Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Alonzo Cannon was convicted by jury on offenses related to possession of cocaine and marijuana. At trial, the State introduced evidence that after being read his Miranda rights, Cannon confessed to police that the drugs were his and also where he obtained them. The trial judge sentenced Cannon to eighteen years unsuspended jail time followed by decreasing levels of supervision. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct appeal. The Superior Court denied Cannon’s first motion for postconviction relief, and the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal of the first motion as untimely filed. In 2015, with the assistance of counsel, Cannon filed a second motion for postconviction relief, claiming that the State’s failure to disclose misconduct in the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”) violated the State’s obligation under "Brady v. Maryland," and that an evidentiary hearing was required to explore the Brady issue further. The motion was a lengthy form motion filed in a number of cases raising misconduct at the OCME. The Superior Court summarily dismissed the motion, and found there was no evidence to support Cannon’s contention that the misconduct at the OCME was ongoing during his trial in 2001, or that the misconduct involved false chemical analysis reporting as opposed to theft. Cannon appealed again. The State responded that Cannon’s motion was barred by amended Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, and in any event, Cannon admitted to the crimes, and the drugs field tested positive for illegal substances, so the motion should be denied. After careful review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the issues on appeal were not fairly raised before the Superior Court, and Rule 61 barred Cannon’s claims because he did not allege actual innocence. "Even if we reached the merits of his claims, they would be barred due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented at trial. Therefore we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment." View "Cannon v. Delaware" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from an incident that took place in 2008 between defendant David Chianese and his then-girlfriend, Heather Barron. Barron alleged that Chianese dragged her out of his house, causing her to sustain injuries that required medical treatment and caused her to miss work. Chianese insisted that he never touched Barron and alleged that he asked her to leave his house, helped her carry her things to his truck, and drove her home. As a result of the incident, Chianese was arrested and later agreed to probation before judgment guilty plea to offensive touching (an offense that did not have as an element that Chianese caused Barron any injury). Barron submitted a Victim’s Loss Statement to the Court of Common Pleas Investigative Services Office (“ISO”). ISO referred Barron to the Victims’ Compensation Assistance Program (VCAP), and then ISO received a revised restitution request. Chianese violated the terms of his probation by testing positive on multiple occasions for illegal substances. Although the State had sought restitution as part of the original plea order, and the court staff was actively investigating restitution at the time of the violation of parole hearing, the State did not raise the issue of restitution, and the court discharged Chianese from probation as “unimproved” without addressing restitution. VCAP awarded Barron $12,107.35 to cover her out-of-pocket medical expenses and lost wages. The Court of Common Pleas investigator then sent Chianese a letter recommending that Chianese pay restitution to VCAP. Chianese refused to reimburse VCAP and demanded a hearing, denying causing any injury to Barron. The Court of Common Pleas denied the State’s request for restitution because it ruled that it could only award restitution to the victims of crimes, not third parties, and because it did not have custody or control over the defendant’s funds. The Superior Court affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed, and affirmed. View "Delaware v. Chianese" on Justia Law

Appellant Xavier Broomer appealed the Superior Court’s March 2015 bench ruling denying his post-verdict Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. Broomer raised one argument on appeal. The jury acquitted Broomer of Aggravated Possession and Drug Dealing. However, the jury convicted Broomer of Conspiracy in the Second Degree. Broomer argued that his acquittal on the underlying offense of Drug Dealing precludes his conviction on Conspiracy in the Second Degree. After review, the Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. View "Broomer v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The issue common for forty-five defendants (whose cases were consolidated for this opinion) was whether a defendant who pled guilty after a colloquy and admitted to crimes involving the possession of illegal narcotics should have her conviction vacated because she was unaware of serious problems at the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (the “OCME”) involving the handling of narcotics evidence. The Superior Court answered that question no, and held that the defendants were bound by their pleas. A 2014 investigation by the Delaware State Police and the Department of Justice revealed that some OCME employees had stolen drug evidence stored at the OCME due in large part to flawed oversight and security. To date, those problems, although including substantial evidence of sloppiness and allegations of “drylabbing,” did not involve evidence-planting. Much of the uncovered misconduct seemed to be inspired by the reality that the evidence seized from defendants in fact involved illegal narcotics, and the temptation this provided to certain employees to steal some of that evidence for their personal use and for resale. In prior decisions, the Delaware Supreme Court made clear that if a defendant knowingly pled guilty to a drug crime, he could not escape his plea by arguing that had he known that the OCME had problems, he would not have admitted to his criminal misconduct in possessing illegal narcotics. In those prior decisions, the Court found that defendants' please did not invalidate their freely-made pleas. The Court reached the same conclusion after review of this case, and affirmed the Superior Court. View "Aricidiacono,et al. v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Ronald Luttrell appealed his convictions for Attempted Rape in the First Degree, three counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, one count of Attempted Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, and two counts of Indecent Exposure. Defendant raised two issues on appeal: (1) the Superior Court abused its discretion when it failed to grant his motion for a bill of particulars, because the indictment did not clearly delineate the acts for which he was being prosecuted or when they occurred, and therefore it did not allow him to adequately prepare a defense or protect him from double jeopardy; and (2) the Superior Court committed plain error when it allowed impermissible vouching evidence to be presented to the jury. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a bill of particulars, and that the admission of vouching evidence constituted plain error. The matter was remanded for a new trial. View "Luttrell v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Brandon Williams appealed his convictions of Burglary Second Degree, Unlawful Use of a Credit Card, Misdemeanor Theft, and Resisting Arrest. The State alleged that Williams entered the home of Jeffrey Fisher through an open window and stole his wallet from his home office. Williams did not object at trial to the evidence of officers being dispatched to a nearby gas station in which surveillance video captured Williams using the stolen credit card. In his defense, Williams conceded that he unlawfully used Fisher’s credit card and that he resisted arrest. But he denied that he was the person who burglarized the Fishers’ home. Instead, Williams claimed that he found the wallet and that he had been too intoxicated to commit the burglary. The jury found Williams guilty of all charges. The trial court sentenced Williams to fifteen years of imprisonment as a habitual offender. On appeal, Williams argued: (1) the trial court committed plain error when it allowed the State to emphasize through four police officers and closing argument that Williams was arrested in this burglary case after the police responded to a call of an attempted burglary at the gas station; and (2) that the trial court plainly erred and unfairly bolstered police testimony when it provided an expert-witness jury instruction that referred to police officers because there was no qualified expert who testified at trial. The Supreme Court found no merit to Williams' appeal, and affirmed his convictions. View "Williams v. Delaware" on Justia Law

