Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy in the second degree where the jury found that defendant and his co-conspirator committed an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy. At issue was whether the trial judge committed plain error by not, sua sponte, giving a specific unanimity instruction requiring the jury to determine unanimously which particular overt act was committed. The court held that, in light of conflicting authorities on the issue, defendant had not shown that the trial judge committed plain error in failing to give the instruction because the error complained of was not so clearly prejudicial to his substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

The State of Delaware ("State") filed an habitual driving offender petition in the Court of Common Pleas against respondent under Chapter 28 of Title 21 of the Delaware Vehicle Code. Hours after declaring respondent an habitual offender, the Court of Common Pleas, sua sponte, vacated its earlier judgment, holding that the State's exercise of prosecutorial discretion in respondent's case was inconsistent with the State's prosecution of other habitual driving offender petitions heard that same day. At issue was whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in vacating its earlier order declaring respondent an habitual driving offender. The court held that the Court of Common Pleas had no legal basis to conclude that respondent was not an habitual driving offender where the statutory requirements for habitual driving offender status had all been established. The court also held that the Court of Common Pleas erred in finding the State's refusal to offer a continuance to respondent constituted a legal "wrong" where the state was not required to request a continuance in each and every habitual driving offender prosecution. The court further held that the Court of Common Pleas erroneously relied on Court of Common Pleas Civil Rules 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(6) as a basis to remedy the State's "misrepresentations." The court finally held that nothing in Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 11 suggested that the trial court could vacate an earlier order, thereby resulting in a dismissal of the proceeding, as sanction for a party's alleged violation of that rule.

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and appealed a superior court judge's denial of his second motion for postconviction relief. At issue was whether the sidebar commentary defendant's counsel made to the trial judge during a pretrial hearing created an unlawful "appearance of impropriety," violated defendant's due process rights, and denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court held that the relevant circumstances did not disclose any "appearance of impropriety" sufficient to reverse the judgment and grant a new penalty phase where the court did not find an unacceptable risk that a reasonable observer would believe that bias influenced the trial judge. The court also held that the superior court judge did not violate defendant's due process rights where there was no evidence proving reliance on counsel's remarks. The court further held that defendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel where there was no "complete" failure of counsel and defendant failed to establish actual prejudice sufficient to warrant relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court was affirmed.

Defendant was charged with nineteen counts in a final re-indictment related to charges of attempted murder, reckless endangering, firearm charges related to attempted murder charges, aggravated menacing by a firearm, aggravated intimidation of a witness, criminal solicitation, disregarding a police officer, resisting arrest, and reckless driving. At issue was whether the trial judge abused his discretion when he decided that a single complaint by the jury during trial, that some members had difficulty hearing one videotaped section 3507 statement, justified departure from the general default rule that such statements did not go into the jury during deliberations. The court held that the jury certainly should not be permitted to "work through" the recorded section 3507 statement during their deliberations until it was understandable and the undue emphasis placed upon the section 3507 evidence by its unwarranted admission into the jury's deliberative process was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.