Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Billy Sheppard Jr.'s motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and denied Sheppard's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the circuit court properly denied postconviction relief for all guilt claims and that Sheppard failed to establish that he was entitled to habeas corpus relief.Sheppard was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Sheppard later filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851. The circuit court granted a new penalty phase but denied Sheppard's claims as to the guilt phase of his trial. Sheppard appealed, raising claims relevant to the guilt phase, and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus raising two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order and denied Sheppard's petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Sheppard was not entitled to relief on any of his claims. View "Sheppard v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus compelling the court of appeals to reinstate his appeal of a circuit court order denying him postconviction relief, holding that Petitioner did all that the text of the inmate filing rule required.Petitioner, an inmate convicted of second-degree murder, filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. The circuit court denied the petition. Petitioner appealed, but the court of appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely. Petitioner then filed for relief seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the court of appeals to reinstate his appeal. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the court of appeals erred in not accepting Petitioner's notice of appeal as timely filed without a prison date stamp because the prison mail log produced by Petitioner indicated the notice was timely turned over to prison officials for mailing under Fla. R. App. P. 9.420(a)(2). View "Wade v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's two first-degree murder convictions and two corresponding sentences of death, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.After a trial, a jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree murder with a firearm. The jury rendered unanimous verdicts recommending a penalty of death on both murder counts, determining that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances. In this direct appeal, Defendant raised fifteen claims, including several challenges to the trial court's evidentiary rulings and to Florida's death penalty scheme. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for first-degree murder and his sentences of death, holding that Defendant failed to establish prejudicial error in any respect. View "Joseph v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentences of death imposed in connection with his conviction for two counts of first-degree murder, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.After he was originally convicted and sentenced Defendant received a new penalty phase in light of Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). Thereafter, Defendant was resentenced to death for both murders. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentences of death, holding (1) Defendant's jury unanimously found that each of five aggravating factors was proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) there was no error in allowing the State to amend its notice of aggravating factors; (3) the trial court did not err in permitting the introduction of victim impact evidence; and (4) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining claims of error. View "McKenzie v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court summarily denying Appellant's sixth successive motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that the trial court did not err in summarily denying Appellant's postconviction motion.Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, sexual battery, and burglary. The trial judge sentenced Appellant to death. In his sixth successive postconviction motion Appellant asserted two claims, including a claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The trial court rejected both claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in summarily denying Appellant's sixth postconviction motion. View "Booker v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and his sentence of death, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Defendant entered a no contest plea to first-degree murder, attempted murder of a correctional officer with a deadly weapon, and other crimes. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not employing all of the mitigation-investigation procedures required in Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2001), because Muhammad's investigative procedures did not apply; (2) Defendant's second assignment of error was without merit; and (3) Defendant voluntarily and knowingly entered his no contest plea. View "Bell v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court summarily denying Appellant's successive motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief.Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder. In a seven-to-five vote recommendation the jury sentenced Appellant to death, and the death sentence became final in 1989. In his postconviction motion, Appellant argued that he was entitled to retroactive application of the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020), which receded from Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) except as to the requirement that a jury must unanimously find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Poole did not retroactively apply to Appellant. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for first-degree murder and sentences of death, holding that the introduction of the testimony of Defendant's mother constituted harmful error.During Defendant's trial, Defendant's mother, Jeanne Avsenew, testified regarding multiple incriminating statements made and actions taken by Defendant shortly after the murders. At issue was whether the perpetuated testimony testimony of Jeanne, which was given despite her inability to see Defendant during her testimony, violated Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(i)(3), which requires that the defendant be in the witness's presence during testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the failure to ensure that Defendant was kept in the presence of his mother during her testimony constituted a clear violation of Rule 3.190(i)(3); and (2) the error was not harmless. View "Avsenew v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's convictions for first-degree murder and remanded this case to the trial court for a new trial, holding that Defendant was entitled to postconviction relief as to the guilt phase of his trial.A jury found Defendant guilty of two murders, and the trial court ultimately imposed a sentence of death for each murder. The Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, raising several Brady claims as to the guilt phase of his trial. The postconviction court denied relief. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of postconviction relief as to the guilt phase and vacated Defendant's murder convictions, holding (1) the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose that one of the witnesses was a confidential informant for the State; and (2) the Brady violation undermined confidence in the outcome of the trial. View "Simpson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that when a defendant voluntarily chooses to allocate at a sentencing hearing, the sentencing court is permitted to consider the defendant's freely offered statements, including those indicating the defendant's failure to accept responsibility.On appeal from the judgment of the trial court in this case, the First District concluded that "lack of remorse and refusal to accept responsibility can be valid sentencing considerations when sentencing within the statutory range." The Supreme Court approved the result in the decision on review, holding that the sentencing judge in this case was entitled to consider testimony that indicated Defendant's unwillingness to accept the truth and to take responsibility for his conduct. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law