James Cooke was convicted of, among other things, raping and murdering a 20-year-old University of Delaware student. Cooke appealed his convictions and the death sentence, seeking either a new trial, or at least a new penalty hearing. Cooke listed ten claims of error on appeal that "def[ied] brief summary. But what is common to all of Cooke's arguments is that none of them provides a basis for reversing the judgment of convictions and the death sentence that were entered against him." View "Cooke v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Christiana Ozdemir and Douglas Riley began a relationship in 2005. The couple had a son in 2007 and a daughter in early 2009. In June 2009, Ozdemir told Riley that she was going to New York for two weeks with the children. She and the children never returned. Riley filed a petition for custody in Delaware. In response, Ozdemir filed petitions for custody and for a protective order in New York. In November 2009, the Delaware Family Court and the New York court held a telephonic joint hearing, during which Ozdemir and Riley were present. The courts determined that Delaware had jurisdiction over the custody matter. Following the hearing, the Family Court entered an interim custody order awarding Ozdemir sole legal custody and primary residency of the children. Riley was given limited visitation rights. Ozdemir failed to bring the children to some of the scheduled visits, and the Family Court found her in contempt.In October 2010, the Family Court entered a temporary custody order awarding Ozdemir and Riley joint legal custody and shared residency on an alternating monthly basis. The trial court held a review hearing in April 2011, but Ozdemir failed to attend. At the review hearing, the Family Court entered another order awarding Riley sole legal custody and primary residency of the children. Riley attempted to enforce Order in New York, but the New York police did not help him. In March 2012, the Family Court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the children. In January 2013, the Family Court held more hearings which Ozdemir did not attend. Because of Ozdemir kept thwarting of Court orders and the guardian ad litem’s recommendations, it was in the best interests of the children to be placed in Riley care. Ozdemir failed to appear on the day she was supposed to hand over the children. A warrant was issued for her arrest. The Federal Marshal’s Fugitive Task Force took Ozdemir into custody in Miami, Florida, and she was returned to Delaware. Her children were found in New York, and brought to Delaware in to face two counts of felony interference with custody.At trial, the State offered into evidence five unredacted Family Court orders to establish that Riley was entitled to custody of the children, and that Ozdemir had intentionally withheld the children from him. The jury found Ozdemir guilty on all counts. This appeal followed. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether Family Court records could be used in the Superior Court to prove that appellant committed the offense of interference with custody. The Supreme Court held that, without redaction, the Family Court records were inadmissible because they included hearsay. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "Ozdemir v. State" on Justia Law

A Kent County Grand Jury returned an indictment against defendant-appellant Dashawn Ayers, defendant-appellant Michael Demby, Galen Brooks, and 11 other individuals. Ayers was charged with one count of Drug Dealing, one count of Aggravated Possession, and one count of Conspiracy Second Degree. Demby was charged with two counts of Drug Dealing, two counts of Aggravated Possession, two counts of Conspiracy Second Degree, one count of Criminal Solicitation Second Degree, and one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Before trial, Ayers and Demby unsuccessfully moved to suppress the wiretap evidence. Ayers also filed a Motion to Sever, which was denied. The jury convicted Ayers on all counts. Demby was convicted of one count of Drug Dealing, one count of Aggravated Possession, one count of Conspiracy Second Degree, and one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. He was acquitted on the remaining charges. Ayers and Demby filed separate appeals, which were consolidated for consideration and decision. Defendants argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the recordings were “testimonial” because two witnesses explained the meaning of the codes used in the recorded conversations, and appellants were unable to cross-examine the declarants about the coded language. The Court held that the wiretap recordings, used to prove that appellants committed the crime of conspiracy, were admissible. There was no constitutional violation, and defendants' remaining arguments lacked merit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed defendants' convictions. View "Ayers v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Ronald Luttrell appealed his convictions for one count of Attempted Rape in the First Degree, three counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, one count of Attempted Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, and two counts of Indecent Exposure. Luttrell raised two claims in a direct appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) the Superior Court abused its discretion when it failed to grant his motion for a bill of particulars, because the indictment did not clearly delineate the acts for which he was being prosecuted or when they occurred, and therefore it did not allow him to adequately prepare a defense or protect him from double jeopardy; and (2) the Superior Court committed plain error when it allowed impermissible "vouching" evidence to be presented to the jury. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying Luttrell’s motion for a bill of particulars. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the admission of vouching evidence constituted plain error. The matter was remanded for a new trial. View "Luttrell v. Delaware" on Justia Law