Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Delaware Supreme Court
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Kathleen McGuiness, an elected state official in Delaware, was indicted and tried on various criminal charges related to her conduct while in office. She was convicted of three charges and acquitted of two others. She appealed, claiming that the trial was fundamentally unfair and unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Delaware held that the trial was fair and rejected most of McGuiness's arguments. However, the court agreed with McGuiness that the legal insufficiency of one of the charges resulted in a spillover of evidence that prejudiced the jury’s consideration of a closely linked charge. Therefore, the court reversed McGuiness's conviction for Official Misconduct. The case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also affirmed the trial court's decisions and McGuiness's convictions on all other charges. View "McGuiness v. State" on Justia Law

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In 2019, Jose Terreros was left in charge of his girlfriend's children. Upon returning home, his girlfriend was informed by her four-year-old daughter that Terreros had sexually abused her. The girlfriend immediately asked Terreros to leave and called the police. She later discovered concerning web searches on Terreros's phone, which he had left behind, including queries about how long saliva and fingerprints remain on bodies and clothes, and whether police can detect if a child has been raped. Based on this, investigators obtained a warrant to search Terreros's phone. They searched his messages, messaging apps, photos, videos, internet search history, GPS coordinates, and incoming and outgoing calls without any date restrictions. On trial, Terreros was found guilty of Sexual Abuse of a Child and Dangerous Crime Against a Child, but not guilty of Rape First Degree. Terreros appealed his conviction, arguing that the warrant was overbroad and that the verdicts were inconsistent. The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware agreed with Terreros regarding the warrant, finding it to be a general warrant and thus unconstitutional. The court held that all evidence obtained from the phone should have been suppressed. The court also remanded the inconsistent verdicts issue back to the lower court for further consideration, as it had not been fully addressed by the State. The court reversed Terreros's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Terreros v. State" on Justia Law

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In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, defendant Kwesi Hudson, who was convicted of first-degree kidnapping, first-degree robbery, second-degree rape, and other crimes, appealed on two grounds. First, he challenged the Superior Court's decision to deny his pre-trial motion to exclude the State’s expert testimony on DNA mixture interpretation and technology. He argued that the STRmix software used to process the DNA was not scientifically reliable. Second, he contended that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress cell-site location information collected from cell tower dumps via ten search warrants. He claimed that these warrants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution, and Delaware statutory law. The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware found Hudson’s challenges to be without merit and affirmed his convictions and the decisions of the Superior Court. The court ruled that the DNA evidence was reliable and admissible, and that a Daubert hearing to test its admissibility was not necessary. Additionally, the court concluded that the cell tower warrants were constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, as they were sufficiently particular and based on probable cause. View "Hudson v. State" on Justia Law

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In the case of the State of Delaware v. Taha El-Abbadi, El-Abbadi was convicted of Murder by Abuse or Neglect in the First Degree for causing the death of three-year-old Julian Cepeda. El-Abbadi appealed his conviction on the basis of two issues: the trial court's refusal to provide jury instructions for lesser-included offenses and the limitation on cross-examination and testimony regarding the victim's mother's past involvement with the Division of Family Services.The Supreme Court of Delaware upheld the conviction. The court found that the trial court did not err in refusing to provide jury instructions for the lesser-included offenses of Manslaughter and Criminally Negligent Homicide. The court reasoned that there was no evidence that would allow the jury to find El-Abbadi not guilty of the Murder by Abuse or Neglect charges and instead guilty of Manslaughter or Criminally Negligent Homicide.The court also found that the trial court did not err in limiting cross-examination and testimony regarding the victim's mother's past involvement with the Division of Family Services. The Supreme Court concluded that the exclusion of this testimony was not an abuse of discretion and did not constitute plain error. The court found that the mother's past involvement was distinct from the facts of the case and the witnesses were questioned about the delay in medical assistance, which was the key point the defense was trying to establish.The Supreme Court of Delaware, therefore, affirmed El-Abbadi’s conviction of Murder by Abuse or Neglect in the First Degree. View "El-Abbadi v. State" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware examined the Adult Expungement Reform Act and the Clean Slate Act, which expanded eligibility for expungement and created an automatic expungement process for certain Delaware criminal records. The Acts are applicable to "all criminal