Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s denial of Appellant’s successive motion for postconviction relief from a sentence of death, holding that any error in the proceedings below was harmless.Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After unsuccessfully filing his successive motion to vacate a sentence of death under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 Appellant filed this appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) it was reasonable for the postconviction court to deny Appellant’s motion to exceed page limit; (2) the postconviction court did not violate Appellant’s due process rights by failing to hold a case management conference, pursuant to Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993), before ruling on his second successive motion for postconviction relief; and (3) Appellant’s remaining claims were meritless. View "Rivera v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme court affirmed the circuit court’s order granting in part and denying in part Appellant’s motion for DNA testing under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853, holding that none of Appellant’s claims on appeal had merit.After a retrial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. Appellant later filed his motion for DNA testing of evidence pursuant to Rule 3.853. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. Appellant appealed the circuit court’s partial denial of his Rule 3.853 motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in adopting the State’s reasoning and conclusions as to Appellant’s motion in its order; and (2) the partial denial of Appellant’s motion did not violate his Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights. View "Gosciminski v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion.Appellant was convicted of kidnapping and first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After Appellant’s death sentence became final Appellant filed her motion for postconviction relief, raising fourteen claims and then amending the motion to add a Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) claim. The trial court denied the motion in its entirety. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief on her claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, a Giglio violation, and a Hurst error. View "Allen v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the postconviction court denying Appellant’s guilt phase claims, vacating his sentence of death, and remanding this case for a new penalty phase based on Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), holding that the postconviction court did not err or abuse its discretion.After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and other offenses. The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Appellant to death. Appellant later filed a motion to vacate his first-degree murder conviction and sentence of death pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, raising eight claims for relief. The postconviction court denied Appellant’s guilt phase claims but vacated his sentence of death and granted a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that none of Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel had merit because either deficiency or prejudice or both was not established. View "King v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief.Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death following the jury’s recommendation for death for both murders by a vote of ten to two. The sentences of death became final in 1993. In his postconviction motion, Appellant sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and this Court’s decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief, holding that Hurst did not apply retroactively to Appellant’s sentences of death. View "Jones v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Appellant’s motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Criminal. P. 3.851, holding that this Court’s prior denial of Appellant’s postconviction appeal raising similar claims was a procedural bar to the claim at issue in this appeal.Appellant’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and the Supreme Court’s decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even if his motion was not procedurally barred, Appellant was not entitled to relief under Hurst or the legislation implementing the rights recognized in Hurst. View "Rodriguez v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s conclusion that Appellant presented no basis for declaring Florida’s hazing statute, Fla. Stat. 1006.63, unconstitutional, thus affirming Appellant’s convictions of manslaughter, felony hazing resulting in death, and two counts of misdemeanor hazing.Defendant was convicted in connection with the activities of the Florida A&M University’s marching band. On appeal, the Fifth District affirmed Defendant’s convictions, rejected his arguments challenging the constitutionality of section 1006.63, and expressly declared that the hazing statute was valid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hazing statute is neither unconstitutionally overbroad nor void for vagueness. View "Martin v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question certified to it by the Fourth District Court of Appeal by holding that law enforcement officers are eligible to assert Stand Your Ground immunity under Fla. Stat. 776.012(1) and 776.032(1), as held by the Fourth District.After being indicted for manslaughter with a firearm, Deputy Peter Peraza of the Broward County Sheriff’s Office moved to dismiss the indictment, citing immunity from prosecution under sections 776.012(1) and 776.032(1), Florida’s Stand Your Ground law. The judge granted Paraza’s motion to dismiss based upon Stand Your Ground immunity. On appeal, the State argued that law enforcement officers are not eligible to assert immunity pursuant to the Stand Your Ground law because they are already provided a defense pursuant to Fla. Stat. Ann. 776.05, which involves the justifiable use of force when making a lawful arrest. The Fourth District court held that a police officer making a lawful arrest may claim Stand Your Ground immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that law enforcement officers are eligible to assert Stand Your Ground immunity, even when the use of force occurred in the course of making a lawful arrest. View "State v. Peraza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the First District Court of Appeal holding that it was appropriate for an appellate court to review the entire evidentiary record to determine whether multiple convictions violate double jeopardy, holding that, consistent with State v. Shelley, 176 So. 3d 914 (Fla. 2015), to determine whether multiple convictions of solicitation of a minor, unlawful use of a two-way communications device, and traveling after solicitation of a minor are based upon the same conduct for purposes of double jeopardy, the reviewing court should consider only the charging document.Defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that they violated double jeopardy because the elements of solicitation of a minor and unlawful use of a two-way communications device were subsumed within the elements of traveling after solicitation. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant was convicted of all three counts. The First District affirmed after examining the entire record, concluding that there was no double jeopardy violation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the reviewing court should have considered only the charging document in determining whether Defendant’s convictions were based upon the same conduct for purposes of double jeopardy. View "Lee v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court approved the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in this case and held that release from a county jail after a defendant serves a sentence entirely in the county jail where the sentence would have required transfer to a Florida prison but for the accumulation of jail credit does not satisfy the language of Fla. Stat. 775.082(9)(a)1, which provides the definition of “prison releasee reoffender” (PRR).The portion of the statute at issue requires the defendant, within the three years preceding his commission of qualifying offense, to have been “released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor.” The Second District concluded that the language of the statute is not satisfied when a defendant is released from a county jail under the circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the language at issue does not include release from a county jail; and (2) therefore, commission of a PRR-qualifying offense within three years of release from jail, rather than prison, does not satisfy the requirements of section 775.082(9)(a)1. View "State v. Lewars" on Justia Law