Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1993, the appellant was convicted in Wisconsin of third-degree sexual assault and was required to register as a sex offender for fifteen years. After relocating to the District of Columbia, the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (CSOSA) notified him in 2019 that he must register as a sex offender for life under the District of Columbia Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The appellant filed a motion in Superior Court challenging this determination, arguing that his Wisconsin conviction was not substantially similar to any lifetime-registration offense under SORA.The Superior Court initially scheduled a hearing beyond the statutory sixty-day deadline set by SORA. At the hearing, the appellant contended that the United States had not proven that his Wisconsin conviction involved conduct substantially similar to first-degree or second-degree sexual abuse in the District, which require lifetime registration. The court granted the United States a continuance to obtain additional records from Wisconsin, over the appellant's objection. The additional evidence included transcripts from the preliminary hearing and sentencing, which detailed the appellant's use of force during the assault. The trial court found that the United States had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the appellant's conduct involved the use of force, thus requiring lifetime registration.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The appellate court held that the trial court acted within its discretion in granting the continuance and that the failure to meet SORA's sixty-day deadline did not warrant reversal. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the appellant's Wisconsin offense involved the use of force, justifying the lifetime registration requirement. View "Cox v. United States" on Justia Law

Dagoberto Machado was convicted by a jury of multiple offenses related to the inappropriate touching of I.A., his girlfriend’s young niece. The incidents allegedly occurred during the summers of 2016 and 2017 when I.A. was staying with Machado and his girlfriend. I.A. testified that Machado touched her inappropriately on several occasions, including at a public pool and in their home. She did not immediately report the incidents due to uncertainty and fear of affecting family relationships. The government introduced expert testimony from Dr. Stephanie Wolf, a child psychologist, to provide context for I.A.'s delayed reporting, including cultural barriers within Latino communities.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia admitted Dr. Wolf’s testimony over Machado’s objections. Machado argued that Dr. Wolf’s statements about “machismo” in Latino culture were prejudicial. The trial court qualified Dr. Wolf as an expert and allowed her to testify about cultural norms that might impede a child from disclosing abuse. Dr. Wolf mentioned that in Latino culture, men might have a higher standing, which could impact how sexuality and abuse are viewed. The jury found Machado guilty on all counts.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Wolf’s testimony about Latino culture. The court held that the testimony had minimal probative value and was substantially outweighed by its potential to unfairly prejudice the jury against Machado based on ethnic stereotypes. The court emphasized that such testimony could lead the jury to view Machado as more likely to have committed the abuse simply because of his ethnicity. Consequently, the court reversed Machado’s convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Machado v. United States" on Justia Law

Corey Nelson-White was barred from Rhode Island Row, a mixed-use development in Northeast D.C., which includes two buildings at 2300 and 2350 Washington Place NE. The barring notice directed him to stay off the property and grounds of Rhode Island Row. Officers explained the barring notice to Nelson-White, but did not provide him with a copy. Six days later, Nelson-White was found inside a parking garage attached to one of the Rhode Island Row buildings and was arrested for unlawful entry.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia convicted Nelson-White of unlawful entry, finding that he knew or should have known he was barred from the premises, including the parking garage. The trial court based its decision on the barring notice and the officers' instructions, despite Nelson-White's argument that the garage was not clearly marked as part of Rhode Island Row.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found the evidence insufficient to sustain Nelson-White's conviction. The court noted that there was no clear indication that the parking garage was part of the barred premises. The court highlighted the lack of signage or other markers that would inform a reasonable person that the garage was part of Rhode Island Row or 2350 Washington Place. The court concluded that a rational fact-finder could not determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Nelson-White knew or should have known the garage was included in the barring notice.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed Nelson-White's conviction for unlawful entry, holding that the evidence did not support the conclusion that he was aware or should have been aware that the parking garage was part of the premises he was barred from entering. View "Nelson-White v. United States" on Justia Law