cases brought and convictions entered in a court in this State" and limit expungement to individuals with "no prior or subsequent convictions." The three petitioners, Alex Osgood, Osama Qaiymah, and Eric Fritz, requested expungement of their criminal records. However, the Superior Court denied their requests due to their prior or subsequent misdemeanor convictions from other states.The issue the Supreme Court had to decide was whether the phrase "prior or subsequent convictions" in the Acts includes out-of-state convictions. The court ruled that "prior or subsequent convictions" refers only to Delaware convictions, not to out-of-state convictions. The court reversed the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings in line with its opinion.In reaching its decision, the court considered the specific language of the Acts, their purpose and legislative intent, as well as practical considerations. The court also noted that including out-of-state convictions could lead to inconsistencies and impracticalities. View "Osgood v. State" on Justia Law

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Defendant-appellant Larry Martin appealed the sentence he received after pleading guilty to one count of Stalking and two counts of Non-Compliance with Bond (“NCB”). The trial court entered its first sentencing order on August 12, 2022, followed by three corrected sentencing orders, entered on September 8, September 21, and October 17, 2022, respectively. It was undisputed that the trial court’s first sentencing order was illegal because it imposed a sentence that exceeded the maximum lawful sentence for Stalking, which was three years at Level V supervision. In an email dated August 29, 2022, Martin’s trial counsel informed the trial court of the illegality of the sentence, and that the State recommended that the trial court fix its error by redistributing Martin’s five-year prison sentence across the Stalking conviction and the two NCB convictions. In a corrected sentencing order, issued on September 8, 2022, the trial court reduced Martin’s sentence for Stalking to three years of incarceration at Level V supervision, to bring it in line with the lawful maximum sentence. The trial court then added one year of incarceration at Level V supervision, suspended for probation, to the suspended fines for each NCB conviction. It was undisputed that if this had been the original sentence, Martin’s sentence would have been lawful. Martin appealed the trial court’s sentencing order insofar as it modified his sentence for the NCB convictions, arguing that by increasing his sentence for the NCB convictions, the trial court effectively resentenced him for those convictions despite the fact that he had already served them. This was because those sentences consisted solely of fines that were suspended when imposed and as such, were completed as of the date of the sentence. According to Martin, he completed his sentence for both NCB convictions on August 12, 2022, and any subsequent resentencing was barred by principles of double jeopardy. The Delaware Supreme Court was not persuaded by this argument and affirmed the sentence imposed by the trial court in its September 8, 2022 sentencing order, as modified by the September 21, 2022 and October 17, 2022 sentencing orders. View "Martin v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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After arresting Aaron Garnett in whose care were three young children, the police promptly sought to locate the children’s parent or guardian. This search, initiated before sunrise on a cold and rainy day, led the police to a house where they were told the children’s mother lived and was sleeping. Once there, the police knocked, then banged, on the front door and loudly announced their presence. When no one answered, one of the officers went to the rear of the house where, after another round of knocking and announcing, the officer noticed the back door was unlocked. He pushed open the unlocked door and, peering into the interior of the residence with the benefit of a flashlight, saw a motionless body under a blanket at the foot of a stairway. Joined now by fellow officers, he entered the residence and found the lifeless body of Naquita Hill, the mother of one of the children whose welfare had motivated the police’s visit. Seven or so hours later, Garnett confessed that, during a heated argument, he had choked Hill until she slumped to the floor and beat her with his fist after that. After a jury trial, Garnett was convicted of Naquita Hill’s murder. He appealed, but the Delaware Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed Garnett's conviction. View "Garnett v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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Defendant-appellant Shamayah Thomas (“Thomas”) was convicted after a bench trial of Stalking and related acts of intimidation and harassment. Before his bench trial, Thomas filed a pro se Motion to Dismiss Current Counsel and/or to Appoint New Counsel on grounds that his then-current counsel was not following his instructions regarding his pretrial defense (the “First Motion to Dismiss Current Counsel”). Also before trial, Thomas’ counsel filed a motion to suppress digital evidence (the “Motion to Suppress”) collected from Thomas’s pink iPhone (“Pink iPhone”), alleging that law enforcement seized the phone without a warrant and, alternatively, that the search warrant issued following the seizure of the Pink iPhone (“Search Warrant”) was constitutionally defective. The trial court denied Thomas’ motion for new counsel pursuant to Superior Court Rule 47; the court granted in part, and denied in part, the Motion to Suppress, ultimately admitting certain evidence extracted from the Pink iPhone. After trial, but before his sentencing, Thomas