Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of carrying a pistol without a permit and criminal possession of a firearm. Defendant was found not guilty of murder, either as a principal or an accessory. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the trial court properly admitted testimony that Defendant previously had possessed a pistol on an occasion prior to the date of the crimes with which he was charged; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering, in sentencing Defendant, remarks made by the family of the victim in their impact statement and other evidence related to the murder charge, of which Defendant was found not guilty.

Defendant was charged with, inter alia, six counts of capital felony in connection with a triple murder, sexual assault, and arson. During the trial, the trial court granted the motion of intervenors, a newspaper and one of its reporters, to vacate an order sealing Defendant's "witness list." The appellate court dismissed Defendant's appeal of the trial court decision for lack of a final judgment. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for certification to appeal, (1) concluding that the appeal should be treated as a late petition for certification to appeal and, therefore, not determining whether the appellate court properly concluded the trial court's decision was not a final judgment; and (2) reversing the trial court's order granting the intervenors' motion to vacate the sealing order, holding that Defendant demonstrated that the potential abridgement of his rights to a fair trial and to prepare a defense clearly outweighed the rights of the intervenors and the public to access the witness list document.

After Defendant was charged in three criminal cases and, in a fourth case, with violating his probation, he was found incompetent to stand trial and not restorable to competency. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges in all four cases, claiming (1) he was entitled to dismissal of two cases involving misdemeanor charges and the violation of probation case because the statute of limitations had expired, and (2) he was entitled to dismissal of the case involving a felony charge pursuant to Practice Book 41-8. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss with respect to all four of the pending cases on the ground that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the two cases involving misdemeanor charges on the alternate ground that the charges were subject to dismissal pursuant to section 54-56d(m) because the statute of limitations had expired; (2) reversed the judgment of dismissal as to the felony charge and remanded for a determination as to whether the case should be dismissed pursuant to Practice Book 41-8(5); and (3) dismissed the portion of the appeal regarding the dismissal of the violation of the probation case.

At age fifteen, Defendant was charged with larceny in the second and fourth degrees and burglary in the third degree. Before the juvenile court, the State filed a motion to transfer the charges from the juvenile docket to the regular criminal docket pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-127(b). The juvenile court denied the State's motion. After the State filed an appeal, the Supreme Court released its decision in State v. Fernandes, which interpreted section 46b-127(b) to comply with due process requirements because, prior to the finalization of the transfer of a case involving certain crimes from the juvenile docket to the regular criminal docket, the juvenile is entitled to a hearing in the criminal court to contest the appropriateness of trying the juvenile as an adult. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the juvenile court's denial of the State's motion to transfer the charges of larceny in the second degree and burglary in the third degree and affirmed in all other respects, holding (1) Fernandes controlled in this case, and (2) before the transfer of Defendant's case to the regular criminal docket was finalized, Defendant was entitled to a hearing before the court on the regular criminal docket. Remanded.

Defendant was charged and convicted of murder, carrying a pistol without a permit, and criminal possession of a pistol. At trial, three witnesses who had criminal matters pending in a variety of venues testified that they had seen Defendant commit the murder. On appeal, Defendant claimed (1) the trial court committed plain error when it failed to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that the testimony of the three witnesses should be viewed with great caution in light of potential benefits the witnesses could receive from the government in their pending criminal matters in exchange for their testimony; and (2) in the alternative, the Supreme Court should exercise its supervisory power to require such an instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the trial court did not commit plain error when it failed to give, sua sponte, a special credibility instruction for the three witnesses; and (2) because trial courts already have discretion to give a special credibility instruction under existing case law whenever the court reasonably believes a witness' testimony may be particularly unreliable, there is no need for the Court to create a new supervisory rule requiring a special credibility instruction in such cases.

After a jury trial, Harry Gonzalez was convicted of felony murder, robbery in the first degree, and kidnapping in the first degree. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the trial court improperly denied in part Gonzalez's motion to suppress certain statements he had made to the police because he made those statements as a result of police interrogation while in custody and without having been informed of his Miranda rights, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) Gonzalez's constitutional right against double jeopardy was not violated by his convictions of and separate punishments for felony murder and first degree robbery. Remanded for a new trial.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of kidnapping in the second degree and one count of risk of injury to a child. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court as to one of the two kidnapping counts and remanded for a new trial on that charge, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to a jury instruction in accordance with State v. Salamon, which bars a jury from finding a defendant guilty of kidnapping if it finds that the restraint used in connection therewith was merely incidental to the restraint used in the commission of another offense, and (2) the trial court's failure to give such an instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in all other respects.

Defendant Calvin Long was committed to the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board following a finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease of assault in the second degree. The state later petitioned to continue the defendant's commitment under Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-593(c), which the defendant challenged on equal protection grounds. The Supreme Court held that the legislature had a legitimate basis for providing review procedures for the continued commitment of insanity acquittees different from those afforded to civilly committed inmates. Following remand, the trial court granted the state's petition. The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly construed the Supreme Court's decision in the previous appeal to preclude his current equal protection challenge and that a higher level of scrutiny of the statutory scheme should apply to this claim than the Court had applied to his claim in the previous appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that its decision in the previous appeal precluded the defendant's present claims.

Defendant was convicted of one count of sexual assault in the first degree and two counts of risk of injury to a child arising out of defendant's sexual abuse of his wife's son. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. The court held that the trial court reasonably determined that the results of the Abel Assessment of Sexual Interest test administered to defendant were not sufficiently reliable for admission into evidence and, in light of the circumstances, defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the test. Because the evidence that defense counsel proffered provided no basis on which the jury reasonably could have concluded either that the son had visited pornographic websites on his own or that he had viewed images of conduct similar to the conduct attributed to defendant, the trial court properly excluded the evidence. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the state's attorney to adduce testimony from an expert on the reporting of sexual abuse by child victims where defense counsel opened the door to redirect examination. The court further held that the comments the state attorney made were based on the evidence and were neither inflammatory nor inaccurate and therefore, defendant's claim of prosecutorial impropriety must fail. Finally, the state conceded that the sentence that the trial court imposed did not comply with General Statutes 53a-70(b)(3) because it included a period of probation rather than a period of special parole. Accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded for resentencing and the judgment was affirmed in all other aspects.

Defendant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault in the first degree and one count of risk of injury to a child where his convictions stemmed from his sexual assault of his step-granddaughter over a two year period. Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction and raised several issues of error on appeal. The court held that the trial court neither abused its discretion nor violated defendant's confrontation rights by precluding him from questioning the physician that had examined the victim hypothetically about the likelihood of injury. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the undisclosed portion of department of children and families records contained in the court file either irrelevant or cumulative of the disclosed portions and declining to provide it to defendant. The court further held that, to the extent there was any impropriety in the prosecutor's remark, it was not sufficiently prejudicial as to require reversal of the conviction. The court finally held that the trial court's jury instructions did not prejudice the defendant. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.