Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of attempted murder in the first degree, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, and possession of ammunition by a person prohibited. On appeal, defendant argued that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the Superior Court admitted into evidence hearsay statements by persons who did not testify at the trial. The court concluded that the erroneous admission of the testimonial hearsay evidence was harmless and therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed.

Appellant Roger Johnson was convicted of two counts of robbery in the first degree and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and one count of conspiracy in the second degree. Johnson filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging, in pertinent part, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction under Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 274 (a 274 jury instruction). The superior court denied Johnson's petition in 2007. Johnson subsequently filed a second petition for postconviction relief, again arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a 274 jury instruction and citing the Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Allen v. State. The superior court denied Johnson's motion as procedrually barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court properly denied Johnson's second postconviction motion as procedurally barred, and (2) the issue of the 274 jury instruction did not warrant exceptional consideration.

Defendant appealed from his convictions for unlawful sexual contact in the first degree, a lesser-included offense of rape in the first degree. Defendant contended that his conviction should be reversed because the prosecutor improperly prodded the victim to cry in front of the jury. The court concluded that the record evidence did not support that contention. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of three counts of issuing a bad check greater than $1,000. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial judge erred by failing to grant a motion for a new trial after discovering that Juror No. 8 was a victim in a pending criminal case and by failing to conduct a sufficient post trial inquiry. The court held that when a juror serving on a criminal trial was an alleged victim of a crime and was contemporaneously represented by the Attorney General's office in the prosecution of the alleged perpetrator of the crime against the juror "victim," a mere inquiry by deposition into whether the jury knew the prosecutor or anyone in his office insufficiently probed the ability of that "juror/victim" to render a fair and objective verdict as a matter of law. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded.

A jury found that defendant and a co-defendant had crashed through patio doors of the Warren family, shot and killed Kenneth Warren in front of his wife and their nineteen-month-old-son. For that crime, defendant was sentenced to death. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial judge erred in admitting the out-of-court statements of his co-defendant; defense counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate DNA issues; certain evidence demonstrated that defendant was innocent, or alternatively, that a new trial was required; defense counsel was ineffective in failing to rehabilitate prospective jurors or to object to the trial judge's dismissal of them; his death sentence was unconstitutional; and defense counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation and to present that mitigation evidence to the trial judge and jury. The court held that defendant was not entitled to postconviction relief or a new trial where defendant's first claim was procedurally barred; defendant's second claim failed because he had not shown prejudice; defendant's third claim failed for the same reason; defendant's fourth claim failed because he had not shown that defense counsel's performance was deficient; defendant's fifth claim was procedurally barred; and defendant's sixth claim failed because he had not shown prejudice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of several crimes arising from the death of his fiancee and defendant was sentenced to death. Defendant subsequently appealed his convictions and death sentence. The court held that the trial court properly applied this court's holding in Cooke v. State to the circumstances of this case and did not deprive defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find defendant guilty of Abuse of a Corpse beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further held that the judge in this case imposed the death sentence after adequately careful and deliberate consideration. The court finally held that defendant's death sentence, on the facts of this case, was not unlawfully disproportionate compared to the sentences imposed in similar cases. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

The police arrested defendant at a private party and based on evidence seized on the night of defendant's arrest, a magistrate issued a warrant to search his home. While executing the warrant, police discovered drugs and firearms in defendant's residence. Defendant was subsequently convicted of drug crimes committed on the evening of the arrest and defendant was later convicted of drug and firearm offenses related to the items seized at his home. Defendant appealed both his convictions, contending that the Superior Court judge erred by denying his motions to suppress. The court held that because the police illegally seized defendant when they obtained the drugs leading to his initial arrest, the evidence against him, including evidence seized from defendant's home, constituted inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree. Accordingly, the court reversed.

Defendant was convicted of crimes related to the attempted murder of the victim on January 26, 2006, and the subsequent murder of the victim on April 2, 2007. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's motion to sever the trial of the attempted murder case from the murder case; that his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury was violated when the evidence presented at trial did not clearly and convincingly establish the State's proffered "other crime" evidence of motive, due to the unwillingness of a State witness to testify; and his due process rights were violated when the trial judge denied his motions to suppress two separate pretrial eyewitness identifications. The court held that defendant's arguments were without merit and therefore, affirmed the judgments of the Superior Court.

Defendant was convicted of robbery first degree and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (PFDCF) for robbing Barbara Santana at gunpoint. At defendant's jury trial, defendant's counsel proffered evidence of a different bank robbery (Artisans' Robbery) that recently had occurred across the street from the bank were Santana was robbed. Counsel called the man who had pled guilty to that crime, Joseph Blevins, as a witness in defendant's trial in an attempt to create a reasonable doubt that defendant had robbed Santana. At issue was whether the trial judge abused his discretion by precluding defendant's proffer of exculpatory evidence to establish a reasonable doubt that someone else could have committed the crime charged. The court held that the exculpatory evidence could have been admitted where defense counsel could have presented the jury with the facts of the Artisans' Robbery and photographs of Blevins or where defense counsel could have presented the jury with the facts of the Artisans' Robbery and then have Blevins identified in court as an exhibit to avoid the concern that Blevins might invoke his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. The court held that if the trial judge had employed either of those methods, the probative value of the relevant evidence would not have been substantially outweighed by the dangers of confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. Accordingly, the court held that the evidence was admissible and reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Defendant appealed his sentence from convictions of two counts of assault in the second degree, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (PFDCF), and one count of reckless endangering in the first degree. At issue was whether the trial court erred by imposing a more severe sentence than recommended under the relevant Sentencing Accountability Commission (SENTAC) Benchbook guidelines. The court held that the record reflected that defendant was fully aware that the Superior Court was not bound by the state's sentence recommendations, and that he had been twice advised that by pleading guilty, he faced a maximum sentence of seventy-one years of incarceration. The court also held that, where the sentencing judge imposed a harsher sentence than those recommended by the SENTAC Benchbook guidelines, the sentences were neither illegal or an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.