G.W. was convicted of simple assault in 2019 after allegedly grabbing the jacket of a Metropolitan Transit Police Department officer outside the Anacostia Metro Station. G.W. filed a notice of appeal, and the case was remanded to allow the trial court to set aside his conviction under the Youth Rehabilitation Act (YRA). Following the trial court's set-aside order and issuance of a new judgment and commitment order, G.W. filed a new notice of appeal, challenging his conviction.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially convicted G.W. of simple assault. G.W. timely filed a notice of appeal, and the case was stayed pending the outcome of the en banc decision in Perez Hernandez v. United States, which addressed the elements of an offensive touching assault. After the decision in Perez Hernandez, the stay was lifted, and G.W. sought an indicative ruling for a YRA set-aside. The trial court issued an indicative set-aside order, and the case was remanded. The trial court then issued a set-aside order and an amended judgment and commitment order, which G.W. appealed.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that G.W.'s appeal was properly before the court. The court determined that the trial court had not applied the correct elements of an offensive touching assault as defined in Perez Hernandez. Specifically, the trial court did not consider whether G.W.'s actions would offend a person's reasonable sense of personal dignity and whether G.W. acted with the purpose of causing offense or knowing that his actions would cause offense. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to make the necessary findings regarding G.W.'s mens rea and the nature of the touch. The court did not reach G.W.'s Rule 16 claim due to the decision to remand. View "G.W. v. United States" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of two counts of simple assault and one count of attempted possession of a prohibited weapon. The incidents involved an altercation with his girlfriend, Ms. Williams, and her daughter, M.W. Ms. Williams testified that the appellant slapped her at a Metro station, and later, after an argument, he kicked in her apartment door, punched her, and hit M.W. with a belt. Ms. Williams also claimed the appellant had a gun, which he used to hit her. The police arrived shortly after the incident, and body-worn camera footage captured Ms. Williams's statements and visible injuries.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia found the appellant guilty of both counts of simple assault and attempted possession of a prohibited weapon. The court credited Ms. Williams's testimony and found the video evidence, particularly Exhibit 7, significant in showing the appellant holding his belt while running out of the building. The court did not credit the appellant's testimony and found the injuries on Ms. Williams consistent with being hit rather than a fall.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court accepted the United States' concession that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for attempted possession of a prohibited weapon and reversed that conviction. The court found the evidence sufficient to support the assault convictions but held that the trial court erred in admitting Exhibit 7, which was harmful error regarding the conviction for assaulting M.W. Consequently, the court vacated that conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court affirmed the conviction for assaulting Ms. Williams, finding any error in admitting the video exhibits harmless concerning that conviction. View "Ransom v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2002, the appellant was convicted of armed robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon. He later filed two motions for post-conviction relief under D.C. Code § 23-110. The first motion, filed in 2017, claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel and alleged that he was beaten by U.S. Marshals during his trial, rendering him unable to participate meaningfully in his defense. He attached an affidavit and medical records to support his claims. The second motion, filed pro se, argued ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel during a 2016 sentence reduction hearing.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the first § 23-110 motion after an evidentiary hearing. The court found that the appellant's absence from the hearing meant his affidavit was inadmissible hearsay and that the medical records did not sufficiently demonstrate that he was unable to participate in his trial. The court concluded there was no evidence, aside from the inadmissible affidavit, to support the claim that the appellant was too emotionally or physically impaired to assist in his defense.The appellant's second § 23-110 motion was also denied by the Superior Court. The court found that the appellant had not demonstrated prejudice from his post-conviction counsel's performance during the Rule 35 sentence reduction hearing. The appellant appealed both denials.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the denial of the first § 23-110 motion, agreeing with the lower court that the appellant's affidavit was inadmissible and that the medical records did not prove his inability to participate in his trial. The court dismissed the appeal of the second § 23-110 motion as moot because the appellant had already completed his term of imprisonment, and his term of supervised release was statutorily unalterable. View "Thompson v. United States" on Justia Law