Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Cameron Pierce was convicted after a bench trial on two counts of Robbery First Degree, two counts of Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony, and two counts of Felony Theft. The Superior Court sentenced Pierce to a total of 60 years at Level 5 incarceration, suspended after 6 years, to be followed by probation. Pierce appealed, arguing: (1) the superior court erred in admitting palmprint evidence because it lacked the requisite foundation for admission; and (2) the superior court’s verdict was not supported by evidence sufficient to identify Pierce as the suspect who robbed Silverside Discount Liquors. Finding no merit in either of Pierce’s claims of error, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "Pierce v. Delaware" on Justia Law

At the heart of the State’s prosecution of defendant Karieem Howell for numerous drug and weapons offenses was the testimony of Brian Caldwell: a witness who had agreed to cooperate with the prosecution in return for a favorable plea agreement. During Howell’s trial, the trial judge instructed Howell’s jurors, at the beginning of Caldwell’s damning testimony, that they could not consider Caldwell’s agreement with the prosecution in weighing his credibility. The State conceded the court’s instruction was legally erroneous. But, because Howell’s lawyer did not object to the instruction, the Delaware Supreme Court was limited to review the mistake for plain error - an error that so affected Howell’s substantial rights that his failure to object would be excused. The State contended that the strength of the evidence independent of Caldwell’s testimony and the correct instructions regarding witness credibility provided to the jury at the close of evidence suffice to erase any prejudice that Howell might have suffered because of the erroneous instruction. The Supreme Court's review of the trial record persuaded it otherwise, finding Caldwell’s testimony was "pivotal evidence" upon which the jury’s determination of key elements of the crimes charged likely turned. "Without Caldwell’s testimony, the prosecution’s case was susceptible to doubt; with it - if the jury found it credible - the likelihood of conviction increased dramatically. The trial court’s instruction, however, unduly restricted the jury’s assessment of Caldwell’s credibility and undermined the fairness of Howell’s trial." Therefore, the Court reversed Howell's convictions and remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial. View "Howell v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellant Ricardo Castro appealed his convictions on two counts of Drug Dealing and two counts of Conspiracy in the Second Degree. On appeal, he argued: (1) the Superior Court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the two Drug Dealing convictions; (2) the Superior Court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the two Conspiracy convictions; and (3) the Superior Court erred in not granting his pre-trial motion to suppress wiretap evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed appellant's convictions. View "Castro v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Corey Patrick was convicted by jury for multiple drug and weapons offenses. On appeal, Patrick challenged : (1) the trial court’s decision to permit law enforcement witnesses to testify about the lengthy drug investigation leading to his arrest; (2) one of his convictions for possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, arguing there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for the simultaneous possession of a firearm and a controlled substance because the State failed to satisfy the “possession” element; and (3) the second of his weapons charges should have been vacated as duplicative of his other conviction under Count Two of the Indictment for possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited (weapon and prior felony conviction). After review, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Patrick’s convictions except for his conviction under Count Four of the October 7, 2019 Indictment (weapon and drugs together). The Count Four conviction duplicated his conviction under Count Two (weapon and prior felony conviction) and violated the constitutional prohibition against Double Jeopardy. Thus, judgment was reversed and remanded to the Superior Court to vacate his conviction and sentence under Count Four of the October 7, 2019 Indictment. View "Patrick v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Heather Juliano was a passenger was passenger in an SUV that was stopped because of a suspected seat-belt violation. One of the investigating officers detected an odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. Based on that odor alone, the occupants of the vehicle, including Juliano, were immediately ordered out of the vehicle and placed under arrest. The police searched Juliano at the scene and then transported her to their station where they told her that they intended to perform a strip search, prompting Juliano to admit that she had concealed contraband— marijuana and cocaine—in her pants. Juliano was then escorted to another room where she retrieved and handed over the drugs. Juliano was then charged with several drug offenses. Juliano moved to suppress the drugs that the police seized from her, claiming, among other things, that her arrest and the ensuing searches were not supported by probable cause. The State responded that the odor of marijuana emanating from the area of the vehicle where Juliano was seated and on her person provided probable cause for Juliano’s arrest. And, the State argued, because the arrest was lawful, the searches of Juliano at the scene and at the station were incident to her arrest and hence lawful. In two separate orders, one following the suppression hearing and the other on remand by the Delaware Supreme Court of that first order, the Family Court agreed with the State and denied Juliano’s motion. On appeal, Juliano contended that, although the odor of marijuana could support the extension of a traffic stop or serve as a factor contributing to probable cause to search a person or vehicle, it did not, standing alone, authorize a full custodial arrest. The Supreme Court found that under the totality of the circumstances presented by the State in this case, including the vagueness of the officers’ description