Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A jury found that defendant and a co-defendant had crashed through patio doors of the Warren family, shot and killed Kenneth Warren in front of his wife and their nineteen-month-old-son. For that crime, defendant was sentenced to death. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial judge erred in admitting the out-of-court statements of his co-defendant; defense counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate DNA issues; certain evidence demonstrated that defendant was innocent, or alternatively, that a new trial was required; defense counsel was ineffective in failing to rehabilitate prospective jurors or to object to the trial judge's dismissal of them; his death sentence was unconstitutional; and defense counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation and to present that mitigation evidence to the trial judge and jury. The court held that defendant was not entitled to postconviction relief or a new trial where defendant's first claim was procedurally barred; defendant's second claim failed because he had not shown prejudice; defendant's third claim failed for the same reason; defendant's fourth claim failed because he had not shown that defense counsel's performance was deficient; defendant's fifth claim was procedurally barred; and defendant's sixth claim failed because he had not shown prejudice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of several crimes arising from the death of his fiancee and defendant was sentenced to death. Defendant subsequently appealed his convictions and death sentence. The court held that the trial court properly applied this court's holding in Cooke v. State to the circumstances of this case and did not deprive defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find defendant guilty of Abuse of a Corpse beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further held that the judge in this case imposed the death sentence after adequately careful and deliberate consideration. The court finally held that defendant's death sentence, on the facts of this case, was not unlawfully disproportionate compared to the sentences imposed in similar cases. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

The police arrested defendant at a private party and based on evidence seized on the night of defendant's arrest, a magistrate issued a warrant to search his home. While executing the warrant, police discovered drugs and firearms in defendant's residence. Defendant was subsequently convicted of drug crimes committed on the evening of the arrest and defendant was later convicted of drug and firearm offenses related to the items seized at his home. Defendant appealed both his convictions, contending that the Superior Court judge erred by denying his motions to suppress. The court held that because the police illegally seized defendant when they obtained the drugs leading to his initial arrest, the evidence against him, including evidence seized from defendant's home, constituted inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree. Accordingly, the court reversed.

Defendant was convicted of crimes related to the attempted murder of the victim on January 26, 2006, and the subsequent murder of the victim on April 2, 2007. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's motion to sever the trial of the attempted murder case from the murder case; that his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury was violated when the evidence presented at trial did not clearly and convincingly establish the State's proffered "other crime" evidence of motive, due to the unwillingness of a State witness to testify; and his due process rights were violated when the trial judge denied his motions to suppress two separate pretrial eyewitness identifications. The court held that defendant's arguments were without merit and therefore, affirmed the judgments of the Superior Court.

Defendant was convicted of robbery first degree and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (PFDCF) for robbing Barbara Santana at gunpoint. At defendant's jury trial, defendant's counsel proffered evidence of a different bank robbery (Artisans' Robbery) that recently had occurred across the street from the bank were Santana was robbed. Counsel called the man who had pled guilty to that crime, Joseph Blevins, as a witness in defendant's trial in an attempt to create a reasonable doubt that defendant had robbed Santana. At issue was whether the trial judge abused his discretion by precluding defendant's proffer of exculpatory evidence to establish a reasonable doubt that someone else could have committed the crime charged. The court held that the exculpatory evidence could have been admitted where defense counsel could have presented the jury with the facts of the Artisans' Robbery and photographs of Blevins or where defense counsel could have presented the jury with the facts of the Artisans' Robbery and then have Blevins identified in court as an exhibit to avoid the concern that Blevins might invoke his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. The court held that if the trial judge had employed either of those methods, the probative value of the relevant evidence would not have been substantially outweighed by the dangers of confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. Accordingly, the court held that the evidence was admissible and reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Defendant appealed his sentence from convictions of two counts of assault in the second degree, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (PFDCF), and one count of reckless endangering in the first degree. At issue was whether the trial court erred by imposing a more severe sentence than recommended under the relevant Sentencing Accountability Commission (SENTAC) Benchbook guidelines. The court held that the record reflected that defendant was fully aware that the Superior Court was not bound by the state's sentence recommendations, and that he had been twice advised that by pleading guilty, he faced a maximum sentence of seventy-one years of incarceration. The court also held that, where the sentencing judge imposed a harsher sentence than those recommended by the SENTAC Benchbook guidelines, the sentences were neither illegal or an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy in the second degree where the jury found that defendant and his co-conspirator committed an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy. At issue was whether the trial judge committed plain error by not, sua sponte, giving a specific unanimity instruction requiring the jury to determine unanimously which particular overt act was committed. The court held that, in light of conflicting authorities on the issue, defendant had not shown that the trial judge committed plain error in failing to give the instruction because the error complained of was not so clearly prejudicial to his substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

The State of Delaware ("State") filed an habitual driving offender petition in the Court of Common Pleas against respondent under Chapter 28 of Title 21 of the Delaware Vehicle Code. Hours after declaring respondent an habitual offender, the Court of Common Pleas, sua sponte, vacated its earlier judgment, holding that the State's exercise of prosecutorial discretion in respondent's case was inconsistent with the State's prosecution of other habitual driving offender petitions heard that same day. At issue was whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in vacating its earlier order declaring respondent an habitual driving offender. The court held that the Court of Common Pleas had no legal basis to conclude that respondent was not an habitual driving offender where the statutory requirements for habitual driving offender status had all been established. The court also held that the Court of Common Pleas erred in finding the State's refusal to offer a continuance to respondent constituted a legal "wrong" where the state was not required to request a continuance in each and every habitual driving offender prosecution. The court further held that the Court of Common Pleas erroneously relied on Court of Common Pleas Civil Rules 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(6) as a basis to remedy the State's "misrepresentations." The court finally held that nothing in Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 11 suggested that the trial court could vacate an earlier order, thereby resulting in a dismissal of the proceeding, as sanction for a party's alleged violation of that rule.

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and appealed a superior court judge's denial of his second motion for postconviction relief. At issue was whether the sidebar commentary defendant's counsel made to the trial judge during a pretrial hearing created an unlawful "appearance of impropriety," violated defendant's due process rights, and denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court held that the relevant circumstances did not disclose any "appearance of impropriety" sufficient to reverse the judgment and grant a new penalty phase where the court did not find an unacceptable risk that a reasonable observer would believe that bias influenced the trial judge. The court also held that the superior court judge did not violate defendant's due process rights where there was no evidence proving reliance on counsel's remarks. The court further held that defendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel where there was no "complete" failure of counsel and defendant failed to establish actual prejudice sufficient to warrant relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court was affirmed.

Defendant was charged with nineteen counts in a final re-indictment related to charges of attempted murder, reckless endangering, firearm charges related to attempted murder charges, aggravated menacing by a firearm, aggravated intimidation of a witness, criminal solicitation, disregarding a police officer, resisting arrest, and reckless driving. At issue was whether the trial judge abused his discretion when he decided that a single complaint by the jury during trial, that some members had difficulty hearing one videotaped section 3507 statement, justified departure from the general default rule that such statements did not go into the jury during deliberations. The court held that the jury certainly should not be permitted to "work through" the recorded section 3507 statement during their deliberations until it was understandable and the undue emphasis placed upon the section 3507 evidence by its unwarranted admission into the jury's deliberative process was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.