Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court approved in part and quashed in part the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in this case and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal as to first-degree premeditated murder and that Appellant was entitled to resentencing.A jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder and other crimes. The court of appeal affirmed Appellant’s convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court approved in part and quashed in part the court of appeal’s decision, holding (1) because Appellant presented a prima facie case of self-defense and the State did not refute Appellant’s claim beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial improperly denied Appellant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the first-degree premeditated murder count; (2) the trial court did not err in denying the motion as to the attempted murder count; and (3) Appellant was entitled to resentencing. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the postconviction court denying Appellant’s motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), did not apply retroactively to Appellant’s sentence of death.Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The jury recommended death by a vote of seven to five. Appellant’s death sentence became final in 1993. In his postconviction motion, Appellant sought relief pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst. The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s order denying relief, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief under Hurst. View "Thompson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding, among other things, that Appellant’s attorney was not ineffective for failing to investigate and present certain mitigation evidence.Appellant was convicted of kidnapping and first-degree murder and sentence of death. In her motion for postconviction relief Appellant raised fourteen initial claims and then amended her motion to add a Hurst claim. The trial court denied the motion in its entirety. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, the State did not commit a Giglio violation, and Appellant was not entitled to a new penalty phase under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). View "Allen v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s order denying Appellant’s second successive motion to vacate his judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death, holding (1) any error on the part of the postconviction court in failing to hold a case management hearing pursuant to Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993), was harmless; and (2) the postconviction court did not err in summarily denying Appellant’s newly discovered evidence claims.In his second successive motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, Appellant alleged newly discovered evidence in the form of an exculpatory affidavit of a witness and new DNA evidence. The postconviction court denied the motion without conducting a case management conference. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s due process rights were not violated by the postconviction court’s failure to hold a Huff hearing; and (2) the postconviction court did not err in summarily denying Appellant’s second successive postconviction motion. View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal expressly declaring valid Fla. Stat. 775.082(10), holding that subsection (10) violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.In the decision on review, the Fifth District expressly declared subsection (10) valid in the context of rejecting Defendant’s argument that her state prison sentence violated the Sixth Amendment because the jury did not find that she presented a danger to the public under section 775.082(10). Section 775.082(1) requires that a qualifying offender whose sentencing scoresheet totals twenty-two points or fewer be sentenced to a nonstate prison sanction unless the trial court makes written findings that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that subsection (10) violates the Sixth Amendment because it requires the court, not the jury, to find the fact of dangerousness to the public that is necessary to increase the statutory maximum nonstate prison sanction. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying a motion for attorney’s fees incurred during a capital postconviction proceeding, holding that the circuit court improperly denied attorney’s fees to a designated attorney.Maria del Carmen Calzon was the lead attorney of a death defendant represented by court-appointed private counsel. Calzon designated Albert A.A. Cartenuto, III as her “designated attorney” to assist in the case. Calzon moved for attorney’s fees. The circuit court denied the motion to the extent that it included Cartenuto’s fees as a designated attorney but granted the motion as to Calzon’s fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying attorney’s fees to Cartenuto as a designated attorney. View "Cartenuto v. Justice Administrative Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant’s successive motion for postconviction relief, holding that Mullens v. State, 197 So. 3d 16 (Fla. 2016) controlled the outcome of this case.Appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and, after a second penalty phase, was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later filed a successive motion to vacate his sentence of death pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851. The postconviction court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to retroactive application of Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) and Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), because his conviction and sentence became final more than two years before Ring was issued; and (2) Appellant’s claim regarding his right to a penalty-phase jury was procedurally barred because it should have been raised on direct appeal. View "Robinson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the trial court partially granting and partially denying Gerald Delane Murray’s initial motion for postconviction relief under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 and denying Murray’s successive postconviction motion, and further denied Murray’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Murray was not entitled to relief on any of his claims on appeal.Murray was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death after four trials and three convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, Murray filed a motion for postconviction relief that was amended four times. The postconviction court granted a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst but denied relief on all other claims. The postconviction court summarily denied relief on Appellant’s successive motion for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err by granting Murray a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst; (2) the trial court properly denied Murray’s other initial postconviction motion claims; (3) the summary denial of Appellant’s successive postconviction motion was not in error; and (4) Appellant was not entitled to habeas relief on any of his claims. View "State v. Murray" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and directed the Clerk of Court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Petitioner that are related to Petitioner’s criminal cases unless such filings are signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar, holding that Petitioner had abused the Supreme Court’s limited judicial resources.Petitioner filed twenty-nine petitions or notices with the Supreme Court since September 17, 2008. On September 12, 2018, the Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and ordered Petitioner to show cause why he should not be barred from filing further pro se requests for relief in this Court. The Supreme Court found that Petitioner failed to show cause why he should not be barred from filing further pro se requests for relief in the Supreme Court, holding that Petitioner’s extensive history of filing pro se petitions and requests for relief that were meritless or otherwise inappropriate for the Supreme Court’s review required that Petitioner be barred. View "Marts v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court approved of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in this case concerning the proper interpretation of Florida’s witness tampering statute, Fla. Stat. 914.22, holding that the statute does not require the State to establish that the witness attempted to contact law enforcement during the commission of the underlying criminal offense.The central issue was whether section 914.22(1)(e) requires the State to demonstrate that a witness attempted to contact law enforcement to prove its case in chief on witness tampering. The Supreme Court held (1) the statute does not designate an attempt to contract law enforcement as an element of the crime of witness tampering; and (2) in the instant case, the State presented competent, substantial evidence to support Defendant’s conviction for witness tampering. View "McCloud v. State" on Justia Law