Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Delaware Supreme Court
Murray v. State
The court reviewed the Superior Court's denial of a motion to suppress stemming from a traffic stop. Because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, the court reversed the trial judge's denial of the motion to suppress drugs discovered in defendant's bag. Defendant's continued detention constituted an impermissible seizure, and the questioning itself violated even the limited rights possessed by a probationer. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment.
Richardson v. State
Defendant was found guilty on four charges related to the sexual assault of two minors. At issue was the use of out-of-court statements in criminal prosecutions. The court found that, in this case, the inadmissible comments were made in court, when the interviewer explained the protocol used for interviewing children about sexual abuse. The interviewer offered her opinion that the protocol made it "very obvious when [children] are being truthful." Therefore, that was impermissible vouching and required reversal.
Dennis v. State
Defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction of Carjacking in the Second Degree. On appeal, defendant argued that the Superior Court "relieved the State of its burden to establish every element of an indicted charge beyond [a] reasonable doubt when it erroneously interpreted...the [statutory] language of [Title 11, section 836(a) of the Delaware Code.]" The court concluded that defendant's argument was without merit where the statute was properly construed and affirmed the judgment.
Kirkley v. State
Defendant was found guilty of Attempted Robbery First Degree. On appeal, defendant argued that statements in closing rebuttal argument, asserting that the State brought Attempted Robbery charges because that was exactly what defendant did, constituted improper vouching for the State's case. The court found that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct which prejudicially affected defendant and therefore reversed and remanded.
Panuski v. State
Defendant was indicted on 29 counts of Dealing in Child Pornography (DCP) and plead guilty to two counts of DCP and the state entered a nolle prosequi on the remaining counts. Defendant, proceeding pro se, subsequently appealed from a Superior Court order denying his motion for postconviction relief on five grounds: (1) violation of due process due to insufficient evidence; (2) violation of double jeopardy; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) abuse of prosecutorial discretion; and (5) "contradictive and ambiguous" colloquy at his sentencing hearing. The court concluded that none of defendant's claims were meritorious and therefore affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court denying the motion.
Robertson v. State
Defendant appealed from her convictions for Assault Second Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During Commission of a Felony, and Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited. The court held that the superior court did not err in giving the jury flight instructions where the instructions were appropriate in light of the facts of the case and that the instruction was not a comment on the evidence in violation of Article IV, Section 19 of the Delaware Constitution. The court also held that the superior court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on Assault Third Degree. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.
Davis v. State
Defendant was found guilty on multiple counts of robbery, conspiracy, and various possession offenses. Defendant appealed from the denial of his untimely motion to suppress, contending that the Superior Court abused its discretion by not permitting him to move to suppress, out of time, his incriminating statement to a police officer on grounds that he was arrested without probable cause and that his incriminating statement was involuntary. The court held that defendant failed to prove that exceptional circumstances prevented him from filing a timely motion to suppress. Defendant was not precluded from seeking relief pursuant to a Rule 61 motion for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.
Stafford v. State
The State indicted defendant on four counts: possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, receiving a stolen firearm, and criminal impersonation. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and the trial judge found defendant guilty of all the offenses except receiving a stolen firearm. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial judge improperly refused to suppress the gun because an illegitimate search resulted in its seizure. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial judge where defendant gave the officer an improbable name and address, and therefore the officer had the power to arrest him and conduct a search incident to arrest.
French v. State
Defendant was indicted on nine counts, including aggravated menacing, reckless endangering, and possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited (PDWBPP). At issue was whether the Superior Court properly applied Delaware's habitual offender statute when it imposed an enhanced minimum sentence on a person whose fourth felony was PDWBPP. Because the indictment identified a non-violent felony as the crime that made him a person "prohibited," defendant argued that his fourth conviction was not a violent felony. The trial court held otherwise and the court agreed. A person became a violent felon the first time that person was convicted of one of the statutorily designated violent felonies. Thereafter, the person retained the status of "violent felon" for any future convictions. Accordingly, defendant's PDWBPP conviction was a violent felony and his minimum sentence was the 8 year statutory maximum penalty for that offense.
Davis v. State
Defendant appealed from the Superior Court's denial of his untimely motion to suppress. On appeal, defendant contended that the Superior Court abused its discretion by not permitting him to move to suppress, out of time, his incriminating statement to a police officer on grounds that he was arrested without probable cause and that his incriminating statement was involuntary. Defendant had not shown that the motion was based on evidence not available as of the deadline for motions to suppress, or that extraordinary circumstances precluded the filing of a timely motion. Therefore, the court concluded that defendant's contention was without merit because the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely where defendant was not precluded from seeking relief pursuant to a Rule 61 motion for post-conviction relief.