Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted on 29 counts of Dealing in Child Pornography (DCP) and plead guilty to two counts of DCP and the state entered a nolle prosequi on the remaining counts. Defendant, proceeding pro se, subsequently appealed from a Superior Court order denying his motion for postconviction relief on five grounds: (1) violation of due process due to insufficient evidence; (2) violation of double jeopardy; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) abuse of prosecutorial discretion; and (5) "contradictive and ambiguous" colloquy at his sentencing hearing. The court concluded that none of defendant's claims were meritorious and therefore affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court denying the motion.

Defendant appealed from her convictions for Assault Second Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During Commission of a Felony, and Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited. The court held that the superior court did not err in giving the jury flight instructions where the instructions were appropriate in light of the facts of the case and that the instruction was not a comment on the evidence in violation of Article IV, Section 19 of the Delaware Constitution. The court also held that the superior court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on Assault Third Degree. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was found guilty on multiple counts of robbery, conspiracy, and various possession offenses. Defendant appealed from the denial of his untimely motion to suppress, contending that the Superior Court abused its discretion by not permitting him to move to suppress, out of time, his incriminating statement to a police officer on grounds that he was arrested without probable cause and that his incriminating statement was involuntary. The court held that defendant failed to prove that exceptional circumstances prevented him from filing a timely motion to suppress. Defendant was not precluded from seeking relief pursuant to a Rule 61 motion for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

The State indicted defendant on four counts: possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, receiving a stolen firearm, and criminal impersonation. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and the trial judge found defendant guilty of all the offenses except receiving a stolen firearm. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial judge improperly refused to suppress the gun because an illegitimate search resulted in its seizure. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial judge where defendant gave the officer an improbable name and address, and therefore the officer had the power to arrest him and conduct a search incident to arrest.

Defendant was indicted on nine counts, including aggravated menacing, reckless endangering, and possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited (PDWBPP). At issue was whether the Superior Court properly applied Delaware's habitual offender statute when it imposed an enhanced minimum sentence on a person whose fourth felony was PDWBPP. Because the indictment identified a non-violent felony as the crime that made him a person "prohibited," defendant argued that his fourth conviction was not a violent felony. The trial court held otherwise and the court agreed. A person became a violent felon the first time that person was convicted of one of the statutorily designated violent felonies. Thereafter, the person retained the status of "violent felon" for any future convictions. Accordingly, defendant's PDWBPP conviction was a violent felony and his minimum sentence was the 8 year statutory maximum penalty for that offense.

Defendant appealed from the Superior Court's denial of his untimely motion to suppress. On appeal, defendant contended that the Superior Court abused its discretion by not permitting him to move to suppress, out of time, his incriminating statement to a police officer on grounds that he was arrested without probable cause and that his incriminating statement was involuntary. Defendant had not shown that the motion was based on evidence not available as of the deadline for motions to suppress, or that extraordinary circumstances precluded the filing of a timely motion. Therefore, the court concluded that defendant's contention was without merit because the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely where defendant was not precluded from seeking relief pursuant to a Rule 61 motion for post-conviction relief.

The court consolidated appeals concerning accomplice testimony to determine whether a trial judge must give a cautionary instruction on testimony offered by a witness who claimed to have been defendant's accomplice, even if the defense did not request it, and to determine the appropriate content of an accomplice instruction. The court held that a trial judge who failed to give an instruction about accomplice testimony committed plain error. The court also held that trial judges must give a modified version of the instruction from Bland v. State whenever the State offered accomplice testimony against the accused. Combined, these two holdings provided clear guidance to trial judges: give the modified Bland instruction or commit plain error.

Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery in the first degree and sentenced to 25 years at level V. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the following: (1) the trial judge erroneously denied him a missing evidence instruction; (2) an officer's out of court identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive and unreliable; (3) the trial judge abused his discretion by asking the prospective jury panel two voir dire questions pertaining to mental illnesses and illicit drug use; (4) the manner in which the trial judge conducted his colloquy violated defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial; (5) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction; (6) the trial judge erred by not, sua sponte, expounding upon the wording of the statue or providing a single-theory unanimity instruction; (7) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; (8) defendant's conviction and sentencing for both attempted carjacking and attempted robbery first degree constituted prohibited cumulative punishment in violation of constitutional protections against double jeopardy; and (9) the trial judge made an erroneous finding of fact by concluding that defendant had rejected the State's modified plea agreement. The court found that the issues defendant raised had no merit and therefore affirmed the judgment.

This case arose when plaintiff posted a cash bail for a criminal defendant and defendant failed to appear for a Rule to Show Cause hearing. Plaintiff subsequently appealed from a Superior Court judgment that granted the State's motion to dismiss its petition for a writ of certiorari. Plaintiff raised three arguments on appeal. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that plaintiff's contentions, that the Superior Court erred when it applied the wrong standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Superior Court committed an error of law by exceeding its jurisdiction, and the record provided to the Superior Court was inaccurate and incomplete, were without merit.

Defendant appealed from a Family Court sentencing order initially entered when he was a juvenile where he robbed a woman with a BB gun. Defendant contended that the Family Court did not have the authority to sentence him, at the outset, to twelve months of adult probation following his juvenile commitment. Because the statute the Family Court relied upon affirmatively provided only two circumstances, not present in this case, where the Family Court could sentence a juvenile to adult probation, the court found that the General Assembly intended to limit the authority of the Family Court to impose adult consequences on the juvenile. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a correction of the sentence order.