of the marijuana odor, the timing of their detection of that odor, and the absence of any other observations indicative of criminality, Juliano’s arrest was unreasonable and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution. "It follows that the evidence obtained following Juliano’s unlawful arrest should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. This being so, we reverse." View "Juliano v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Diamonte Taylor was convicted by jury for gang-related murder and violent felonies. On direct appeal, Taylor claimed the superior court should have suppressed evidence from his smartphones collected under an unconstitutional search warrant. After review, the Delaware Supreme Court determined that unlimited in time and scope, the general warrant to search Taylor’s smartphones violated Taylor’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution, and the particularity requirement under Delaware statutory law. The evidence should have been suppressed and the error was not harmless. The Court therefore reversed his convictions and remanded to the superior court for a new trial without the taint of the improperly seized evidence. View "Taylor v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Prior to sentencing, defendant Jerry Reed sought to withdraw his guilty plea, but his counsel refused to file a motion to do so, apparently under the belief that no grounds justifying a plea withdrawal were present. The Superior Court refused to consider his pro se motion because he was represented by counsel. As Reed put it, he became stuck in a Catch-22 due to the operation of two Superior Court Criminal Rules. The Delaware Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant’s control of the objectives of the representation prior to sentencing required counsel either obey an instruction to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, or seek leave to withdraw so that the defendant could file the motion with other counsel or pro se. Because the factual record in this case was incomplete, and because some of the Superior Court’s factual findings were not supported by the record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for additional fact-finding necessary to determine whether Reed’s claims for ineffective assistance of counsel had merit. View "Reed v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In 2019, Jason White was convicted of eight crimes related to possessing and dealing narcotics. White filed a timely direct appeal, arguing that the Superior Court abused its discretion by allowing the State to admit text messages without proper authentication, and that the prosecutor made improper comments during his rebuttal summation by misstating the burden of proof, denigrating the role of defense counsel, and vouching for evidence. Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and record on appeal, and after oral argument, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment: the State provided sufficient evidence to authenticate the text messages, and the prosecutor did not make improper remarks warranting reversal during his rebuttal summation. View "White v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellant Kili Mayfield was convicted at a bench trial of Rape in the First Degree (two counts), Rape in the Second Degree (four counts), Kidnapping in the First Degree (one count), Strangulation (one count), and Assault in the Third Degree (one count). In pre-trial proceedings, he was initially represented by counsel from the Public Defender Division of the Office of Defense Services. Several months before trial Mayfield filed a motion indicating he wished to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. The Superior Court held a hearing and granted the motion. On appeal, Mayfield did not dispute that the Superior Court committed no error in granting his motion to waive counsel and proceed pro se. At a conference held the day before his scheduled trial date, however, Mayfield informed the trial judge for the first time that he had decided that representing himself was not in his best interest. He requested time to retain private counsel. In the alternative, he requested that the Public Defender’s Office be reappointed to represent him at trial. After fully considering Mayfield’s requests, the judge determined that granting either request would necessitate a trial delay. He also determined that the trial should go forward as scheduled the next day, that the continuance that either of Mayfield’s requests would entail should be denied, and that his request for counsel should, therefore, be denied. The trial did commence the next day, with Mayfield representing himself. Mayfield claimed on appeal the trial judge’s denial of his request for reappointment of the Public Defender’s Office to represent him at trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected Mayfield’s claim and affirmed the Superior Court judgment. View "Mayfield v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Murad Diggs was convicted of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a person prohibited. In his direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, Diggs claimed the Superior Court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized from him - the firearm and ammunition - following an investigative detention and frisk that was, in Diggs’s view, unsupported by reasonable suspicion. More specifically, Diggs challenged the court’s conclusion that the tip upon which the police were acting came from a “citizen informant” and therefore was presumptively reliable. Diggs also contended the Superior Court’s suppression-hearing factual determinations were flawed because the court failed to draw a “lost and/or missing evidence” inference as a result of the police’s failure to collect and preserve certain evidence. Although the Supreme Court agreed, in part, with Diggs’s criticism of the Superior Court’s “citizen-informant” analysis, it disagreed with his conclusion that his seizure was not supported by sufficient reasonable suspicion. Likewise, the Court rejected Diggs’s contention that the Superior Court’s failure to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution - an inference that Diggs did not urge the court to draw at trial - was plainly erroneous. Hence, the Court affirmed the Superior Court judgment. View "Diggs v. Delaware" on Justia Law