moot Defendant's appeal, holding that dismissal of the habeas corpus action extinguished any claim to a live controversy in this appeal. View "State v. Milner" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of eight counts of sexual assault in the first degree and eight counts of risk of injury to a child. The sixteen counts were predicated on four separate incidents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction of each of the sixteen counts, as there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant abused the complainant on four separate and distinct occasions; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in withholding certain portions of the records of the Department of Children and Families relating to the complainant; and (3) the prosecutor did not engage in improper argument during closing argument. View "State v. Stephen J. R." on Justia Law