Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Cookie A. Hunter appealed his judgments of conviction, after a Superior Court jury trial, of Assault in the Second Degree, Resisting Arrest with Force or Violence, and Driving Under the Influence, First Offense. Defendant raised two issues in his direct appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) it was error for the trial judge to admit the results of his blood alcohol content (BAC) blood test into evidence because the foundational requirements necessary to admit that scientific evidence were not met; (2) the trial judge erred by not granting his motions for judgments of acquittal on the Assault and Resisting Arrest charges, because the State failed to preserve the videotape that recorded the events that led to those charges. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the results of the BAC test were erroneously admitted into evidence. Therefore, the DUI judgment of conviction was reversed. Furthermore, the Court determined that Defendant's motions for judgments of acquittal on the Assault and Resisting Arrest charges were properly denied. Consequently, the judgments of the Superior Court were affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Hunter v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Pablo Melendez appealed his convictions after a Superior Court jury trial stemming from numerous actual and attempted robberies. Defendant was convicted of: eighteen counts of Robbery in the First Degree, thirty-three counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, eleven counts of Wearing a Disguise, six counts of Conspiracy in the Second Degree, six counts of Aggravated Menacing, eight counts of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, and one count of Reckless Endangering in the First Degree. In this appeal, Defendant claimed that the trial judge erred by admitting "improper witness bolstering and needlessly cumulative evidence when, despite their lack of personal knowledge, [two] police [officers] were allowed to provide their own interpretations and opinions of what happened during the [crimes]." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant waived his claim by failing to raise it at trial. Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court were affirmed. View "Damiani-Melendez v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Leslie D. Small appealed his convictions of two counts of First Degree Murder, three counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, First Degree Robbery, and Second Degree Burglary. The trial judge sentenced Small to death. Small made two arguments on appeal: (1) that the judge violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by allowing testimony that Small refused to discuss the crime during his mental evaluation; and (2) that the prosecutor’s characterization of mitigating circumstances as “excuses” jeopardized the fairness and integrity of the penalty hearing. Because the Supreme Court found the prosecutor’s repeated characterization of mitigating evidence as excuses to be plain error, the Court reversed the imposition of the death sentence and remanded the case for a new penalty hearing.

After a first trial, at which a jury convicted the Defendant Dallas Drummond of three crimes, the Supreme Court remanded for a new trial because the Superior Court judge failed to thoroughly inform the defendant about the significance of his decision to waive counsel. During retrial, the trial judge allowed the State to present a record of the testimony given at the first trial. Later, a prosecution witness referenced the defendant's criminal history while responding to a question on cross examination. After being convicted again, Defendant appealed, claiming that reading of the prior testimony, and the witness' reference, were admitted in error and warranted a new trial. Finding no merit to Defendant's argument, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Defendant-Appellant Earl Bradley, a former pediatrician, was found guilty of fourteen counts of Rape in the First Degree, five counts of Assault in the Second Degree, and five counts of Sexual Exploitation of a Child for acts of sexual and physical abuse committed against children. He was sentenced to fourteen mandatory life sentences and 164 years at Level V imprisonment for these crimes. Defendant raised two claims in his appeal, both relating to the Superior Court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during the execution of a warrant. Defendant argued that the warrant itself was defective because the affidavit in support of the search warrant application did not allege facts establishing probable cause that the patients' medical files would be found in an outbuilding on the property where he practiced, would be contained in digital format, or would relate to the crimes described in the search warrant application. Defendant also contended that the police exceeded the scope of the search warrant by proceeding with a general search to locate and seize evidence without probable cause. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the issuing judge had sufficient facts before him to make a practical, common-sense determination that evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime could be found in the patients' medical files, whether in paper or digital format. The Court also held that it was objectively reasonable to conclude that Bradley used the white outbuilding identified in the warrant for medical examinations, and that patient files could be found there. The Supreme Court held that the police acted reasonably in executing the warrant with respect to the evidence that was introduced at Bradley's trial. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Defendant's claims lacked merit and affirmed.

A jury convicted Peter Kostyshyn of three crimes. He appealed, claiming that the Superior Court judge erred by finding he forfeited his right to appointed counsel, even though he screamed "You’re an idiot" at one of his attorneys during a court hearing, and then managed to drive off his next attorney by engaging in behavior the Superior Court judge deemed "abusive." Kostyshyn claimed that the Superior Court judge erred by failing to order, sua sponte, a competency hearing, even though the judge conducted lengthy colloquies about all aspects of Kostyshyn’s case. Finally, Kostyshyn argued that the trial judge’s clarifying instruction to the jury constituted an impermissible comment on what facts the jury should find. Finding no merit to any of these arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.

A grand jury indicted Defendant Jeffrey Rose for: (1) Trafficking in Cocaine, (2) Possession with Intent to Deliver, (3) Maintaining a Dwelling for Keeping Controlled Substances, and two other charges. The indictment for Maintaining a Dwelling referenced Counts I and II. The jury acquitted Defendant of those two Counts but convicted Rose on the Maintaining a Dwelling charge. Defendant argued on appeal that his conviction were based on insufficient evidence because Counts I and II were predicate offenses on which the jury acquitted him. The Supreme Court found no merit to Defendant's argument and affirmed.

Defendant-Appellant Patrick Monceaux appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss charges against him under Section 777A of the Delaware Code. He contended that the statute violated his right to due process under the United States and the Delaware Constitutions because placing his status as a sex offender directly in issue lessened the State's burden of proof and the presumption of innocence. He also contended that the trial judge erred by failing to address this constitutional argument when denying his motion to dismiss. Instead, the trial judge bifurcated the trial into two phases. In the first phase, the elements of the Unlawful Sexual Contact Second Degree charge were tried before a jury with no evidence of Monceaux's status as a sex offender. With the consent of Monceaux, the second phase of the trial, limited to determining his status as a registered sex offender, was tried before the trial judge. The bifurcation procedure used by the trial judge in this case prevented the jury from hearing evidence of Monceaux's sex offender status before determining his guilt for purposes of Section 777A. For that reason, the Supreme Court found no merit to Monceaux's constitutional claim. Furthermore, the Court held that the Superior Court must use a bifurcation procedure in all future Section 777A cases, to avoid the potential constitutional issues raised here. Finally, because the alternate relief requested in Monceaux's motion to dismiss was bifurcation, which the trial judge granted, Monceaux's second claim on appeal lacked merit. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Defendant Malik Brown appealed his conviction on Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping Cocaine, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. He brought three arguments on appeal: the trial judge (1) unfairly supplemented the jury instruction to include not only selling but also giving in the definition of delivery; (2) abused his discretion by admonishing his counsel in front of the jury; and (3) erroneously prohibited defense counsel from reading the dictionary definition of “substantial” during closing argument. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed.

Defendant Vicenzo DiDomenicis was convicted for driving under the influence (DUI). The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the prosecutor's misconduct deprived Defendant of a fair trial. The prosecutor’s opening statement admonished the jury about the dangers of drunk driving, and the need to protect everyone on the road. In addition, the prosecutor pointed out that people who are arrested for DUI may have been arrested seven times before. The State conceded that the prosecutor’s opening statement was improper, but argued that his comments did not amount to plain error. The Supreme Court was "troubled that, after years of decisions addressing improper prosecutor statements to the jury, the State made such a basic error." Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the prosecutor’s comments did not warrant reversal in this case.