filed a second motion to dismiss current counsel and/or appoint new counsel. Although the Superior Court prothonotary’s office failed to direct the second motion to dismiss counsel to defense counsel or to the trial judge, the trial court addressed the motion at Thomas’ sentencing hearing. Given the option of either delaying sentencing and proceeding pro se, or proceeding with his then-current counsel, Thomas chose to proceed with sentencing as scheduled, represented by his then-current counsel. On appeal, Thomas argued the Superior Court: (1) erred when it categorized the Pink iPhone Search Warrant as an overbroad warrant as opposed to an unconstitutional general warrant; and (2) failed to adequately address Thomas’ Motions to Dismiss Counsel. Thomas asked the Delaware Supreme Court to reverse his convictions and remand for a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Thomas v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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In 2013, defendant-appellant Darnell Martin received an unconditional gubernatorial pardon for his previous criminal convictions, which included several felony convictions. Several years later, Martin was arrested and charged with new offenses. After his convictions for those charges were affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective. More than two years passed as the parties briefed Martin’s motion and the trial court considered it. During that time, Martin served his prison sentence and his term of probation. He was discharged from probation while the postconviction motion was under advisement with the Superior Court. After Martin’s probation was discharged, the Superior Court dismissed his postconviction motion as moot, concluding that he no longer was “in custody” as required by Rule 61(a) and, given his extensive criminal history, he would not suffer any collateral consequences as a result of the convictions he was challenging. When the Superior Court dismissed the motion, it was not aware that Martin’s previous convictions had been pardoned. Martin appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court remanded to the Superior Court to further consider the effect of Martin’s pardon, including whether a pardoned defendant suffers collateral consequences in the same manner as a first-time felon and therefore should not have his postconviction motion mooted if he is released from custody before the motion is resolved. The Superior Court concluded the collateral consequences doctrine, which the Supreme Court adopted more than 50 years ago based on United States Supreme Court precedent, has no continuing application in postconviction proceedings in Delaware. Martin’s appeal then returned to the Supreme Court, where he again challenged dismissal of his motion and the Superior Court’s application of the mootness doctrine. Having carefully considered the Superior Court’s decision and the parties’ submissions, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred in dismissing Martin’s postconviction motion as moot. View "Martin v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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In 2019, Tyrese Burroughs was convicted of felony drug dealing. As one consequence of that conviction, Burroughs was, from then on, prohibited from possessing a firearm or ammunition. According to an affidavit of probable cause, on November 25, 2020, police caught Burroughs engaging in a hand-to-hand drug transaction while in possession of a “Smith and Wesson Walther .380 firearm loaded with seven live rounds.” Burroughs was arrested and charged with six felonies, relevant here: possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, possession of ammunition by a person prohibited, two counts of drug dealing, carrying a concealed deadly weapon. Together, these charges carried a minimum-mandatory of eight years and a statutory maximum of 77 years in prison. Burroughs filed a “Motion for Modification of Bail,” in which he requested, “[d]ue to his inability to post bail, . . . that his bail be converted to an unsecured or lower secured amount.” The State argued his financial conditions of release should be maintained because, in its view, there was strong evidence supporting his conviction and ample facts demonstrating that he posed a serious safety risk to the public. Burroughs filed a “Motion for Review of Commissioner’s Order,” arguing that the Commissioner erred by failing to test his motion under the strict-scrutiny standard of review on the grounds that he either fell into a suspect class by virtue of his indigency or that his pretrial detention deprived him of his fundamental liberty right under substantive-due-process principles. If the Commissioner had properly conducted a strict-scrutiny review, Burroughs contended, then the State would have had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that “no other non-monetary conditions of release [could] accomplish” its “compelling interest in preventing crime.” The Delaware Supreme Court was asked to decide whether, in light of Delaware's constitutional right to bail, it was permissible to attach unaffordable financial conditions to a dangerous defendant’s pretrial release on bail and, if it was, what procedural protections had to be observed when such bail is considered. The Court responded: (1) strict scrutiny, answering in the affirmative; and (2) the determination to set cash bail had to be supported by clear and convincing evidence that: the defendant is a flight risk or poses a substantial risk to the community and nonmonetary conditions of release would not alleviate that risk. Because these answers were consistent with, and yielded the same result as, the Superior Court’s decision on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burroughs v. Delaware" on Justia Law